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ABSTRACT
The Politics of Transformation: Nigeria, OPEC,
and the Multinational Corporations
(May 1984)
Isaac Chinedum Igweonwu, B.A., University of Kansas
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
M.P.A. Candidate, University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
Directed by Professor Eric Einhorn
The Politics of Transformation seeks to explore and critically
analyze the new politics and policies formulated, articulated
and adopted by Nigeria's ruling and political elites and partly
out of demand made by academic intellectuals including a handful of
influential too level bureaucrats who run the machinery of government.
Furthermore, the Politics of transformation examine through critical
analysis the Organization of Petroleum Exnorting Countries
1 (OPEC)
"quiet revolution" in the world of global oil, its impact on
the
global economy and most importantly on the dynamics of
international
relations. By focusing on the Doctrines of Sovereignty
and of
"Changing Circumstances," we explore and examine
specifically the
changing relationship between international oil
comoanies and
producer-governments within the frameworks of systems
analysis,
bargaining strategies and negotiation tactics.
The Politics of transformation therefore seeks to examine
for the purposes of restricting prevailing ideologies by looking
into the past while going beyond mere survival of that past, through
the creation of new forms and modes and the conscious presentation
of new demands based on a new era of national consciousness and
political management in a changing world.
In the Nigerian context, the politics of transformation gave
birth to indigenization of "Migerianization" of the economy,
membership into the OPEC and the transnationalization of the society.
Studied within the framework of systems analysis, objectives and
goals seem rather haphazardly and limitedly successful and dependent
on the alliance between domestic and state actors on the one hand,
and foreign interests on the other. The final outcome of this
interaction remains to be seen since structural arrangements
engendered by this process is not yet ossified. In the final
analysis, however, indigenous control of the economy seem the
goal of Nigerian planners.
With regards to OPEC, the quiet revolution sought not only
to defend the posted price of oil then, it represents the vision
and goals of a grouo of nations bound together for the accomplishment
of a stated goal. Consequently, the dynamics of global oil is not
only based on economic terms, but fundamentally politically in
nature. The multinational oil companies are on the defensive and
no amount of game theoretic calculations can come to their rescue
save a deliberate inter-government intrusion in the global oil
vi
ndustry. This study proceeds from that assumotion.
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INTRODUCTION
Two decades ago after nationalists proclaimed Nigeria as independ-
ent nation, the nation's confidence in her ability to remain so has
fallen to a low ebb. Despite the rapid economic and social 'development'
following independence, it dawned on Nigerian society that the cost of
this progress was a subtle form of dependence on external forces for
sustenance. External dependence, long a baneful instrument of global
capitalist arrangement, was deemed more sinister, systematically
exploitative and structurally manipulative than formal colonialism.
Nigeria, a former British colony, was a victim of 'neocolonialism'
deeply rooted in her historical past and sustained by the logic of
structurally integrated global economy. Like many other 'third world'
nations caught in this structural quagmire, Nigeria is struggling
for extrication. Fundamental to success in this struggle was the
necessity for change of policy as well as for choice of policy
instrument.
The choice of policy instrument dates back to the period
of independence, however, policy choice was distorted by lack of a
clear goal and clear perception of what the problem is and what change
is suppossed to achieve. Although indigenizing the economy became a
pivot around which the policy of change revolved, there was no
general agreement or consensus on how to achieve it. Inconsistency
and incoherence of policy marked the process of decision-making
during the civilian regime of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.
1
2Credit is generally given to the successive military regimes
of General Gowon and Olusegun Obasanjo (1967-1979) for successfully
formulating and implementing a consistent and coherent program
designed to 'nigerianize' the economy. Recognition also went to those
army of bureaucrats who made the program possible. With the advent
of the military leadership, the struggle for the control of
investments in the country entered a new stage. The hegemonic position
once held by foreign capital no longer exists. Now a gradual
transformation of this position in favor of the government is reached
mostly by political means. This struggle for supremacy and the
change in the balance of power engendered, how the government eventually
won and the impact of this on the nation is partly the subject matter
or general thesis of this work. Forming part of the thesis also is
the argument that the predominant posture of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) over the changing structure of
global oil industry is fundamentally political in nature making it
necessary for consumer governments participation in global oil
negotiations
.
We boldly advance systemic reasons which serve as a basis for
the argument that a government-to-government approach in negotiations
on matters relating to the international oil industry is indeed
necessary and in the long run inevitable. We argue also that the era
of industry negotiation with producer governments is approaching
anachronism due in part to the changing structure of the oil industry
occasioned by the politics of transformation sweeping through
producer nations of the 'third world.' The effects of this
3transformation is already underway leading to unprecendented 'unsettling
shift' in the international oil industry.
As a dramatic illustration of this unsettling shift, we give
examples of recent ' mega -mergers
' among oil majors pointing accurately
to the fact that oil wars which were largely fought in the oil
fields of Middle East and other third world producing regions
before the 1970s, now has been shifted to the home fronts of the
oil majors. A major reason for this shift - one which should be taken
seriously - is the widespread producer nation displacement of oil
companies from their traditional activities of 'upstream' as well as
'downstream' operations around the world. The oil crisis had indicated
the myth of the invulnerability of multinational oil corporations to
national sovereignty. In 1973 for instance, ninety three percent of
OPEC production or 27.9 million barrels per day went to oil majors
on a long term basis. By 1979/1980, this dropped to around fifty
percent of OPEC exports and forty two percent of world oil trade.
Stripped mostly of their concessionaire reserves around the
world, the major oil companies are gobbling each other through mega-
mergers. Recent examples are a tip of the iceberg in an economic
activity which promises more intense concentration than either the
steel industry or big automobile conglomerates. Slack demands,
depressed prices and declining reserves - all contributed to the
consuming desire of major oil companies to cannibalize each other
in order to achieve efficiency of production and control needed
reserves. Thus in February, 1984, Texaco completed its $10.1 billion
acquisition of Getty Oil Corporation, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group
4announced a $5.2 billion purchase of the thirty percent of the Shell
Oil Company that the Dutch Oil Group did not already own, and in March
of 1984, Mobil announced to have plans of buying out Superior Oil
for $5.65 billion. Standard Oil Company of California, (Chevron) made
a hasty move and bought the Gulf Oil Corporation for $13.2 billion,
allegedly the biggest price tag in merger history.
One observation should, however, be remarked in the recent
wave of oil mega-mergers: the big oil companies have begun to
'detect the whiff of death' and the only route out of the imminent
catastrophe is to retreat to home base, consolidate through merger
struggles what oil reserves remain in home territory and friendly
regions. The fight among the oil companies has just begun; it will
be a bitter one pitting the strong against the weak. We predict
that as the fight progresses, the smaller of 'independent' oil
companies will be swallowed, a high concentration of the oil industry
will ensue and government will be forced to intervene to restore
competition by directly negotiating with other producer governments
for access to crude production and sales.
Purpose
This study thus, is concerned with the new politics of trans-
formation as formulated and articulated by Nigeria's ruling and
political elites and partly out of the demands made by academic
intellectuals including a handful of influential top level bureaucrats
who run the machinery of the state. In addition, we examine through
critical analysis the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)
5'quiet revolution' in the' world of global oil, its impact on the
global economy, and most importantly, on the dynamics of international
relations. By focusing on the doctrines of sovereignty and doctrines
of 'changing circumstances,' we can explore and examine specifically
the changing relationship between international oil companies and
producer governments within the framework of bargaining strategies
and negotiation tactics and also within a political environment where
the necessity for change and choice is paramount and apparently define
the dynamics of international systems .international relations and
the law that govern them.
The politics of transformation therefore seeks to examine for
the purposes of restructuring prevailing ideologies by looking into
the past while going beyond mere survival of that past, through the
creation of new forms and modes and the conscious presentation of
new demands based on the satisfaction of the psychology of the new
Nigerian man of our times.
More concretely and specifically stated, the politics of
transformation ushered in a new era of national consciousness and
political management in a changing world. It took several forms and
can be understood within the framework of four fundamental systemic
transformations which include:
I. Indigenization or 'Nigerianization' of the economy.
II. Creation of the New Politics of Unity.
III. Changing structure of international oil industry and of
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
IV. The transnationalization of the society.
6These policies borne of experience and vision should be seen
in the context of change and 'progress'. None has exemplified an.d
captured the spirit of the times more than the indigenization of
the economy. Indigenization of the economy represents a milestone
and a major achievement in the onward march toward economic self-
determination. Propelled into force with the 1972 and, later revised
(1976-77) indigenization decrees, ' Nigerianization' of the economy
seeks to place a greater portion of economic control in the hands
of Nigerians while providing adequate incentives for foreign interests.
Concurrent to the policy of Nigerianization is a related policy
of transforming the 'classical dependent' state of the economy
into one of rapid industrialization. Although Nigeria has been
grouped among the ranks of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs)
or in Immanuel Wallersteins words ' semi -perphery ' such as Brazil,
Mexico, Iran and Hong Kong, the nation's industrialized base
remains weak, exposing a severe backwardness in manufacturing activity.
The import-substitution phase of the early 1960s, argues Terisa
Turner, should usefully be understood as 'accomodating' and complementing
foreign interest rather than as a serious effort at capital accumula-
tion and capitalist production (Terisa Turner and Peter Nore, "Oil
and Class Struggle, 1980). Present industrial policy is aimed among
other pursuits, to correct deficient capitalist production through
the creation of sectoral industrial bases such as iron and steel
industry, petrochemical and agro-allied industry.
Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Petroleum and
Exporting Countries (OPEC) extended the opportunity as well to use
7the activities of the organization in furtherance of stated goals.
OPEC was simultaneously undergoing profound transformation in terms of
philosophy and goals. Within this organization, the politics of
transformation represents the 'quiet revolution' inspired by the
perfidy of major international oil companies in oil negotiations with
producer governments. Gradual shift of producer governments positions
should thus not be seen as 'radical' but should be interpreted as a
sensible and historical response to 'forces of reaction', exploitation
and imperialism. It represents the ultimate desire, legitimized
and justified by lessons of history - past and present - for control
of a group of nations' economic and natural resources and finally
utilizing these resources as an effective tool for reshaping global
politics and for initiating the march towards a new international
economic order.
The lessons of history - past and present - as addressed in
this study concern economic as well as political and structural
debilitations associated with colonialism and neo-colonial ism.
The colonial authority through political subjugation and
sheer economic power had a monopoly over economic activity and the
processes of state capital accumulation. Private indigenous capital
accumulation was consequently minimal and even discouraged.
Marketing boards were set up by the colonial state to appropriate
'peasant surplus' which were eventually transferred to the colonial
state. The result was the underdevelopment of productive forces which
might have economically benefitted from this flight of capital to
the 'metropole'. Control over the network of capital enabled
8metropolitan interests to monopolize large scale commercial activity.
Commerce as distinct from productive industrialization was emphasized
by the colonial state thus underdeveloping the industrial process.
The rise of nationalism and the consequent shifts of power
within the Nigerian state after 1952 increased nationalist demands
for a share in the distributive trade and in the early 1970s for a
coherent plan for rapid industrial development. These demands weakened
the position of British commercial capital and later of foreign
capital in general and opened up opportunities for local enterpreneurs.
Local enterpreneurs, lacking finance capital and management
technology, were unable to compete effectively with foreign capital
which in the main continue its dominance over economic production
and commercial activities. Indigenization decrees of 1972, and later
1977, were designed to change this situation. These decrees,
promulgated by the federal military government, sought to transfer
control over economic activities from foreign interests to Nigerians.
The process by which this goal is sought has been gradual
but deliberate, one in which the advantage lay in the gradual trans-
formation of a stated position and goal, in which the opponent's
moves were utilized first to paralyze and then destroy him. It was
a game whose greatness derived from the skills of its moves as well
as from the inspiration of its origins. It was a game deemed vital
to the success or failure of Nigeria as a nation and she was set to
play it.
Nigeria, with an area of 356,667 square miles and with a
population estimated at between eighty to one hundred million
is
the most populous in Africa and potentially the wealthiest.
The
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vastness of its natural resources, particularly its oil reserves,
has made it one of the most economically powerful and perhaps the most
influential nation on the continent.
Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960 and later in
1963 gained the status of a republic, after a long spell of British
colonial rule. A military coup, led by a group of young Army Majors
in 1966, abolished civil rule, killing several top civilian leaders.
In 1967, after a prolonged political instability and turmoil,
accompanied by tumultous religious upheaval and tribal hatred, the
Ibo tribespeople from the defunct Eastern Region unsuccessfully sought
independence as Biafra. Ibo secession led to a bitter and costly civil
war, which lasted for two and one half years with an estimated one
million lives lost. The nation was thereafter under military rule - from
General Yakubu Gowon, a Sandhurst Military School graduate (Britain)
to General Olusegun Obasanjo - a period that lasted for thirteen years.
After the military interregnum, democracy was given a
chance when in 1979, the military handed over power to civil authority,
and under the watchful eyes of the army boys, elections were held.
A northerner, Alhaji Shehu Shagari , leading the National Party of
Nigeria (NPN), emerged victorious. A second term for Shagari, amidst
accusations of unfair electoral victory, rampant corruption, economic
instability, ushered in the nation's fifth military intervention since
1960. Major General Mohammed Buhart, forty ona, a career military
man, former oil commissioner and head of the State owned oil company
in the mid-1970s, describing the civilian regime as "inept and corrupt,"
took the reigns of government.
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Nigeria is rich in natural resources, particularly oil. It is
primarily an agricultural nation, however, it imports about $2 billion
worth of food every year. As a newly industrializing nation,
industrialization is proceeding rapidly. A member of OPEC, it depends
on petroleum exports for about ninety five percent of its foreign
exchange. World oil surplus, an ever increasing population, bad
management and squandermania have all contributed huge foreign debts and
unstable economy. Oil revenues, which were $22.4 billion in 1980,
slumped to $9.6 billion in 1982 and even further in 1983. Judging
from the continued slump in global oil demands, the financial situation
may get worse, aggravating the nation's balance of payment position.
Nigeria's foreign debt to banks around the world amounts to
about $9.2 billion, according to the Bank for International Settlements
in Basel, Switzerland. The total debt, however, is approaching $15.0
billion - moderate when compared to other developing nations,
particularly those of Latin America. It will take prudent economic
management and certainly a noticeable improvement in the sale of
crude oil for Nigeria to control its foreign debt. In pursuit of this,
the government wants an increase in the production quota set by OPEC
to two million barrels per day up from 1.3 million, the nation's
current limit.
With all these to battle, the new military government, as
with those that preceded it, are faced with a major task of redefining
national values and priorities, of creating the new Nigerian man
survivable under these conditions. Thus, the politics of transformation
is both psychological and historical; very much a product of our
11
times, of historical change and a matter of 'sensibility'. The
inevitability cf this change has been conditioned extensively by lesson?
of history and of concrete global experiences.
Methodology
A study of this nature requires that attention be paid to the
whole structure of the society and more specifically to its political
economy. Thus, within the theoretical framework of systems analysis,
games theory, decision-making theory, and dependency theory, the
political and economic fabric of the society as linked to global
economic system is examined for structural weaknesses or strengths.
We focus on systems analysis because I believe it is un-
questionably the most powerful and useful approach. The objectives
of development and goals of national actors can be determined more
easily if we take into account the anatomy of society, which is a
subject of systems analysis. Thus it would be useful to combine a
systems analysis approach with concepts of political economy based
on considerations of its most important components, namely productive
forces and production relations.
Systems analytic approach within a descriptive and critical
framework will, we believe, shed more light on the anatomy of society
by (1) exploring the system of economic and political relationships,
(2), the interests of actors, (3) power distribution and how actor
configuration and interactions affect objectives and goals of national
development and, (4) how in practical terms systemic processes are
translated into policy measures.
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We will as a matter of conceptual clarity and distinction shy
away from the more general and often ambiguous treatment of 'systems
theory' prevalent in the social sciences. Some of these treatments
can be readily identified. For example, Gabriel Almond's definition
of systems as that system of interaction which performs the functions
of integration and adaptation, or David Easton's 'authoritative
allocation of values for a society' or Karl Deutsch's 'ability to
respond effectively to demands' or on a more general level 'requisite
functions' or 'systems maintenance' and 'input-out' analysis.^
For the purposes of this study, definitions such as these
suffer one common conceptual defect: they are mechanistically
conceived, and having been borrowed from the 'hard' sciences such as
engineering and biological sciences are hurriedly translated into
social scientific tools of analysis with little success.
We argue instead that society cannot be conceived or under-
stood simply in mechanistic terms or as a machine with predictable
patterns of behavior, but as an organic entity: fluid, dynamic,
unpredictable and composed of system of human relationships and system
of wants which could only be satisfied within the context of production
and production relations. This view represents our definition of
systems analysis where society is organically viewed as a 'system.'
We do believe nevertheless, that social scientists can and should make
use of accepted hypothesis and models developed in the behavioral
and engineering sciences as long as this is done to enhance understanding.
Closely related to the theoretical insights of systems analysis,
we draw periodically from dependency and Marxist literature to
explain the major argument on development and how this role seeks to
resolve or in some instances exacerbate certain contradictions endemic
in the society. Thus the logic of this intervention should not be
seen as the promotion of the interests of a single class; rather it
should be seen and interpreted as the resolution of certain economic
and social forces. In the Nigerian context and indeed in most contexts,
this logic is inherently faulty. Why? We give reasons in the chapters
that follow.
Particular attention was paid to the nation's oil industry
and how it negotiates with international oil companies on matters
concerning petroleum. I use conceptually relevent materials from
games theory in attempts to deepen understanding of negotiation
strategies, strategic behavior and strategic interaction of the
various actors engaged in the global oil industry. The primary
concern here though, is the applicability of game theory to global
interaction. It should be pointed out early enough that although
game theoretic materials offered some thought-provoking insights
and analysis of the oil industry, no attempt was made at mathematical
'solutions' of specific games because it seems that game theory is
not relevant to solutions of competitive behavior involving more than
two players. Solutions would anyway be highly indeterminate due to
the highly political nature of global oil industry.
Interviews with several officials of the State-owned National
Oil Corporation (NNPC) was conducted in Lagos with the view of
understanding through content analysis how decisions are made and who
makes them, for whom and why? In this case, Graham Allison's bureau-
cratic and organizational models of decision-making process provided
an analytical framework. Bureaucratic wranglings" and bureaucratic
imperatives, it was found, dominate the decision process with the result
that policies arrived at were founded in consensus among the players.
Information materials of obvious consequence were picked up from the
British Petroleum Library in London; the Royal Dutch Shell Oil
Company Headquarters in Amsterdam, Holland and the Shell Development
Company in Houston, Texas.
Although research methodology relies heavily on systems
analysis, the imposition of descriptive and prescriptive technique
on the study generally seems obvious. Descriptive analysis throws
light on the subject matter and leaves open the possibility of studying
in details the great linkages between actors and between issues.
In addition, techniques such as these rescue areas which suffer
theoretical deficiencies.
For example, theoretical perspectives on Nigeria's political
economy are generally blurred. These have not been sharpely focused
because efforts have largely been directed toward particular actors,
issues and toward certain sectors of the economy. This study therefore
seeks to bring into clearer focus perspectives on Nigeria's political
economy while simultaneously recognizing the inevitable conceptual
difficulties which this entails. One major conceptual limitation is
the inadequate interpretation of the role of the state in national
development, and the functional limitations of the state in a
'mixed economy.' Economic analysis has given the role of the state in
national development a narrow interpretation with the result that
state intervention is seen in such terms like welfare, growth and
organ for expropriating generated surplus. Conflict of interest among
15
productive forces are thus hardly recognized. This study makes a
broad interpretation of the role of the state as an agent of national
development, as well as a powerful organization responsible for
resolution of economic and social forces.
Finally, a major methodological limitation on a study of this
type is the unreliability of data and certain information. We
accept the fact that numbers used may probably be wrong. This reflects
the widely held view that 'there is no accurate information about
Nigeria,' and some vital information may simply be unavailable.
Limitations grievious as these may hamper the quality of any serious
work.
For purposes of organization convenience, this study is
divided into five parts, each reflecting a block of issues which they
present and discuss. As an academic dissertation, it was necessary
to present a theoretical foundation of the issues which were subsequently
treated. In Part I, we examine the debate on multinational corporations
within the system of transnational relations and the 'changing'
nature of the nation-state. In addition, we employ models representative
of three prevailing schools of thought on political economy: liberalism,
Marxism (World system/dependency) and economic nationalism for
enquiry and explanation on transnational activities and response from
nation-state. Specifically, liberal thought attempt to understand why
multinational corporations go abroad, world system/dependency
approach examines the nature of the structural relationship between
actors in the international political and economic system and finally
economic nationalism describes the response from nation-states on
transnational behavior as they affect internal economic processes. As
case study on national response, we examine the role of Nigerian
National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and several indigenization decrees
designed to 'nigerianize' the economy. These models do not attempt to
offer comprehensive answers' to questions of transnational interactions
they do however assist us in understanding the issues.
Part II dwells on the oil companies
and producer-nation states. Theoretical models of OPEC behavior
was presented although emphasis was on political models. In addition,
negotiation strategies and institutional factors affecting the outcome
of negotiations are explored and analyzed. Part II also discusses the
state-owned Oil Corporation (NNPC) in the framework of the changing
structure of the global oil industry. Part III seeks to explain
the nature of the impact of transnational ism on Nigerian society by
examining several economic policies and programs instituted to take
advantage or be taken advantage of, by transnational ization process.
Part IV takes a broad, comprehensive view, through conclusion, of
what the politics of transformation is all about.
17
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Part I
CHAPTER I
THE STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The problem with social sciences and political science in
particular, is its inability to come to grips with issues which
face it both on methodological and theoretical levels. In the
study of international relations, the task has been compounded by
numerous approaches seeking attention, and rarely deviating from
what they profess. The practice of any profession depends upon the
knowledge which it's members profess. In international relations,
this knowledge has been in disarray for lack of coherence, consistency
and precision. The major task facing political scientists, and one
which demands immediate attention, is the need for coherent formula-
tions of alternative methods, theory and its application in a rapidly
changing world.
The search for a new paradigm for understanding global politics
occasioned a massive interest in the study of transnational relations.
Subsequently, less reliance is made upon the traditional values of
power politics. Currently, arguments rage on whether the power politics
theory (represented by the Realist School) which has dominated European
study of international relations since the peace treaties of Osnabruck
and Munster in 1648 and American study since 1945 is adequate for under-
standing the existing international system. As more and more events in
the international system seemed hard to comprehend and explain employing
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the power polities' approach, attempts were made to create comprehensive
alternative paradigms aimed at a holistic view of the international
system.
The Realist School assumes intev alia that states acting
"rationally" are the only actors whose behavior is of consequence for
international politics. Since this is so, therefore, states must be
interested mainly with gaining and maintaining power. However, recent
developments in the field of international relations have proved that
while states continue to be the main actors in the international system,
they are by no means the only significant actors.
The purpose of this chapter then is two-fold: the first is an
historical analysis of the rise of transnational relations, including
the contending perspectives and approaches to the study of it and
consequences of transnational processes on international relations.
The second purpose is a broad treatment of transnational corporations
on issues of economic growth and development in the so-called third
world. This is done by surveying the different approaches to economic
growth and development. Two major approaches deserve emphasis.
The first one is the "world-system/dependency" approach with its
emphasis on forces external to the nation-state. The second one is
the "modernization" approach. This approach places faith largely on
internal mechanisms for economic growth and development.
Treatment of these issues have never been devoid of emotional
attachment and content. While some observers think transnational
corporations are "engines of development," others proclaim blatantly
they are "agents of imperialism." On the whole, these judgments
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seem valid depending on the point of view of the judge, emphasis ought
to be laid on national context based on lessons derived from history
and supported by events. It is only fair to argue that transnational
corporations aid in global development as well as its impoverishment.
The issue is whether the benefits derived from them outweigh the costs
or vice-versa. This functional ambivalence, made worse by lack of
precise definition of "transnational ism, " gave impetus to the contending
perspectives on the roles played by transnational actors in international
pol itics
Contending Perspectives and Approaches
Understanding contending perspectives and approaches to the
study of transnational relations requires firstly that one understand
the role of the nation-state in contemporary international political
system, secondly, the limits to such roles imposed by forces within and
without it, and finally, the roles played by "new forces" in the
international system.
Considering the role of nation-states in contemporary international
system with regards to transnational relations, it is necessary to
distinguish between what the power politics or (Realist) theory thinks
this role should be, and those who subscribe to a theory of an inter-
dependent world. Although a brief mention of foundations upon which
power politics is based was made earlier in this chapter, it is
necessary to add that political realists assume that states are
coherent units and are dominant actors in world politics; that force
is a usable and effective instrument of policy coupled with the view
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that a "hierarchy" of issues of world politics in fact could be
arranged headed by questions of military security.
However defined, political realism assumes that in inter-
national politics, nations act in their interest defined in terms of
power, neglecting in the process concern with motives and the concern
with ideological preferences. 1 Thus subjectively defined, the
concept of power defys limit to its application because power has
no inherent limit. This is a central paradox to contemporary uses
of power: for power to have meaning, it must be limited, but power
by its definition has no inherent limit. Power in international
*
relations has always obeyed limits imposed on it be concrete
circumstances because the concern with motive or ideological
preferences which are always necessary for any international action
confronts countervailing balancing force. That power has limits
depending on specific issues finds ample support in history. Those
who recently dreamed of world power now despair of maintaining power
at home. Defeat in Vietnam, economic stagnation and chaos, the
debacle in Iran and countless other failures produce a mood of
pessimism in super power America.
The international dimensions of the current malaise in the
international system cannot be attributed solely to an American failure
of strength. The Soviet Union finds it currently difficult to feed
*
The definition of "power" in international relations suffers
from the multiplicity of meanings usually attached to it, and lacks
precise application. Power in this study is used in the context of an
actor's ability to influence others and the system within which they
act.
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its teeming masses, and several economic reforms aimed at controlling
economic activity prove largely a barren exercise. To confound issues,
the U.S.S.R. finds herself embarrassingly bogged down in Afghanistan
and Poland. These tragedies too cannot be attributed to a Soviet
failure of nerve. Rather, a bitter lesson, never before taught in
history was presented - that power, to have meaning, must be limited!
As more international events seemed hard to explain using
power politics theory and as the classic paradigm of interstate
politics proved inadequate as a framework for understanding the
international system, efforts were made to develop alternative
paradigms which would take into account:
1. The changing role of the nation-state in international politics
2. The impact of such change in international behavior
3. Emergence of "new forces" in international politics.
The changing role of the nation-state in international politics
can be fully understood through reference to its historical role. The
nation-state has traditionally been the focus of international politics.
The ideal type of international politics stresses two points: First,
the field of action of politics lies in the area between the nation-
states; second, the actors involves are states. However, international
politics of this sort have never existed purely in this form in the
history of international relations. It existed in approximation in
the period extending from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century
when the foreign policies of great powers participating in the
international system was made by a handful of individuals. Policies
were formulated in the name of the state, and their decisions mainly
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reaches as reactions to external events and demands. 2 Non-state
actors were either non-existent or their influence in international
system largely ignored.
International system based on the above assumption formed
the foundation of eighteenth and nineteenth century European inter-
national relations. A distinct feature of the nation-state during
this time was the legal recognition of sovereignty accorded them.
That sovereignty was an important ingredient in the dynamics of
international system was recognized and glorified in the writings of
great political philosophers as Hobbes, Jean Bodin, Hegel, among
others. Other international actors lacked sovereignty and thus were
deemed insignificant in international politics.
Historically, the nation-state has played discretely packaged
roles devoid of complex interrelations. Their main duty has been the
guarantee of "at least a measure of protection." The politically
basic unit is that which can afford its people protection and
3
security. This, in turn, depends on the defensibi 1 i ty of the unit.
Hence, the basis of nation-state system was "territoriality" of units
justified and legitimized by a sense of military preparedness,
"protectedness and impermeability." Nation-states became "hard shell"
units, recognized others as such and strove to maintain territorial
integrity and independence. Intense nationalism butressed by
extreme independence was a chief characteristic of the nation-state
system.
But instability and constant wars rendered the european
international system unworkable. This was so even with the Peace of
Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna resulting in the formation of
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alliances and counteral 1 iances aimed at a balance of power and
restoration of the status quo. Diplomacy was simple and straight
forward because the main actors were individuals acting on behalf of
their respective states. Great diplomats of the period in the persons
of Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand were able to reach a
negotiated settlement because they spoke the same language and the
art of diplomacy spared the complexities which characterized and
burden it today.
Restoration of the status quo sought by the various peace
treaties failed and the nation-state no longer played the dominant
part it once played in international politics as a result of competing
struggle between it and non-state actors. As the international system
moved from one crisis to the other, as it experienced wars and economic
upheavals, it gave way to forces of transformation which radically
changed the nature of nation state and its role in the system. Among
these forces are nuclear technology (mentioned earlier). In its far
reachinq implication, nuclear technology altered war and the nature of
it. Other forces include transnational ism with non-governmental (NGOs)
and multinational organizations as the most important actors; complex
interdependence of nations threatening national autonomy, and finally
the twin forces of integration and functional ism. Apparently,
aggregation of the above elements have threatened the nation-state as
a viable political unit.
Nevertheless, the "obsolescence" theory does not pretend to
predict the demise of the nation-state nor does it bear a premonition
for "state-centric" catastrophe, rather, it seeks to explain the
26
inadequacies of state centred framework in predicting international
behavior. Nation states however, retain essentially sovereign powers
which is, in the words of Stanley Hoffman, the "stuff" with which
international politics is made.
But the nineteenth century witnessed developments that fore-
shadowed a transition from sovereignty to "complex interdependence,"
from "impermeability" to penetrability." Permeability and penetrability
of national societies by transnational forces render them dependent
no matter how powerful a society is, because to understand the role
of power in situations of interdependence, "sensitivity" and
"vulnerability" of particular national societies have to be accounted
for.
4
Extreme nationalism and independence gave way to dependence
and interdependence; nations and statesmen began exploiting the
benefits of the situation because what was once thought as the self-
sufficient unit became dependent. As a matter of fact, the meaning and
function of this basic protective unit, the sovereign nation-state
became doubtful
.
The impact of change regarding the role of nation-states in
international behavior is a source of contention between those who
see it as minimal and those who proclaim openly its demise. For
instance, while attention is paid to the "inadequacy" of the "state-
5 6
centric" paradigm, and the emergence of transnational society,
the realists gracefully conceding the complexities of modern
international politics, think the stuff of politics remain within
the confines of interstate interaction.
This assumption sets them apart from transnational theorists
who envision world politics as a complex web of political and economic
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interdependence. Henry Kissinger, though deeply rooted in classical
theory, has stated that the "traditional agenda of international
affairs
- balance of power, security of nations, no longer define
our perils or possibilities.... Now we are entering into a new era.
The world has become interdependent in economics, in communication, in
human aspirations.^
Finally, recent studies in transnational relations frequently
assert that the concept of sovereignty is about to become obsolete.
We are undergoing, in the words of Robert Strausz-Hupe, a "systemic
revolution." Just as the medieval church-state was destined to pass,
the nation-state system is in turn bound to yield to a different form
* 8
of organization.
This prognosis on the future of nation-states seems very
premature. As part of this study, I reject it. Although we duly
note the changing role of the nation-state in a world of complex-
interdependence, and the emergence of "new forces " in international
politics introducing changes in international behavior, it seems Nye
and Keohane's "world politics" paradigm captures the essence of a
world in transition and therefore offers a more useful analytical
tool and framework within which to study and understand international
politics. This study follows this tradition. However, we cannot arrive
at a conclusion until a thorough analysis of what transnational ism
is and what role they play in international politics is carried out.
Transnational ism
Transnational theory presupposes the existence of a transnational
society, a "global village" which can be defined as a system of inter-
action in specific issues between societal actors in different systems
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taking into account the interdependent nature of global relations.
Within each national system, policies of interactions are decided upon
by non-governmental elites and to a lesser degree by governmental actors.
These policies are pursued directly by social, economic and political
forces in the participating societies. The process of arriving at
decisions usually escape direct policy making organs of various states
involved with the result that state's policy is sometimes undermined,
rendered chaotic and even threatened.
A general theme running through transnational literature
foresees the gradual erosion of the nation-state as a coherent
political unit. Foremost among the proponents of a transnational
society are Raymond Aron, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, Arnold
Wolfers, Karl Kaiser whose general ideas predicate on a global
society linked or intertwined by complex interdependence. This
assumption follows from the fact that a transnational society can
exist between geographically separate societies and that it must be
understood functionally. This means that the society is "circumscribed
by the issue areas" which are the object of transnational interaction.
The dominance of nation-states in global affairs has never
been so menancingly challenged. As Karl Kaiser has correctly pointed
out, the reality of international politics has never totally
9
corresponded to the model of exlusive state-to-state interaction.
Other important actors have always been part of the international
system. For example, an influential international organization like
the Roman Catholic Church has its own territorial basis and pursues
independent foreign policies. Today, international "terrorist"
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organizations like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the
Red Brigade in Italy, though lacking autonomous territorial basis,
on occasion conduct their own foreign policies.
Contemporary international politics strive to undermine the
primary role played by nation-states because of the struggle between it
and other global actors. These actors seek to secure as many or as
much of their preferences on various issues, relying on a variety of
means. This is possible only because international and domestic politics
are interconnected and affect each other significantly. 10
Therefore, transnational i sm can hardly exist or even operate
legitimately in a global arena "dominated solely by nation-states" if
attempts are not made at functional separation of "issue-areas."
We cannot claim for instance that transnational actors such as multi-
national corporations are participants in transnational games or
activities unless we differentiate them into functional areas such as
international management and economics, bureaucratization, the
politics of decision-making and so on. Differentiation according to
issue areas creates the analytic framework necessary to study and
explain likely differences between the manifestations and between the
political consequences of transnational relations in various issues.
Secondly, in a world that is increasingly multidimensional and complex,
instruments of analysis must be refined accordingly. Finally, the
restriction of the concept of transnational society to issue areas
should make it easier to examine the "prerequisite" for any trans-
national interaction.
Although transnational interactions have aroused considerable
interest in many quarters, and are subjects of intense analysis,
. 30
nevertheless, transnational relations remain a terra incognita.*
Despite a plethora of definitions and writings, there remains much that
we do not know about transnational actors. Indeed, the nature of trans-
national interactions have been confusing and eludes a common, precise
interpretation. For example, Nye and Keohane argue that transnational
relations include the activities of transnational organizations, except
within their home states, and across state boundaries in which at least
one of the participants is not the agent of a government or an inter-
governmental organization. 11 The phrase "except within their home states"
fails to take into account the fact that most transnational organizations
also operate within their home states. Obviously, it sounds
ridiculous for one to suggest that Exxon corporation (which is a
transnational actor) or Royal Dutch Shell or Lockheed Corporation do not
operate within their home bases!
Nye and Keohane' s contention, however, is neither that trans-
nationals are new nor that they supersede interstate politics but that
they significantly affect interstate politics by altering and modifying
the choices open to nations and statesmen and the costs or consequences
to expect from adopting alternative sources of action.
A more sophisticated definition was offered by Samuel Huntington.
According to him, a distinctive characteristic of the transnational
organization is its broader-than-national persDective with resDect
to the pursuit of highly specialized objectives through a central
1
2
optimizing strategy across national boundaries. Professor Huntington
*The obscure and intractable nature of transnational relations
renders them difficult for a framework of analysis. On what basis
should an interaction be seen as transnational? What are the criteria
for definition? These are questions that need answering in concrete terms.
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then added that a transnational organization has its own interest which
inheres in the organization and its function, which may or may not be
closely related to the interest of national groups. For example, in
the United States, there are far reaching arguments against "multinational
corporations" policies and their effect on American labor. Organized
labor has been far more critical of these policies than any other group.
According to other observers, the study of transnational
relations encompasses the study of international relations. It focuses
on interactions among non-governmental entities as well as relations
among states and between states and non-governmental entities. 13
These definitions do not deny the fact that the major actors in
international politics remain the nation-state, but they seek to modify
such views by taking into account the role played by other non-state
actors with the primary purpose of enriching the study of understanding
of international behavior.
This study is particularly interested in transnational
corporations and lays emphasis on transnational oil corDorations
.
Transnational Corporations*
The spectacular and phenomenal rise of transnational corporations
in recent years has been a polemic and a subject of intense interest.
Primarily of American origin, these giant corporations have spread to
Europe and Japan and surprisingly to a handful of "emerging" nations.
This is the official U.N. designation. Other terms include
Multinational Corporation (MNC), "Cosmocorp", Multinational
Enterprises (MNE), global corporation, megafirm, supranational
corporation, international corporations and world company.
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In the simplest form, a transnational corporation is any
corporation in which ownership, management, production and sales activity
extend over more than one national jurisdiction, but with a centrally
located decision making headquarters. Essentially the transnational
corporation invests in several countries in order to obtain access to
a foreign market, to secure foreign sources of raw material, or supply
and to take advantage of lower cost of production or lower taxes.
The fact to bear in mind is that whenever possible and when it fits
policy, investments usually are direct. Direct investment is the
establishment of a foreign branch or subsidiary or the takeover by a
foreign firm. Whatever form it takes, the goal of the investment is
to have managerial control of a production unit or units in a
foreign country.
Most important of all, the "parent" or headquarters operates
the whole enterprise in terms of a coordinted global strategy. Every
aspect of the operation: production, purchasing, marketing, research,
etc., are organized and managed by the parent in order to achieve its
long-term goal of corporate growth. This power emanates from the
corporation's "unique" capacity to employ finance capital, technology and
highly specialized managerial knowledge to integrate production on a
14
world wide scale.
This preliminary definition of transnational corporation does
not foreshadow the fact that formidable intellectual problems arise
when serious analysis is done on issues raised by the acitivities of
these corporations. Most of these issues are contentions and no
consensus exists regarding foreign investments and their implications
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for national political economies. The absence of consensus derives
largely from the fact that the phenomenon under investigation enjoys
wide and multiple meanings and interpretation; and therein lies the
intellectual crisis.
Transnational corporation is designated in some quarters as
"key instruments for maximizing world welfare," others see it as
"dangerous agents of imperialism." The latter notion was undoubtedly
conceived by Marxists. To quote Lenin: "Imperialism is capitalism in
that phase of its development in which the domination of monopolies
and finance-capital has established itself; in which the export of
capital has acquired very great importance; in which the division
of the world among international trusts has begun." 15 Lenin's
definition of imperialism however seems unsatisfactory because it
failes to account why non-capitalist nations such as Russia engage in
imperialist adventures around the world.
Richard E. Ells defines "multinational" corporations as a
cross-border or transnational business organization or aggregate of
organizations that is characterized mainly by the disposal of its
managerial centers among several nations for purposes of overcoming the
barriers at the political frontiers of states. 16 Whether they are
agents of imperialism or engines of economic growth depend on the part
MNCs play in concrete historical situations and of course on their
activities in specific countries. This study argues and submits that
on balance, MNCs are servants of imperialism.
Transnational corporation is only one part of the practical
answer to the problem of a viable world political economy. It does not
assume to have ready-made answers to global problems, but its emergence
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is a clear response to new demands. The demands are global in their
reach, hence the actors are huge and global in their operations. But
in reality these corporations in their present form and dimension are
products of the international economic system within which they operate.
Their basic strategy evolves in response to the existing world
situation as well as to policies at national level. 17
Why Do Corporations Go Abroad?
Transnational corporations go abroad for the benefits of world
production. Production on a global scale is thought to be more
efficient by using the factors of production where they are cheapest
and in this process, contribute to the economic growth of host countries,
strengthening their balance of payments and raising their employment. 18
These factors of production are numerous and the most frequently
mentioned are the following:
1) Location and access to raw materials
2) Foreign trade barriers
3) Favorable tax laws
4) Currency controls
5) Cost differences between foreign and domestic production
6) A "combination of human skill."
These factors, however, do not explain adequately reasons why a
good number of corporations go abroad. In order to understand better,
it is necessary to turn to the theoretical work carried out by
several economists and political scientists who have written on
transnational corporations. In doing so, examination of the contending
perspectives is done.
35
There are at least two contending economic perspectives or models
and four political models. The economic models include:
1) Economic and Technological lead position
2) "Public Policy" position
The four political models are:
1) Sovereignty-at-bay thesis
2) Global Reach thesis
3) The Imperialist argument and
4) The Mercantilist position
The Economic and Technological Lead Position
This position rests on the assumption that transnational corpora-
tions and direct investment abroad are products of the international
economic system within which they operate, and hence "necessary"
consequences of contemporary economic and technological developments.
First, direct investment is a response to the shrinkage of the world
due to technological advances in transporation and communication.
Second, direct investment is a response to the rise of economic
protectionism, i.e., the protection of domestic markets.
As stated earlier, transnational corporations are unique
American creations. These corporations tend to be large, are global
in scope and seek largely to exploit global resources where they are
cheapest. Richard J. Barber argues that American corporations, in
shifting production abroad and implementing a policy of supplying
foreign markets from overseas subsidiaries, shrewdly use their
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preponderant resources to gain dominant positions abroad roughly
equivalent to those they occupy at home. 19
Most transnational corporations tend to be large oligopolies.
Thus they enter or penetrate foreign markets because they have a
monopolistic advantage of factors of production over lesser competitors.
These advantages may be one of several factors such as technological
lead and superiority, managerial and financial expertise or better
working arrangements with a host government. But, in general, monopoly
advantage rests mostly on oligopolistic arrangements among corporations. 20
Moreover, monopoly advantage is manifest where there is a high
degree of market concentration. Frequently, these corporations are
dominant producers in the foreign market, thus their activities could
be described as "aggressive behavior" and is primarily a phenomenon
associated with oligopoly and market concentration. 21
But the theory of international oligopoly does not explain why
a corporation seeks to serve a particular market or sell particular
products through the establishment of a local subsidiary rather than
through exporting or licensing. The "Product cycle model" developed
by Raymon Vernon explains. Essentially, the product-cycle theory
identifies three phases in the development of a product: (a) the
introductory phase; (b) the maturing phase; (c) the standardization
22
phase. The underlying determining factor in product cycle process
is the supremacy and availability of particular technologies which
are suited to particular types of production. Diffusion of these
technologies erode the corporate powers and technology lead of those
corporations which first invented them. Therefore, if the American
corporation (usually identified with these inventions) is to
maintain its lead and profits on its investments, it is argued they
?
must either establish foreign branches or subsidiaries or else sell
its licence to a foreign corporation.
Foreign direct investment, understood in the above terms, are
therefore, highly defensive in nature. It is a commercial game where
the action of one corporation, and the nature of a particular market
largely determines the decisions of another. Moreover, individual
corporations are likely to consider foreign investments as important
forestalling tactics to cut off market preemption by others. 23
Another economic theory which seeks to explain why corporations
go abroad is the so-called "organic" theory of investment. According
to the organic theory, the fundamental motive of the corporation is
survival and under conditions of oligopolistic competition, the one
pre-condition for survival is continued growth. 24 Continued growth
can be guaranteed only by an increasing share of the market. This
law of corporate survival in an oligopolistic market has been put
precisely well by Charles Kindleberger: "Direct investment is tied
to markets. If markets grow, the firm must grow... If the firms stops
25growing, it dies." Direct foreign investment is not only tied to
the overseas market, it is also a direct result of national policies.
The "Public Policy" Position
This second explanation is based on an entirely different set
of assumptions. Whereas the first position sees transnational
corporations as the response to economic and technological forces, the
second position regards transnational corporations as a product of
national policies, particularly tax laws and antitrust laws which
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encourage foreign rather than domestic investment. 26 Foreign direct
investment largely, therefore, is a mechanism whereby corporations
seek to enhance their own growth and profits at the behest and
assistance of their government. Tax avoidance and the minimization of
tax liabilities are a critical factor in corporate strategy and the
decision to invest abroad. For example, American tax laws intentionally
encourage oligopoly and the pursuit of foreign investment as a growth
strategy. A country which prides itself on the principles of
"free enterprise" and competition, encouraging oligopoly, formulating
tax laws which give impetus to investment abroad, places her in a highly
anomalous position. This contradiction which underlies U.S. foreign
investment policies does not explain why oligopolistic corporations
are allowed to operate abroad and not at home. Such policies are
based on economic as well as on political grounds.
The Political Models
(1) Sovereignty at Bay thesis.
This thesis argues that transnational corporations have become
dominant over all nation states. Developed by Professor Vernon,
sovereignty-at-bay thesis further argues that "sovereign states are
27 •feeling naked." This is so because the great size,
-the sheer
financial strength and the superior technology and managerial organization
of vast transnational enterprises set them beyond the effective
control of individual nation-states.
Obviously, sovereignty-at-bay thesis is largely based on an
underestimation of the power of national sovereignty and on exaggeration
of the powers of corporations. The growth of transnational corporations
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has coincided with a period of rapid global development - attainment
of independence and nationalism, growth in the number of nation-states
and their importance, and the necessity of economic interdependence.
Transnational corporations have subsequently fitted perfectly this role
of forging and promoting economic interdependence among nations. However,
in contrast to the powerlessness of nation-states, 28 and in the event
of any dispute, it must be apparent to all concerned that the sovereign
power of government is paramount. In Chapter 3 of Part I, I argue that
despite the powers of transnational corporations, the nation-state
remains a supvema potestatis.
(2) Global Reach Interpretation
The position of this school is much like that of sovereignty-at-
bay thesis. Global Reach posits that the structural transformation of
the world economy through the globalization of Big Business is under-
mining the power of the nation state to maintain economic and political
stability within its territory. Global Reach thesis bestirs contro-
versy for it overlooks also the powers that all governments have -
soverei gnty
.
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(3) The Neoimperial ist Position
Neoimperial ist school argues that transnational companies,
aided by their respective governments, go abroad in order to acquire,
maintain and protect access to needed raw materials and foreign
markets. Using this position, I argue in Part III, Chapter 2 (as I
did in Chapter I) that transnational oil companies go abroad
most importantly to secure access to resources and hence supply of
these resources to their global market.
(4) Neomercantilist Interpretation
This school sees the nation state as a unitary actor and
assumes that governments use the activities of businesses abroad to
advance the interest of the states. 31 Such interests are advanced by
manipulating economic arrangements whether or not this is at the expense
of others.
Transnational Corporations and Developing Nations
The debate over the desirability of transnational corporations
in the development of the "third world" rages on. Whether or not
transnational enterprises result in a net gain over time to the
society concerned is a question of considerable interest and one that
has been the topic of intense controversy for several decades.
There are several reasons why transnational corporations operate
abroad, some of which I gave on earlier pages of this background study
However, the most important reason and indeed a reason behind any
business enterprise is that of profit. Transnational corporations go
abroad because of profit. The desire to maximize this profit globally
by combining factors of production wherever they are cheapest and
most efficient to do so led to what Lester Brown calls the
"internationalization of production." Hence production of goods and
services is "international" when it combines factors of production from
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more than one country.
Traditionally, the third world has provided the metropolitan
governments as well as transnational corporations with a vast and
veritable source of raw materials. The colonial system provided an
automatic mechanism by which the metropolitan government had or
41
obtained preferential access to necessary raw materials.* Preferential
access was partially closed with the dawn of independence and sub-
sequently nationalism. Independent third world countries asserted
their right to dispose of their natural resources the way they saw fit.
Commercial arbitration, no matter how exploiting and disadvantageous,
was more appealing and hence transnational corporations filled the role
created deliberately by the metropolitan government, because
colonization was an international extension of domestic self-
sufficiency and its effectiveness depended upon the ability of the
home governments to get colonial companies to act in accordance with
3d
its desires.
Preferential access to raw materials and the need for commercial
dominance partially explain why transnational corporations engage in
business in the third world. It was more of a managerial challenge
to them. The resources of the third world nations including the
raw materials and cheap labor, as well as the potential customer's
represented by their "expanding middle class" were crucial to the plans
35
of the global corporations. On the part of third world governments
eager for rapid industrial and economic growth, the necessity for
permitting foreign investment into their country sometimes becomes
compel 1 ing.
It is a common knowledge that several third world countries
rich in natural resources simply do not have the financial, managerial
and the technological base for exploiting these resources. Therefore,
*
I touched on these issues in the opening chapters of this
study. For more on this, see consessions under the Colonial
system and under periods of commercial dominance, pp. 2-13.
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in order to tap a potential resource, these nations have resorted to
either one or all of the following basic methods:
1) Invite foreign concessionaires to form local subsidiaries and
thereby supply management and technology, capital and markets;
2) Undertake joint ventures in which foreign investors supply
management and technology and markets as well as a portion of
the capital - with the remaining capital furnished by the
host country;
3) Institute management contracts whereby experienced foreign
corporations offer management and technology only, and the
host supplies the capital and tries to market the product;
4) Do without foreign participation entirely and furnish management
and technology, capital and markets itself. 36
When third world nations choose either options (1) or (2) or (3),
the remaining problem often becomes one of implementation. However, it
is necessary also to recognize that there are bound to be conflicting
demands and divergencies between the developing nation and the foreign
investor. The government controls the conditions under which rights
and concessions are awarded to exploit the country's natural wealth.
The corporation owns or controls capital, technology and expertise.
The government recognizes that there is a benefit derived from
the productive factors controlled by foreign investors - employment
and hence income to its people, appropriate technology or "technology
of choice," and revenue to the state. There is also a recognition of
cost involved. And from its side, the company sees it as giving up
productive factors as a cost in terms of foregone opportunities to
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use scarce capital, technology, and expertise in alternative ventures.
Each actor in this case is bent on achieving or winning the maximum
benefit in which the perceived benefit outweigns costs.
The main contention, then, of foreign investment is who gets
what and at what cost. Such contentions feature prominently in most
negotiations between foreign investors and third world governments.
Precisely put, the question is - what will be the cost-to-benefit
(or conversely, the benefit-to-cost) ratio that is simultaneously
acceptable to each agent? Indeed, each actor theoretically wishes to
obtain the most of maximum units of benefits for a given unit of cost.
According to a study done by Robert L. Curry, Jr. and Donald Rothchild
on bargaining between African governments and multination companies,
the ratio that emerges is strongly influenced by the relative strength
of each agent's impatience and demand intensity. 37
Most third world governments are impatient when it comes to
negotiating with transnational corporations and this is likely to
affect the government's ability to effectively conclude a transaction.
The competitive bidding for transnational corporations among third
world countries defeats the need for a closer scrutiny of specific
business transactions. However, there are a few developing countries
which are not ready to accept foreign investment in just any form.
The following statement, which forms part of the Charter of Algiers,
confirms this position:
"Private investment should be of permanent benefit to the
host developing country. Subject to nationally-defined
priorities and within the framework of national development
plans." 38
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Libya provides a classic example of a developing nation which is not
ready for investments at any cost,* however, others like Liberia
apparently accept foreign investments with little or no strings attached.
For example, in the late 1940s, Republican Steel began to mine ore with
a concession that included no income tax, no control over transfer
prices for the output and only a small royalty per ton. These concessions
were subsequently renegotiated. 39
It is necessary and important to point out that foreign invest-
ment takes place between two fundamentally assymetrical actors - host
governments and transnational corporations. The imputation of assymetry
depends considerably on how one judges the strengths of each actor.
Is the host government more powerful because it possesses "sovereignty"
over its resources?; or is the transnational corporation more powerful
since it controls the technology, capital and management know-how
necessary for productive enterprise? These questions can only be
answered in relation to particular cases.
However, a general assumption is that most developing nations
are "institutionally weak" and hence unable or incapable of dealing
effectively with foreign investors. As Richard Barnet and Ronald
Muller observed, the lack of bargaining power of "underdeveloped"
countries is due to three major institutional weaknesses. The first
they argue is "antiquated governmental structures." National laws,
according to this argument, are inadequate for collecting taxes,
controlling foreign business, or preventing the drain of capital. A
In 1970 the Libyan government started negotiations with the oil
companies in the country for a higher posted price. When the companies
resisted (Occidental, Hunt) Libya ordered production cuts and
nationalized portions of several oil companies.
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second source of institutional weakness is lack of strong labor
movement. A third source that explains why global corporation is
able to exert "such strong power in underdeveloped countries" is the
lack of ineffective competition from local business. 40
The first argument originating from "antiquated government
structure" is indeed very tenuous. State intervention in national
economies is not new; certainly not to most "developing" nations.
However, pitting the overwhelming corporate power of transnational
corporations against those of the state where both state and local
private capitalist enterprise are weak is an ineffective, frustrating
and often barren exercise. Nevertheless, host governments reserve
the sovereign right either to indigenize or outrightly nationalize
foreign-owned investments, because "in fact a sovereign state, however
small, is more powerful than the multinational corporation doing
business in it." 4 ^
The second argument seems credible. Host governments have
always provided "cheap labor" to work in the manufacturing and
extractive industries. Over the years, labor in their negotiations
with management has been unable to articulate their desires and needs.
This situation is true to most developing countries. But this is not
to say that labor in these countries remains weak. For example,
labor unions in Nigeria are becoming stronger, wresting concessions
from management through government policies. Foreign corporations
engaged in the development of petroleum resources are expected to
provide the requisite technology as well as to train and develop
Nigerian staff for all positions in the companies and for all types
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of operations in the petroleum industry.
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Perhaps the most important argument of the three is the lack of
competition from local enterprises. Local business has neither the
necessary capital nor the advanced technology to compete effectively
with transnational corporations in most extractive and manufacturing
sectors of the economy. But when these factors of production
surprisingly generate locally, there usually is an economic dysfunction
because the local economy is unevenly developed. In order to combat
certain shortages and structural dysfunction, attempts are not made at
remedying the problem at the source, rather a recourse to importation
of manufactured goods (where necessary is made) thus perpetuating
dependence.
For example, in Nigeria, most liberal economic strategies
have been attempted to hasten industrialization, especially since the
late fifties. Generous tax concessions for "pioneer industries" have
been decreed, relief from import duty for capital goods and raw
materials have been granted, and industrial estates, facilities, and
loan capital have been provided by the Government. 43 Despite all
these supports, there is widespread feeling of failure among concerned
segments of the country. This is largely so because of the alliance
between the local and foreign investor which neither creates the
necessary structural linkages within the economy nor would see local
initiatives backed by the government succeed. Moreover, the dependent
nature of the economy cries out for local initiatives because "all our
power plants, military hardware and ammunition, transport machinery,
railway equipment, iron and steel products, electrical and electronic
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goods and many consumer goods are. .. imported. " It can hardly be
*Detailed analysis of this alliance is made in Part IV, Chapter I
of this study.
otherwise since foreign (especially trading) corporations controlled
the bulk of the modern economy. The dominance of foreign capital and
interest over Nigeria's economy45 is also experienced by most other
developing nations, eliciting or begging the question of whether such
interests are "machinery for growth and development," or "agents of
imperial ism?"
Transnational Corporations and Development
The role of foreign private investment in development is
acknowledged in the International Development Strategy for the Second
United Nations Development Decade. 46 In the effort to reduce the gap
between the rich and poor nations, the General Assembly in December of
1961 took a "historic" step towards coordinating the activities of
governments and international organizations. Towards the goal, the
1960s was declared as the United Nations Development Decade; however
concrete achievements of the decade fell short of expectations. Although
it recommended that industrialist nations help developing countries
in achieving by the end of 1960s an annual growth rate of five percent,
and although it urged the former to move towards allocating one percent
of their national incomes to the developing world, this goal was never
reached. Subsequent target was changed to one percent of GNP of
industrialized world, but this also has been achieved only by a few
developed nations.
The plans and targets of a development decade, unlike an
international treaty, are not legally binding on governments even on
those who can afford it. Thus the United States of America donates
less than one percent of its GNP to developing world and programs.
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Targets and plans of a development decade represent in
principle a "consensus on what governments believe to be the most
appropriate course of action" for the decade ahead in matters such as
the promotion of economic and social advancement of all peoples. Toward
this end, a "shared responsibility" by nations throughout the
world is implied and has given birth to resolutions such as the
establishment of the New International Economic Order in 1974 by the
U.N. General Assembly. Designed to provide developing countries with a
larger share of the benefits from global economic growth this new
economic order to date has achieved but little. The Third Development
Decade of the 1980s took cognizance of this shortfall, and one of the
major tasks before the committee preparing the International Development
Strategy for the 1980s has been to "set goals for structural and
institutional changes in the world economy."
The implications of United Nations Development Decade therefore,
is that it has cast the U.N. in the role of a casuis sui generis, a
champion advocate of bridging the gap between rich and poor nations
and of encouraging international organizations such as the multinational
corporations for exploiting investment opportunities mutually beneficial
to them and the third worlds. Towards this end, the United Nations
has extensively engaged in constructive arrangements whereby investors
and governments can fruitfully agree and cooperate as regards the
general conditions of foreign private investment. These efforts
have not been on the whole successful both to the governments who
receive investments and the multinational corporations who seek
investment outlets because there are few areas of convergence. In
general terms, however, the gap between the rich and poor nations - a
gap which the U.N. seeks to narrow, keeps widening - a result perhaps
of the activities and product of foreign private investment?
Traditional theory holds that foreign private investment
contributes positively to development. 47 It is also assumed that
these investments carry with them advantages such as capital,
technology, management and marketing skills to those societies in need
of them. Furthermore, deriving from these factors of production, jobs
are created, additional funds go to governments tax revenues, which
can be used for further development. The chronic balance of payment
constraints, long a major fiscal problem in developing countries, are
eased by the infusion of foreign capital. Developing nations undoubtedly
may benefit extensively from foreign investment, however, they also
express concerns on the effect of these on the economy as a whole.
Indeed, there is no concensus what effect multinationals have on
these countries' interests - whether foreign investment stimulates
desirable development or simply exploits. 48 It is clear, though,
that these corporations are an integral part of the expansion of
capital on a global scale, that they are merchants of the most ad-
vanced technology, but also the purveyors of overpriced obsolete
equipment; they are rapacious exploiters of raw material s and labor,
but also the major agents of profit repatriation and resource outflow.
As the Decade of Development draws to an end, and despite
dramatic economic growth in a few poor countries, it has become
abundantly clear that the gap between rich and poor throughout the
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world was widening. It became evident that development strategies
pursued by "global corporations" contributed more to the worsening
of world poverty, unemployment and inequality than to their solution.
Global ills became exacerbated because of and due primarily to
the dismal fact that global corporations and developing countries have
different, if not conflicting, interests and needs, arising in part
from the strategy of transnational corporations creating conducive
global economic environment from which profit could be maximized
regardless of who gets hurt.
In recent years, such corporate strategies and its contribution
to the development of poor countries has been challenged. 50
According to opponents, multinationals take out of developing countries
more than they put in, and thus, repatriation of earnings usually
exceed infusions of new foreign capital hence undermining balance-of-
payments. Unemployment is increased because capital intensive
technology most suited to advanced developed economies is introduced
rather than labor-intensive technology thought to be more appropriate
for developing countries. In addition, opponents argue, these
corporations promoted unequal income distribution, because local elites
strengthen their positions through alliances with foreign investors.
There is therefore an increasing awareness among most developing
third world countries that the transnational corporation (with its limited
benefits) does not hold substantial answers to the question of national
economic development and growth. Developing countries have found it
necessary to adopt various development strategies and since
discussion of these strategies to economic growth and development are
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available elsewhere, my attention is confined to a brief sketch
of the key issues.
Two broad approaches to economic growth and development in the
third world exist. The first one is the "world-system/dependency"
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approach with emphasis on forces external to the nation-state. The
second is the "modernization" approach emphasizing on internal
mechanisms. These approaches have been analyzed in the quantitative
as well as non-quantatiti ve comparative literature52 as providing
two competing hypothesis about the' impact of foreign investment on
economic growth.
First, following the work of Baran (1957), Frank (1967),
Galtung (1973), Emmanuel A. (1972) and others, dependency approach
is generally taken to imply that foreign investment in effect
depresses growth. The core-periphery relationship53 is considered
exploitative, in that profits are transferred back to the core rather
than reinvested in the periphery; economic dependency thereby
contributes to the underdevelopment of the periphery. At the same
times, the external orientation of periphery economies encouraged by
foreign investment is said to generate internal distortions 54 and
contradictions that retard growth. This is a result of "international
division of labor" and what Galtung has described as the "penetration"
and "fragmentation" of periphery economies by the metropolis. Moreover,
Galtung argues that exports of "semi -processed" goods from the
developing countries suffer what he calls "blocking mechanisms" in the
hands of the developed. This is akin to Emmanual Aghirri's "unequal
exchange" arising from the "imperialism of trade" when "hidden" transfer
of resources takes place when rich and poor nations trade together.
The difference in wage rates between them is the key factor in this
process of unequal exchange. Growth and development is therefore
slower, more a response to global economic policies, than otherwise
might be in the developing countries.
T U
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In sharp contrast, the modernization approach, implies that
foreign investment promotes growth by providing external capital, which
either substitutes for or supplements local capital. It is the
presence rather than the origin of capital that is considered important.
Verification of results on these two approaches are mixed.
There has been no empirically verifiable evidence or otherwise
available which points to issues of economic growth and development and
why either approach should provide a useful instrument toward growth.
The selection of either approach depends largely on a nation's historical
experience. For example, in a case study survey .entitled "Two Routes
to El Dorado," and written by John Grimond, the choice of development
path chosen by Kenya and Tanzania was made in "pursuit of a clear
goal
- the transformation of their country from imperial adventure
playgrounds into modern states. But, though they share this goal, they
do not share a strategy for reaching it." 55
Whether transnational corporations are "agents of imperialism"
depends to a large extent on concrete national circumstances and
experience derived from history. This judgment must be made taking
into account the overwhelming powers of corporations to conduct
autonomous strategies which are largely independent of national
jurisdiction, and the ethical predicament of accountability or lack of
it thereof to sovereign nations.
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CHAPTER II
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
The response to transnational corporations is predicated on the
fact that they can be "at once effective instruments of development and
sources of tensions of conflicts" arising from their global activities.
In order to comprehend this ambivalent role and the nature of trans-
national activities, it is necessary to distinguish clearly activities
in home governments, in host countries and most importantly between
developing and developed nations. The pervasive criticisms of
transnational corporations usually is general in nature without a
distinction as to what type of corporation, how it conducts its
business and where it does so. This blanket accusation, in effect,
lumps corporate culprits as well as innocent ones in one basket, makinq
it extremely difficult to devise codes of conduct for transnational
activities. This study is interested mainly in international organiza-
tional response and also response from developing countries.
It is not only the presence of transnational corporations in
foreign countries, or even their size that generates debate among
critics and outright tension among nations around the world. It is
also the scope of their activities in the traditional business sector
as well as other less conventional affairs which includes intrusion
and meddling in host countries domestic politics. Much of the
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responsibility for myths and emotionalism about the role of U.S. based
transnational, corporations and even those based abroad, must be lodged
with the world business community and their countries of origin on one
hand, and the responsible organ of the United Nations on the other.
It will be done on three counts:
1) Ethical posture and practices of transnational corporations
2) its accountability and
3) its impact on developing countries. 1
This "ethical posture and practices" has been a subject of
intense study both on humanitarian and academic bases. Caught in the
barrage of criticism from environmentalists, consumer protectionists,
advocates demanding more social justice and political leaders in
emerging nations fanning the spirit of nationalism, business spokesmen
have been hard pressed to articulate an intelligible ethical stance
and formulate complementary set of business practices. Lack of
ethical standard and lack of accountability to anyone (except of course
to their shareholders) is a direct result of the enormous powers of
these corporations to conduct autonomous strategies which are largely
independent of national political oowers and are not subject to control
from the point of the common good. It is therefore possible that this
situation can lead to new forms of economic domination which has
repeatedly hunted developing countries since independence.
Many of the developing nations have only recently emerged from
colonial tutelage, only to discover that political independence, to have
meaning, must be accompanied by economic independence because
political independence alone was often accompanied by a more subtle form
of economic dependence, which could be as binding as colonialism itself,
Indeed, there is increasing concern among the new nations, that despite
their independence they perceive themselves to have remained dependent
to industrialized world on economic and financial issues. This concern
has increasingly been focused around the role of large transnational
corporations in their economies.
These corporations usually are the vehicles through which the
resources of developing countries, particularly in the extractive
sector, are developed. Thus, for Nigeria, oil has meant intimate
relationship with Britain's British Petroleum (BP) and Netherlands
Royal Dutch Shell. Copper in Chile has been synonymous with Kennecott
and Anaconda; so also with the Anglo-American corporation of South
Africa and the Roan Selection Trust in Zambia; petroleum in Venezuela
has meant Shell and Creole; Iran has been a close companion to the
major international oil companies known as the "seven sisters" since
1954. In West Africa, American based Goodyear has dominated rubber
production in Liberia; and bauxite in Guyana and Jamaica has been
identified with the Aluminum Company of Canada and the Reynolds
Aluminum Company of the United States. In each case, however, most
of these less-developed countries (LDCs) inherited more presence as
a result of colonial experience; others provided attractive commercial
as well as production opportunities.
Thus, the main characteristics of this relationship was
dependence on foreign capital with its systematic income drain from
dependent economies. Moreover, as a consequence of this relationship,
a developing country's economy became "disintegrated," that is, there
is little or no interrelationship between the different productive
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sectors of the economy; integration that exists, lay in the direction
of the international economy. Such external outlook of developing
country's economy was not one which political elites take pride in
However, this attitude could be confusing and contradictory since the
same political elites forge a tightly knit bond with foreign capital
which feed the international economic superstructure.
The issue facing host nations is how to deal or respond
effectively to the activities of transnational corporations. These
issues include compelling accusations and attacks on transnational
corporations for transferring "inappropriate" technologies which in
most cases are capital rather than labor intensive, and which tend to
"discourage" backward or forward production linkages, the displacement
of indigenous production capabilities, the transfer of "inappropriate"
consumption patterns which drains scarce foreign exchange, transfer
pricing and the minimization of taxes and finally contributing to the
widening gap in income distribution. The issue indeed is not simple
and has no simple answers because the phenomenon of transnational
corporations largely remains a terra incognita despite the efforts
to understand them. Most importantly, developing nations
have been, to a large degree, confounded as to what appropriate actions
to take, because these corporations have been ill -defined and one
cannot take effective action on something not fully understood.
However, most developing nations see transnational corporations as
new forms of commercial colonization, or neo-colonial manifestation
adopted by industrialized countries to keep them in perpetual servitude.
Developing countries have therefore formulated a number of
policies with regard to proposed actions. An analysis of the present
stage of imperialism underlies each of these policies. The crucial
question, therefore, relates to the meaning of transnational relations -
question which received attention in Chapter I of this study. Does
this phenomenon reflect the evolution of capitalism in its highest
stage as Lenin claimed, or is it just a tool by advanced capitalist
centres to dominante the world and perpetuate such dominance? Or
Perhaps, is it part of the abstract discussions proclaiming the
withering away of the state and the establishment of a world state
dominated and controlled by transnational corporations? There is no
definitive answers to the above questions despite numerous studies done.
However, the efforts of further research should be directed at
refining the conclusions reached by earlier studies with the aim of
understanding the multifarious forms of transnational relations.
The facts are there, and the major aim of developing countries is to
understand these facts in order to change reality (see the analysis
on Chapter I of this study).
The reality as seen by developing countries, is not so much
the economic and social injustice that come with transnational
activity; rather the reality is the inability by developing countries
to participate meaningfully in controlling their economic and social
future. The injustice is the deprivation of the means of control
by corporations, which are largely considered alien, exploitative
and non-chalant to the needs of the underdeveloped.
The Doctrine of Sovereignty
A weapon deemed effective by most developing countries for a
gradual transformation of global economic reality was the principle of
a
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sovereignty over natural resources.*
"
0n balance, the recourse to
sovereignty was a formidable advantage to nations in their struggle
with the transnational corporation over who should take charge of
economic processes within a nation's jurisdiction. Looked at
strategically, this doctrine proves to be a response of last resort
by nations who see the struggle between it and corporations as a losing
battle.
Once deemed a legal recognition and a distinct feature of
nation-state, sovereignty has long overflown such canalization. It
confers on the state, not only political supremacy on political issues
affecting it, but invariably on economic issues as well. Of course,
the dominant motive of these declarations is not to deprive less
endowed states of the vital resources necessary for survival; rather
the aim seems to be a strategy of redistributing global wealth.
•The desire for outright ownership of natural resources for
affected nations was a response arising from bitter and often
quarrelsome relationship between it and transnational corporations in
whose hands were placed the responsibility of resource production,
It is a doctrine which the majority of developing countries
welcome with joy. Although this doctrine is only recommendatory
resolution and therefore lacks the force of law, the disturbing factor is
the precedent it sets for future evolution of international law. As
proof of its formidable character, the doctrine of sovereignty has found
expression in international forums and declarations. For example, at
the Fourth Conference of Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries, held
in Algiers in 1973, the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1803 (XVII)
and 2158 (XXI) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (proposed
by Chile and supported by most developing countries); and the initiatives
of the Group of 77 that resulted in the Declaration and Programme of
Action on the New International Economic Order (U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 3201 (X-VI) and 3202 (S-VI), May 1, 1974; and the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of December 12, 1974).
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distribution and marketing. More often than not, this trust was
betrayed because both parties seem to pursue different objectives.
'
Transnational corporations historically incline on maximizing its
profits and of course on maintaining control over access to natural
resources; nation states see natural resources as vital interests and
major sources of wealth, and particularly, of foreign exchange on
which economic development and growth is based. It will always
remain a casus sui generis - and has indeed been treated so in the
United Nations. 2
It is thus understandable that basic attitudes from nation-
states continue to be governed by a will to take charge over their
natural resources by placing their relationship with foreign extractive
corporations on a new basis of "controlled association." The need for
controlled association arises mostly from the desire of host nations to
avoid unnecessary exploitative activities and conflict. But in this
case, the conflict between national governments and transnational
organizations is clearly complementary rather than duplicative.*
In this case, the recourse to sovereign "act" becomes largely symbolic
and rather redundant unless during periods or instances of great
provocation. It is symbolic and arrogant because most developing
nations, for instance, may not do without the corporations and it is
clearly obvious that roles and functions are "complementary."
zero-sum
According to Theodor Moran, duplicative conflict is often
—
...
and involves the survival of one or both parties to a conflict
In contrast, complementary conflict involves entities performing
essentially different functions; the competition stems from this
dissimilarity of functions. Each party has some interest in the
survival of the other. For full details, see "Foreign Expansion
as an Institutional Necessity," for U.S. Corporate Capitalism: The
Search for a Radical Model. World Politics 25 (April 1973), p. 366.
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On the whole, the contradictions imposed by the demands of
sovereignty reveal thrives not as i mmediate gains for developing
countries, but simply as long term strategy where the advantage lay in
the gradual transformation of the position. As Bergsten and his
colleagues observed, several factors explain the contradiction
between the postures of less-developed host countries and the realities
of global economic relations. The most inportant is the tactical ad-
vantage gained by keeping the multinationals and their home countries
on the defensive. This advantage could be seen in the current
discussion about controlling the multinationals. 3
Despite the contention that the great size, financial strength
and the superior technology and organization of vast international
enterprises set them beyond the effective control* of individual
nation states, 4 and that "sovereign states are feeling naked," it
is the argument of this study that on the contrary., nation-states
retain enormous powers conferred by the principle of sovereignty.
The struggle between it and international enterprises remains still
an "unequal contest" and will remain so for a long time.
Whether large or small, developed or underdeveloped, national
governments possess, in their sovereign right, the power to tax, to
discriminate or restrict trade, or to nationalize foreign-owned
businesses, or indeed to confiscate their properties. Increasingly,
governments resort to this exclusive advantage. And more often these
*
Professor Raymond Vernon, was not alone in his premature
prognosis. In Global Reach , Barnet and Muller argue on the same line
Their thesis is that "the structural transformation of world economy
through the globalization of Big Business is undermining the power of the
nation state to maintain economic and political stability within its
Territory." Their description was a passing phase in the reality of global
economic reality.
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governments closely and systematically scrutinize projects proposed
by foreign investors with the possibility of a rejection or approval
on their terms. More often than not, governments have become
increasingly successful at extracting benefits for their economies from
foreign investors. Nigeria, for example, through the exercise of
"indigenization" has virtually satisfied her "yearning for economic
sovereignty." Mexico is forcing foreign based automakers to export
more of their Mexican output. Colombia is placing branches of foreign
banks under majority Colombian control. Iran is insisting that many
foreign-based industrial companies sell forty-nine percent of their
already limited equity to employees or to the general public. Saudi-
Arabia is fighting to obtain a one hundred percent acquisition of
Aramco's operation.
Industrially advanced countries are also demanding a bigger
share of profits, jobs, technology and management in their dealings
with transnational. Several European nations, including West
Germany, which has had a particularly liberal attitude toward foreign
investment, are starting to look closely at foreign investments for
the national interests and benefits involved. In 1975, Canada imposed
a set of formal criteria on foreign controlled companies, including
a requirement that a majority of their boards of directors be
composed of Canadians.
The trend toward control of foreign investment, made possible
largely by political transformation, will continue. It holds a
deadly prospect for the future of transnational corporations never
before experienced in its history. It's even more dreadful and
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authoritative when viewed from the perspective that the doctrine of
sovereignty receives full blessing from the U.N. General Assembly.
Most importantly will be its profound impact and implication to new
and existing body of international law.
U.N. Resolution 1803 (XV1T); 2158 (XXI): Tt, ^i^Ticatjons
On November 25, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly passed
resolution 1803 with no negative votes and six abstentions. Calling for
a nation's right to use and control its natural resources in the
manner it deems fit while reaffirming the inalienable right of all
countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural
resources in the interest of their national development, in
conformity with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations. 5
These resolutions, while noble in their intent, have profound
implications in ways nations conduct their relations in the global
community because it has been treated as a moral and ethical
desideratum by the United Nations. Moreover, in the same manner the
U.N., acting in its official capacity, has invariably rendered these
declarations a casuistry.
Resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 2158 (XXI), call for permanent
sovereignty over natural resources because among other considerations,
it was assumed that transnational corporations exploit and manipulate
the developing world in matters concerning their natural resources.
While this assertion is highly debatable and depends largely on
specific instances and experience, the overwhelming notion is that
transnational are "out there" for their interest and profit.
Although transnational corporations are indeed economically
and commercially very powerful, within the realm of political arena,
they are not. And the U.N. has made it clear and a surety they should
not be. The declarations are indeed a redress for the long standing
grudge borne by most developing nations against the transnational s.
These grudges have never been devoid of emotionalism and the recent
United Nation's study, "Multinational Corporations in World Development,"
before it rendered its controversial judgment, notes that the
phenomenon calls for "serious analysis lest myths should prove more
appealing than facts and emotions stronger than reason." 6 In fact, in
the judgment of the United Nations, emotions proved stronger than
reason for resolutions adopted conferred excessive powers on the
nation-state.* The many government seizures and expropriations of
corporate assets provide ample evidence that countries, not corporations,
wield the real power. In other words, the weakest country is stronger
than the most powerful corporation.
The Report of the Group of Emminent Persons appointed by
the United Nations assumes that the central problem is a conflict
between the economic power of the transnational corporations and the
political power of the host governments; that these 'corporations "are
not per se geared to the goals of development" although they provide
traditional factors of production, and that they can "accentuate rather
than reduce inequalities in the absence of proper government policies
and where necessary social reforms" could prove to be an easy
conclusion.
*
One could argue that the beneficiaries of these declarations and
resolutions are the developing nations whose bargaining power vis-a-vis
the corporation was improved, and who on occasion have expropriated the
transnational with impunity and were free.
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Without waiting for that report, the U.N. General Assembly in
April 1974 adopted one of its many controversial proposals calling
for a "new international economic order" 7 (Resolutions 3201 (S-VI)
and 3202 (S-VI, May 1, 1974). Among many other things, it demanded
"regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational
corporations," indexation of export prices, etc. The report said
"
nothing about the conformity of such measures and its implications to
the norms of international law. For, one thing, regardless of whether
the NIE0 proposals are approved or not, they have provided a common
ground or rallying point for developing countries. In addition, the
Resolutions also asserted all states' rights to nationalize
economic activities without mentioning any duty to pay compensation.
In December 1974, the United Nations Assembly went still
further in adopting, by a vote of one hundred twenty to six, a
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Article 2 provides
that if a country expropriates a foreign owned company, any dis-
agreements about the compensation shall be settled "under domestic
law of the nationalizing country" and "by its tribunals." Although
this article is consistent with Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United
Nations Charter,* it nevertheless smacks of paternalism on the part
of the United Nations over developing countries. This is hardly
considering the composition of the U.N. organization, dominated by
a majority of the developing world.
The international legal aspect of resolution 3201 and 3202,
while supporting the claims of a group of powerful third world states,
*
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter calls for
non-intervention and sovereignty of nations over domestic affairs.
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makes it equally easy for other disadvantaged members of the inter-
national system or those who simply would like to interpret the letters
of international law for their benefit to run afoul of this law. [t
is indeed scarcely the first time that international law has changed
to meet the needs of a powerful group of states. Interpretation of
international law to fit one's perspective of a situation renders
international law weak and ineffective since it readily serves any
purpose.
Third world majority in the United Nations Assembly means, among
other things, that the traditional principles upon which international
law rests, increasingly is coming under attack. It also means the
demand for a new international law, sponsored, sanctioned and
ratified by the U.N. Customary international law was tacitly
recognized by emerging states, however, this law has increasingly become
detrimental to their interests. Emerging states did not exist at
the time when customary international law evolved, hence are not
signatories. For customary international law to be binding, emerging
states not only should be present at the time of its creation, they
should give their consent also. There are numerous dissenting views
to this. I take the stand that newly emerging states reserve the
juridicial right not to recognize customary law or any other aspects
of international law designed to infringe on their legitimate interests.
However, if a state recognizes customary international law without
reservations, this automatically means that it recognizes a certain
body of principles and norms of existing international law. These
norms and principles constitute the basic principles of international
relations.
Most newly emerging nations would prefer as matter of legal
logic that international law emphasize on social change and the
equality of the sovereignty of states than on maintenance of the status
quo. Thus, instead of customs, emerging states place more faith on
treaty arrived directly by common agreements and providing an "effective
basis of reciprocity." This is not to imply, however, that customary
international law is rejected by newly independent states in to-to.
Those areas of customary international law which are judged equitable,
and reasonable, are always adhered to. Those that seem oppressive
become victims of rebuc sic stantibus invoked by newly independent
states in "order to terminate their inherited burdens."
The newly independent nations, therefore, using the forum
provided by the United Nations as a global body and enjoying the
role played by the U.N. as a casuis sui generis, has made repeated
demands that new developments under international law accomodate
their interests and must secure the approval of the majority.
Therefore, the third world is setting the pace in new developments under
international law and evidence of this is compelling in the activities
of the General Assembly, the international law commission, diplomatic
conferences and International Court of Justice. No jurist can deny
that pre-United Nations international law barely existed. The game
of power politics is increasingly subjected to universal influences
and is modified by new climates of opinion. This calls for a
revision of international law based on the enhancement of "social
justice." 8
The United Nations, searching for an easy way out of the
^
contradictions posed by foreign investment, resorted to the doctrine
of sovereignty (statis potestatis) for the enhancement of social
justice. In the process, it failed to recognize the implications
of such a move. Now the issue of confrontation between the defenders
of traditional concepts of international law and those seeking change
in these concepts has become "most acute," since developing states
have made it clear that on this question, they do not wish to be bound
by traditional norms. 9 The doctrine of sovereignty therefore might
preclude an investor and a foreign state from effectively contracting
in advance to submit disputes to international arbitrators. And it
certainly would prevent corporations from suing in courts of another
country, as Kennecott Copper and British Petroleum did in European
courts after expropriations in Chile and Libya, and as Nigeria did in
United States courts.
The doctrine of sovereignty, though a de jure pronouncement
but commanding a de facto application, appears to be neutral but in
fact has profound effect on the international economy. It needed
a modification to conform to the reality of international economic
system. In the words of A.V. Lowe: "What is needed is a refinement
of the concept of sovereignty in international law, so that it can
accommodate both notions of the independence of states and of the
increasing interdependence of states, without losing its coherence as
a legal principle." ®
The Doctrine of "Changing Circumstances"
This doctrine, in contrast to that of "permanent sovereignty"
over natural resources, is not clear and perhaps less understood by
those who invoke it under international law. However, it seems that
both doctrines go hand in hand in matters involving natural resource
extraction and bargaining that lead to extraction activity. There is
no distinction made so far
- either legal or otherwise, between the
need to nationalize a natural resource because of changing conditions
of world trade or political will and the desire to do so simply
because conditions are changing. Indeed, for most resource rich
developing countries, there seems no distinction and perhaps if there is,
such distinction is fine and subtle.
The doctrine of changing circumstances, known technically as
Clausula Rebuo sic stantibus is based on the assumption that if
fundamental changes in the circumstances upon which a treaty rests
take place, these changes may be invoked as a ground for terminating
the treaty.
From the point of view of developing nations, clausula vebuc
sic stantibus not only exonerates them from inherited colonial
oppresssive and obsolete treaties, which did not secure their consent,
but frees them from "unequal" or "inequitable modern treaties imposed
by duress." These modern treaties may include those concluded with
transnational extractive commercial or manufacturing companies who
exploit the bargaining weakness of developing nations. It is clear
however that developing countries who in most cases are weaker
than some powerful transnational corporations and of course a group
of advanced industrialized nations, resort to this doctrine as an
escape clause firstly to unilaterally abrogate long-standing
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concession agreements and contracts and secondly, as a means of
transforming easily a-stated position. This practice has been carried
out most successfully by radical nations, who presumably have less to
lose from breach of contract. Sovereign immunity from prosecution has
provided an added impetus to extremely disturbing international
behavior and rules of international law seem not to adjust rapidly to
cover legal ramifications such as the use of sovereign immunity.
The doctrine of changing circumstances is arguably a by-product
of the portent force of sovereign immunity. For developing nations,
it serves to proclaim to the rest of the world the changing balance
of power or force now going on in the international system. Furthermore,
for those who experienced colonialism, it became a pragmatic slogan
which consolidates political independence. Presently, the notion
of changing circumstances seems indeed hazy and haphazardly explored
under international law - both theoretical and practical. International
lawyers and scholars would rather circumvent this important notion
when confronted than attempt clarification on an issue many perceive
as ambiguous and inapplicable.
But the notion of changing circumstances and its legal
implication is real both to domestic as well as international legal
practice. Although conceding the ambiguity of this doctrine, most
domestic courts in developing countries, however, recognize the
importance of its use as escape clause in negotiations. It also
reflects the overwhelming desire of developing countries to see
contracts, agreements and contract disputes conform to the rules of
domestic courts and tribunals rather than internationalizing the
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process. This creates the need to ask whether international law
should have "direct" effect on domestic law.
There is general agreement that in the absence of
"stabilization" devices or clauses, the law governing a contract is
the law at the time of application. This general rule applies when
the contract is governed by domestic law as well as when parties agree
to "internationalize" the legal framework of their relationship. The
stability of this relationship seems shaky and questionable when
attempts at internationalization fall short of incorporating into
the contract specific rules of international law which commands
submission by both parties. Incorporation per se does not and may not
be adequate to prevent a breach of contract by a state entity invoking
sovereign immunity.
Indeed, a great problem exists currently among international
legal community on the interpretation of what sovereign immunity
is when a state enters into a commercial relationship with other
parties. The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Dispute (ICSID) provides a legal framework, however, the language
of the law remains highly equivocal especially when burdened with
the arbitration process. Sovereign immunity is a "question to which
there is no uniform answer." The rules regarding sovereign immunity
are in greater disarray than any other portion of international law.
The question of whether contracts between states and
private international units can be removed from domestic law and made
subject to international rules of law has attracted much controversy
within and outside the international legal community. Will it be
judged better by both parties or either one if contractual ao.ree.ents
are
"internationalized" or "localized" or "de-localized?" This
question has now been clearly answered in the affirmative by Article
42 of the JCSID Convention There is a i,„ , k .,me also a broad agreement on this
issue among several authorities. I found one very much instructive -
Institut de Droit International at its 1954 session discussed the
question of state immunity and came to the conclusion that "attachment
of or execution against foreign state property is prohibited if the
property arising from contractual obligation is used for "governmental
purposes distinct from any commercial or economic undertaking. Thus
the state is liable to be sued if and when it engages in commercial
activities (jure gestionis) with other states or with non-state actors
It does not however remove the possibilities that an accused state
should not resort to sovereign acts (jure imperii, to safeguard its
national interests.
It seems likely that the question of sovereignty (suprema
potestas) and doctrines of changing circumstance will continue to
shield non-compliant states from treaties which are considered
unjust or harmful to national interest. Until international law
ascertains clearly and unequi vocably what changing circumstance
is, and a system of bounded sovereignty under which nations are
allowed to operate, the principle of Pacta sunt servanda remains
basically weak providing some nations the license to undermine
international agreements at will.
What. the international community needs is a "code of conduct"
which binds both transnational corporations and the host country,
taking into account the special needs and requirements of each party.
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"Code of Conduct"?
The fundamental purpose of a code of conduct for transnational
corporations is to prevent the abuse of power. No matter how one sees
and judges these corporations, they are powerful and where power exists,
there also exists the possibility of its abuse. There is no consensus
'
among "experts" and within academia on what Robert Heilbroner calls
"business atrocities," however, it is widely agreed that transnationl
corporations possess considerable power and influence and that countries
may find their national sovereignty infringed upon and their policy
instruments blunted by such corporations. As George Ball has noted,
multinational corporations "have the power to affect the lives of people
and nations in a manner that necessarily challenges the perogatives
and responsibilities of political authority." 11
Moreover, judging the capabilities of these organizations, it
is clear they pose a credible threat to nation states as well as
the global community at large. Professor Neufield argues, "multinational
firms have acquired such important international dimensions ... that they
seem to enjoy an unusual degree of independence in their relation with
1 9particular governments.
Most observers and analysts therefore feel (and correctly so)
that such independence and power of transnational corporations poses
a "threat" to the global community, because there is no existing body
of laws aimed directly at keeping these "giant conglomerates" in
check. A law to guide the activities of transnational corporations
is inevitably an idea whose time has come.
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It is against this background that the United Nations Cession
on Transnationai Corporations, meeting in L ima,Peru, recorded the
establishment of a working group to elaborate a code of conduct.
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However, addressing the commission at the opening session, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, Migel Angel de la Flor Valle,
stated that "it was the desire of the developing world that a code
of conduct [aimed at governing] the operations of transnational
corporations should take the form of an enforceable statute" rather
than merely a declaration of international intent.
Thus, a code of conduct must be seen within two perspectives:
1 ) Pol itical effects and
2) Legal implementation
Political Approach
It might prove difficult distinguishing between the political
and legal mode of a code of conduct where political statements and
acts are easily transformed into normative rules or principles of
international law. However, in order for any code of conduct to
succeed, it must distinguish clearly the political and legal dimensions.
he ,og1c of political legitimacy^ that a code
International ly acceptable. This calls for the so-called "set" of
formula or "common elements" or standards on which agents win
events,
.est. Up t0 this moment, no set of co™ elects have
been agreed on and if history be the judge, the community of
nations will not agree on a co™ standard for so„,e time to come.*
If there is ever a common code of conduct, it should spell out
the obligations of governments as well as obligations of the
corporations. As wiHian, I. Spencer of Citicorp points out. "a crucia,
step is recognition by the host countries that they need to spell out
Clearly to MNCs the role they can expect to piay in achieving national
objectives." But win this spelling out of functions be within the
framework of an internationally recognized and accepted code of
conduct? Nation-states as well as the MNCs are faced with varying
degrees of difficulties which may render the need for a code largely
trivial. Moreover, considering the different situations and the
needs of each nation, the response to a code of conduct may differ
widely among states.' 5 This is so because governments (especially
those of the developing nations) have clearly and carefully sought to
achieve balance between the presentation of an "ant1 -social " conduct
and the desirability of encouraging foreign enterprises and maximizing
their contribution to social and economic development. The code
exercise has thus been a lesson in tight-rope walking for developing
nations because they are clearly caught in a dilemma.
*
For example, seeking common standards on which to agree the
!n
W
fnI ^VeaS r; d ."^ommon heritage of mankind" is taking over a decadeto formulate. It might even take longer before "common elements" on
which to base a code of conduct for transnational s emerges, taking into
consideration the "social and cultural objectives" of each country
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However, the need for a code of conduct originating from the
perceived and often real injustices of the present economic system
and the desire for redress, occupies a "centre stage" in the world
agenda. Whether the code of conduct will in fact significantly alter
transnational corporations activities and eventually lead to a "New
International Economic Order" depends largely on the success of its
impl ementation.
Legal Implementation
Since code of conduct for transnational corporations remains
an "evolving" document, implementation is often difficult. Implementa-
tion, to be successful, must take into account the broad issue of the
relationship between TNCs and nation states.* Intergovernmental
organizations such as the OECD drafted a guideline code proposing,
among other things, that companies be required to divulge confidential
*
There is still no agreement on the nature of this relationship
While some analysts see the TNCs as the villain, others exonerate
them. For example, one Justice Brandeis, writing in Liggett Co vs Lee
(288 U.S. 517, 514 (1933)) proclaims, "Through size, corporations,
once merely an efficient toll employed by individuals in the conduct
of private business, have become an institution - an institution which
has brought such concentration of economic power that the so-called
private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the state." Barnet
and Muller's Global Reach
, and Vernon's Sovereignty at Bay
,
etc.,
render the same judgment. But others see it differently. According
to Seymour J. Rubin, "there may be a time dimension to that
?
proposi tion:
it may be the TNC, not the Nation-state, which is "at bay" (Rubin,
The Multinational Enterprise at Bay. 68 AJIL, 475 (1974).
. 82financial data about their operations and taxes, country by country.
The U.S.
-
a member of the OECD, objected! This invariably raises the
question of whether a global formulation of a code of conduct should
have a "direct" effect on those formulated under domestic or
municipal law. In other words, should a code of conduct accepted by the
international community be self-executing? It is only when this
question is answered in the affirmative will we see the emergence of a
genuine code. Presently, legislation on this issue in different
countries has either suffered setbacks due to the so-called supremacy
clause, or in the process of being "penetrated" by global legislation.
In addition, code exercise, which Professor Horn has aptly described as
"an international process of learning and law making" 16 raises the
"
issue of which law should take precedence - will it be the law among
nations or municipal law? If one accepts the principle of direct
effect and the supremacy of the community law, 17 we will have a clear
cut answer to the above questions. But if history should be a guide
and if it did teach us a lesson, it is that the international
community has been wise enough to accord international law a supreme
position and the sole arbiter of international conflict.*
The code of conduct for transnational corporations is largely
an international intent, lacking the force of the law. The elevation
of this recommendatory resolution to the level of "enforceable statute"
demands that many questions be answered; it also requires an unusual
unanimity among international community members that such a code is
In theory, members of the international community proclaim
the supremacy of international law; in practice, this has been
otherwise. On occasions, members have broken these laws if doing so
furthers their interest.
83indeed necessary and the establish^ of comon eWts ^
m Internationa, relations, enforcing a code of conduct about
transnational will be a diffiV,,it „kjicul objective to achieve. Successful
attests at reaching this goal will , argely depend Qn how
nations perceive the probW* and tact brought into negotiations with
transnational corporations. The outcome of this goal in turn reflects
the historical role played by major actors in transnational relations
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CHAPTER HI
HISTORY OF THE OIL MAJORS OVERSEAS
The study of international Nations can be prope(,y earned out
through an analysis of their historica, context. Us relevance
depends to a large extent on the selection of the crucial period
Historical periods have witnessed the rise of rise and demise of
nation-states, the emergence of non-state actors and global forces
whose influence in global affairs could only be legitimately judged with
the passage of tine. International relations seek to define and
explain relationships among these global actors. Selecting particular
and crucial periods of history, this study will attempt to explore,
define and explain the relationship between the nation-state and
transnational oil corporations.
Although this study draws heavily from the historical relation-
ship between oil producing nations and transnational oil corporations,
emphasis is laid on Nigeria as a case study. But before this is done,
it is essential to present a background and history of global oil
industry.
A hard historical look at the global oil industry and the
system in which it operated revealed a remarkably comolete division
of the world of oil by transnational oil corporations sponsored
and supported by their respective governments. It also revealed the
imperialism of oil on a grand and global scale, generated and
87
perpetuated by diplomatic as as commerc1al ^
interested industrial nations. Access to oil and security of
supply, therefore, were vital (as they are currently, to the
industrialized nations for whom forei 9n oil and its acquisition was
relatively easy and cheap. This access was determined by the sheer
needs of the industrialized nations, who were consequently driven
-
search of foreign reserves. If access was in question at al 1 it
involved rivalries among the great powers over partition and over
"ownership,. Concurrent to the questions of access, partition and
ownership was the problem of colonial and commercial dominance.
Concession under the Colonial System
A distinguishing feature of global oil industry derives from
the fact that the various oil giants (corporations) deliberately
partitioned global oil into corporate trusts based on colonial ties
and "joint control." The colonial system provided an essentially
"automatic" mechanism by which the metropolitan countries acquired
easy access to raw materials. However the impetus for colonial
expansion cannot be explained by economic causes alone. Colonial
expansion has strong geo-political, strategic as well as "humanitarian-
dimension. But on the whole, the ideology of global expansion is that
of power ensuring access to needed raw materials.
The central point, however, is that colonial ties and the
benefits derived from it, reinforced the desire by the great powers
to pre-empt raw materials in their favor and to deny similar
advantanges to others. This maneuver for foreign raw materials,
89
especially oil resources, gave impetus to , c •y to a series of diplomatic
as well as commercial rivalry among the great powers.
The structure and politics of international relations under the
colonial system made it quite possible that metropolitan countries
demanded, received and plundered whatever resources necessary for her
economic and industrial growth. As a system of international relations
colonialism, to a considerable extent, depended on the ability of the
metropolis to enforce its wishes and dominance on the colony. This
phase I call the Hegemony Period * It k . •y o. n is characterized by privilege
enjoyed by transnational oil corporations, supported by their
respective countries. Privilege, by its nature, belonged to the
powerful because out of it was based the security which the great
powers sought.
Every colonization is the product of an imperialist drive.
The history of post World War international relations on energy matters
provides an adequate example of how great powers fought each other
for a strong foothold on those areas of the world where oil was found.
The rush for presence was not limited to commerce; the acquisition of
territories usually follows. Professor A. P. Thornton has correctly
obsei~/ed that when commercial empire has been established, territorial
imperialism of a definable kind necessarily begins. In the age of
achievement, every energy is taken up with the purpose at hand... the
planning of a system of commerce to include East and West. The age
*For analytical purposes, I have divided the history of global oilinto three periods. They are 1) The Hegemony period, 2) Direct
response period, 3) Tacit bargaining period. This division will provide
an analytical framework for a discussion of qlobal oil industry in
the later chapters.
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of imperialism is properly the age that follows the success of the
purpose. What has been got must be kept. 1
Access to foreign oil was secured by the great powers through
two distinct approaches. The first one was through the colonial
system which I have described above. The second was and continues
to be through commerce. With respect to the former, further analysis
will be based on :
a) Interest of Great Powers in Foreign Oil
b) Changes in the International Environment
Interest in Foreign Oil
The First World War ushered in a period in which the several
uses of crude oil and petroleum products were recognized. Oil became
a unique commodity, its multiple uses and varied derivatives gave
rise to complex industrial construction. But the industrial
reconstruction of Europe after World War II significantly influenced
the international oil market and spurred interest in increased
production. As world demand expanded, oil companies devoted
considerable efforts to developing global oil resources especially in
the Middle East where oil reserves were huge and cost of production
very low. The United States of America had become a net importer
of crude oil to supplement domestic production. The necessity for
imported oil resulted from fears of a prospective shortage of American
oil and of a British-Dutch monopoly of foreign reserves. But most
importantly, this increasing interest for foreign commercial production
was also stilted oy the rising costs of American oi, and by the
current and prospective discoveries of large foreign reserves. 2
Basing its judgment largely on commercial and strategic reasons, the
U.S. government decided that cheaper production of crude oil in foreign
lands (especially the Middle East) and the geopolitical strategic
advantage it offers, serves the national interest better than costly
domestic production. This assumption gave rise to a determined
imperial posture in foreign oil
Fear of an oil shortage in American spurred interest in foreign
oil was a fundamental factor in international relations after World
War I. The vital role of oil in a modern industrial economy forced
industrial nations, especially Great Britain and the United States,
into a policy of oil imperialism. Great Britain then had exceptional
concessions to the huge oil reserves located in the Middle East which
was under her "protectorate." Exploration and production was
cheap and the U.S., including other industrial nations, wanted a piece
of the action. However, Great Britain was unyielding. Oil in the
Middle East was hers. She assumed the role of the jealous mistress
eager to defend that which was hers, acquired as it were, through
colonization. The unyielding British posture became a matter of
serious concern to other industrial nations especially to the U.S.
whose sound foreign oil policy will envisage not only the adoption
of well conceived principles, but also their ultimate implementation
through machinery of international understanding. 3
An agreement with Britain for shared concession and access-
was important then to the U.S. A large part of the known oil reserves
involved in international trade was owned, controlled, or under
^
concessions held by the citizens of Great Britain and the United
States. It is necessary, therefore, that the two governments reach
an agreement to guide oil exploration and supply.
Moreover, concurrent with deep fears of oil shortage in the
U.S., and with unfavorable British response to American oil companies
requests for Middle East oil, there was also developing a general fear
of foreign monopoly of all foreign oil resources especially by
the British, the Dutch and Germans. In fact, this strategy of
1
control was based first on the "acquisition" of territory in which
reserves were found, and secondly on monopoly of production and
supply.
In 1920 and 1921, the U.S. Senate demanded an investigation of
the restrictions imposed on American nations by foreign countries.
But the British position was impregnable. All the known oil fields,
all the likely or probable oil fields outside of the United States
itself, are in British hands or under British management of controlled
and financed by British capital. 4 The British-Dutch Companies
were endeavoring to prevent the surrender of the colony reserves to the
American "oil trusts" while simultaneously busily protecting a similar
trust of their own. Today, this trust is known as the Royal Dutch
Shell
-British Petroleum.
The alleged British monopoly in the Middle East and the signing
of the San Remo Agreement* led to heated and prolonged diplomatic
disputes and exchanges between American and British governments over
it
The San Remo Agreement was concluded by the British and French
governments for oil concessions in the Middle East on April 24, 1920.
This agreement further convinced the Americans of a conspiracy aimed at
shutting them off from Middle East oil.
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the oil resources of the Middle East. The African government, under
Secretary Colby and later under Secretary of State Hughes waged a
"determined" diplomatic war with the British regarding the rights of
U.S. oil companies to participate in the development of Middle East
oil resources. 5 The American position in the dispute was that no one
nation or group of nations should enjoy exclusive rights to the
mineral or oil resources anywhere in the world. Concurrent to this
position, is the view that freedom of access should also be extended
to other natural resources vital for industrial production and thus
"open-door" policy, among other diplomatic demands, was introduced.
"Open-Door" Policy
A diplomatic dispute arose when, in 1919, the British refused
to permit American oil companies to send exploration parties into
Mesopotamia (now Iraq). The American position in the dispute was
essentially the "open-door" policy. The most important provisions in
this policy were:
a) That no economic concessions in any mandated territories be so
large as to be exclusive.
b) That the San Remo Agreement discriminated against American
national s
.
The British point of view was that British nationals had "acquired
rights," that these rights must be protected and respected. The
controversy between the British and American governments raged on until
Turkish Petroleum Company decided to discuss American participation.
The resultant negotiation was set around the open doQr po]icy
^
7
iCa
"
nati °na ' S
~ - sessions by Turkish governmen ;
» the process gained a stronghold in the Middle East oil from
which she would eventually donate global oi, enterprises.
^^^-^^
Access to foreign oi, was based on two fundamental factors
The first factor was the necessity to 'acquire" colonies, which
Showed promise of oil reserves. The second was the desire to
dominate commerce associated with oil. Thus, the metropolitan
countries, having established their political control over the
colonies, often left the economic sphere to their private companies
In other words, the task of clearing the way for private oil
companies fell upon metropolitan governments because this task was
fundamentally political, moreover, private oil companies could not
and did not muster the strength for colonial dominance. This lack of
strength on the part of private international oil companies vis-a-vis
host governments undermines the legitimacy and endurance of the
former in current global oil industry when sovereign powers of
metropolitan nations is shoved aside. Lack of metropolitan government's
(now consuming metropolitan nations) direct intervention in the oil
industry which historically was the case, reduces the role of private
oil companies to one of inferior participation. More will be discussed
on this issue in Part II, Chapter 2 of this study.
The period of commercial access dominated the mechanisms of
access to raw materials and though colonialism took another form,
both formed a close association. The essence of commerce was
%
profit; its security depended largely on accessibility to markets.
Colonialism or its variant
- neocolonialism - provided the access, and
in the process commerce was tainted by the association. However,
desire for profit was a common guide 'to action, even though other
motives were declared for it. Any worthwhile study of the global oil
industry must pay close attention to it. Indeed, many such studies
pay close attention to little else. But this approach in itself is
inadequate for a comprehensive treatment of global oil politics,
because economic interpretation alone will not best illuminate the
imperial scene or ask why great powers struggle for presence in global
oil reserves.
In addition to the profit motive, the doctrine of strategic
advantage provides a useful framework within which imperial action
during this period could be interpreted. Neither the British nor
the Americans coveted the Middle East and other areas of the world for
oil alone. There were many other reasons. One fundamental reason
was geopolitical. This was certainly the case with regards to British
and American interest in oil. British interests in the Gulf States
initially reflected British concern to protect the commercial and
communication links and the "territorial integrity" of its Indian
empire from Russian encroachments. Only later, on March 3, 1913, when'
the British Royal Commission appointed to study the problem of
converting the Royal Navy from coal to oil did the interest in oil
add another dimension to British interest in the Persian Gulf.
Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, announced the
Admiralty's oil" policy in a speech before the House of Colons on
%
July 17, 1913, in the following words:
fuel... We must become the owners or at anu Ui+l *u
nquid
controllers at the source of It'lSI.! . ^
the
supply of naturai on
U
which we requireJ Pr° P° rtl ° n ° f the
This policy was of strategic importance for the British who
through the San Remo Agreement with the French had a monopoly in
Middle East oil. It should be pointed out that American influence
in the Persian Gulf during this period was perhaps virtually non-
existent. The Middle East and the Gulf States were exclusively under
British sphere of influence. But following the war (World War I)
which has "brought about radical changes in the status of the United
States in respect to the oil resources of the world," a well thought
out foreign oil policy requires not only the adoption of well
conceived principles but also their ultimate implementation through a
machinery of international understanding. 7 In pursuit of this
policy, Britain had to be consulted because a large part of the
proven oil reserves of the world are either owned or controlled by
the British. Obviously judging from diplomatic notes exchanged
between the two governments, Britain was not particularly interested
in reaching an understanding with America on matters concerning
Persian Gulf oil reserves because doing so would mean "trespassing
on acquired rights" and Britain would not have it so. But America,
realizing the profoundly important role oil was destined to play in
post-war reconstruction and its belief that world wide oil
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developments by their own nationals will not only add to the
security of the United States but will be a major factor in effective
national defense. It could be argued that the United States during
this period did not achieve substantial political advantage in the
Persian Gulf region which predominantly remained in British hands. 8
The most important point which needs remembering when
considering colonial and commercial control and dominance over global
oil until the late fifties is that once the metropolitan governments
had secured a place either through diplomatic intervention or colonial
acquisition, they stepped back and let commercial interests provide
adequate supply for domestic consumption. The "vindication" of
this reliability and responsibility came immediately after World War
II when oil was discovered to have many uses, but this was made
possible by the considerable managerial, technical and capital
assets held by dominant transnational oil corporations. 9
Inspite of the enormous commercial as well as diplomatic
successes scored by international oil companies in developing and
supplying the world with oil, it is only realistic to note that
changes in the international environment drastically transformed this
advantageous position. The system, as pointed out earlier, depended
first on the colonial pattern of relationships which assured easy
access to raw materials, and after the decline of colonialism, the
functioning of the commercial mechanism. All these depended on a
particular structure of international relations - a structure created
and dominated by the metropolis and which conferred automatic
advantage to it. Today, the doctrines of sovereignty and of
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"changing circumstances" induced by changes in the international
environment occasioned a revision in the rules of how the game is
played.
Changes in the International Envi- ronment
Post-war developments in international politics undermined the
advantageous position of transnational oil companies and also the
international oil system. These developments include:
1) Independence and Nationalism
2) The evolution of Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC)
3) Creation of National Oil Corporations
4) Post-war recovery and phenomenal demand for energy
5) Nuclear Stalemate
6) Geopolitics of oil
These developments are quite different but in the context of global
oil, they are importantly related. Post-war developments, as they
affect the global energy resources and international relations, are
discussed in detail in Part III.
So far, a historical background of global oil industry is
presented. For a thorough analysis and comprehension of global oil
industry within a national context, it was necessary to present its
overall activity around the world. History in this context shows
the genesis of oil acquisition and production, the various inter-
locking decision making strategies, because the politics and economics
of global oil cannot be fully understood when studied in isolation.
It must be understood as constituting a meaningful whole where
decisions made in area A affect area B, C, etc. However, this study
pays particular attention to oil industry in Nigeria within the context
of global oil. A less useful study will ensue, if it is done
otherwise.
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The outstanding characteristics of global oil industry is thedominant position held by seven international oil companies The
seven companies that conduct most of the international oil businessinclude five American companies and two European groups. They are-Exxon Mobil Chevron, Texaco, Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell and British"
Petroleum (BP). The words "corporation" and "company" are usedinterchangably in this study.
Part II
CHAPTER IV
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON NEGOTIATIONS AND BARGAINING
This chapter attempts to communicate the central and funda-
mental ideas about the theory of games and related decision-making
models as they apply to sociology of conflict. It seeks to relate
the results of game theory to negotiating and bargaining in inter-
national oil industry. The emphasis will be mostly on tne concepts;
no effort is made toward the mathematical "solution" of any specific
game. However, it is believed that the application of certain
conceptually relevant aspects of the theory of game, for example, those
on decision-making, cooperation, competitive and coalition behavior
may assist in unravelling the often complex and difficult strategies
employed by actors in the global oil industry. Moreover, in general,
the theory of games assists in clarifying situations of conflict
among parties where conflict resolution is achieved mostly by
collusion and conciliation.
Contrary to the prevailing notion among social scientists
that the theory of games of strategy offers little if any use or
insight into the study of social behavior, it is a contention of this
study that it does. As a basis for explaining the sociology of
conflict and conflict resolution, games of strategy can offer useful
insight as a tool for analysis. Presently, game theory deals with
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the choices actors may make, or refine the choices made in order to
"better- the. in the resulting eguilibrium outco.es, and in some aspects
of the convocation and collusion which may occur among players in
their attempts to improve the outcome of a negotiation or bargaining
situation.
Games of strategy depend considerably on the assumption that
Players are rational and that in situations of conflict involving
strategy, players strive to maximize an advantage or utility while
simultaneously minimizing loss. It assumes, in addition, that players
recognize and are aware of possible outcomes of a given situation
because of the way a given situation is perceived. Correct perception
of a given situation naturally leads to a desire to maximize an
advantage assuming that behavior is correctly described as the
maximization of utility. Games theory assumes that players "know"
them in full and are aware also of the preference patterns of other
players.
But it is not always easy to maximize one's utility in a
game when utility functions cannot be measured or are susceptible to
non-measurement. For instance, maximization of utility in the global
oil industry does not readily lend itself to measurable "utilities"
because the situation is usually one of political and economic
controversies and maneuvers. In fact, the parameters within which
players in the oil industry are supposedly confined usually are
ill
-defined domains of action where there is considerable ambiguity
as to the outcome of particular negotiations or situations within
the global oil industry. In this situation, the value of knowledge
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and the use put to it beco.es severely lim1ted because the pay off
of possible moves. Although an argument could be posited that
interactions among players within the global oil industry is
"conmerciaP in nature and hence susceptible to the principles of the
™rket (which may or may not be read„ y measured)> ^
dangerously the political and ethical basis on which current inter-
national agreements on oil negotiations rest. ,n this sense, utility is
not measurable no matter what may be the precise meaning of a
market induced agreement.
The hypothesis that players choose among alternatives as if
seeking to maximize the expected value of some guality called
"utility," is simply intended to be a scientific hypothesis enabling
correct predictions to be made about certain behavior. I argue that
in international oil industry (and particularly presently) no such
thing as discrete measurable utility exists within negotiations
between transnational oil corporations and producer governments because
political and ethical considerations are brought to bear on most
negotiations. Although the outcomes of several negotiations tend to
reflect the demands of the market, they should be seen within the
perspective of political demands. Therefore, the theory of games
have limited application to social and behavioral sciences under
conditions of conflict.
Strategic negotiation in most cases involves an acute
Perception of a participant's interest which may or may not be
compatible with that of the opponent. This unigue element of strategy
distinguishes the sociology of conflict from ordinary bargaining
situations where a constant thread of opposition and conflict is
largely absent and unnecessary.
The logic of strategic negotiation is expectation based on
interests; its outcome is dependent upon personal moves of the
participants conditioned by historical events In seeking to
understand the art of negotiation, there need to be a realization
that it is one of the means by which individuals, organizations,
groups, nations, etc., manage their relationship with one another.
In most cases, negotiation is chosen over other means of reaching an
understanding because it offers the path to a least cost of
interaction, certainly it holds out the advantage over armed
conflict and spares the combatants the perils of destruction. In
other situations, negotiations are preferred because of the real
benefits, perceived by the participants; they allow the presentation
of facts, ideas and arguments by parties which ipso facto allow
for a "mutual learning," trust, and the exploration of alternatives
necessary for reaching an agreement. But as a sociology of conflict,
strategic negotiation usually involves the deliberate obscurity of
interest by participants whose disclosure could have profound effects
on the outcome of a negotiation. For instance, Ivory Coast was
deprived of a much needed investment revenue amounting to a
U.S. one billion Eurodollar loan for developing the promising
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Espoir oil fields. Phillips Petroleum of the U.S. and a consortium
of other oil companies were main agents who sought this loan, which
was denied because Phillips Petroleum reportedly stalled transmitting
the vital information on Espoir reserves which two of the French banks
in the leading syndicate requested. Such obscurity does not however
impinge on the necessity for "extention agreement" needed for
bargaining continuation.
On the contrary, obscurity of particular information ensures
the protection of strategic interests and the gradual transformation
of one's position in a strategic situation. Von Neumann has
described the strategical situation as the interaction between two or
more persons, each of whose actions is based on an expectation
concerning the actions of others over whom he has no control. The
outcome is dependent upon the personal moves of the participants.
The policy followed in making these moves is strategy; and policy
in a strategical situation is often shrouded in implicit, non-comprehen-
sive moves designed intentionally to confuse the opponent. In other
words, the aim of policy is to make an opponent act continously in
a state of "suspended animation" because they qenerally act in
the final analysis on hunch; that is, they gamble without being
able to calculate the risk.
Moreover, strategic negotiation as a sociology of conflict
offers some remarkable illuminations on how negotiating teams view
one another in terms of economic and political behavior because
usually conflict perception govern such interactions. Although
J.C.C. McKinsey, in his Theoryc^ames eloquently argues ^
"7
strategic negotiation "win throw ,ight on al1 kinds of ^
which various peopie have opposing goals and in which each of the.
although he may exert son* influence on the outcome cannot completely
dominate the course of events," 1 from this writer . s^ gf^
strategic negotiation, in addition to McKinsey's observation,
involves competition, conflict, cooperation and diplomatic maneuvers
In economics, the basic example is the exchange relationship of a
the elusive nature of the constant interplay of cooperation,
opposition and conflict that runs through various interrelationships
of men, from the striking of a bargain in the market place to the
unenviable military solution.
Nevertheless, in the literature of social conflict, an exact
description of the nature of strategy has not been made, despite the
enormous progress made on the purely mathematical analysis of it.
But games of strategy offer great potentiality for application to
political and economic behavior in conflict situations and to resolu-
tion of such conflicts through negotiation. Countless number
of human interaction is carried on through negotiation and there is
an enormous diversity on the nature of negotiations, methods of
reaching an agreement and how agreements are reached. Governments as
well as intergovernmental organizations are constantly engaged in
diplomatic bargaining, non-governmental entities negotiate among
themselves, governments and other actors in the international system.
These negotiations represent different types of social conflict
and socia! interaction and in order to render them more meaningful?
one must distinguish among different purposes for which the
parties negotiate.
The parties for which this study is concerned include the
Organization of Petroleum and Exporting Countries (OPEC), the
multinational oil corporations and the diplomatic representatives of
governments. I have gone through theoretical formulation of games
of strategy as a prelude to understanding the triangular relationship
between the above actors in the workings of international oil
industry, and secondly, in the formulation, articulation and the
implementation of "development plans" of oil-producing countries.
It was observed that conflict, competition and cooperation underlie
negotiations between oil-producing government planners and oil
company negotiators; though there was refutation as to the existence
of conflict. 2
Strategic decision in the international oil industry has
always involved a conflict of interest; the need for cooperation and
coordination. Conflict of interests occasionally surfaces as a
result of misperception deeply embedded in historical events
experienced by "developing" oil-producing nations, and as a result of
"side effects"
- that is, effects on outcome which does not concern
the agreement at hand. For example, a country whose foreign policy
is fundamentally based on "social justice" or the elimination of
apartheid policy may engage in negotiating for side-effects when
in fact the focus of negotiation may be oil matters. The inevitable
consequence of such a conviction is that more efforts and ingenuity
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is expended on pursuing these side effects, no natter how irreieva'n't
than in coning to grips with the substance of the negotiations. The
"ere fact that this is so confers subjective legitinacy to the
nation's foreign policy.
Oil development in some West African states obviously start
from the basic assumption that states should not be victims of neo-
colonial exploitation and therefore officials are increasingly aware
of and engage in suspicions of large multinational oil companies,
resulting from lessons of colonial exploitation. For example,
Howard Schissel reports that "tiny" Benin has chosen a different path
its oil development which excludes large multinational oil companies
(South Magazine, January 1983). The government of President
Mathiew Kerekou chose to award service contracts to two small
Norwegian companies, Saga Petroleum and Kraeusner. However, this
strategy seems to be an exception. Small oil companies simply do
not have the resources "which covers Africa's needs."
Moreover, the formulation and execution of foreign policy
(especially those of oil-producing nations) has been deliberately
tied to fighting foreign "oppression," exploitation and the trappings
of imperial ambition by the multinational corporations nurtured and
supported "by their respective imperial "centres." Such ambitions
can be "intoxicating," and has been repeatedly applied to nations
representing the "weakest link" in the chain of "underdevelopment."
Bingu W.T. Mutharika, the acting chief of Africa Trade Centre of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, argues that
"the experience in Africa is such that multinational corporations have
not changed the , rage of colonl,,
^ ^^ n,
h
edt0re9drd
as
T e most pertinent observation in this respect is fhatt countries
with rich mineral resource a*.* ,iources are almost invariably the trouble-prone
or potential politico-economic crisis areas'^ Certainly Mr
Mutharixa raised important issues concerning the activities of
multinational corporations in developing countries, but substantiate
these Cairns is a difficult task indeed and one beyond the scope
of this study. Earlier on and on the same path as Mr. Mutuant
«. Krishnamurti asserts that since multinational corporations follow
a world-wide strategy of interest, they do not normally conform to
the interests of the countries in which they operate. 4 I„ all, issues
of colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, etc., have all been
dealt with in Part I of this study and elsewhere, 5 however, under-
standing the nature and practice of these issues is indispensable
to coming to grips with the much celebrated demand of a new
international economic order by developing countries, and the
sociological conflict which underlie "north-south" interaction
especially in areas of natural resources including crude oil.
Th historical advantage enjoyed by the multinational oil
companies in global oil affairs as a result of the hegemonical role
they played, paved the way for future conflict in perception. Most
oil producing countries presently feel that granted of access to
oil companies and the subsequent arrangement in production and
distribution was one of "unequal exchange." The oil producers
felt cheated and exploited, but most, if not all, nevertheless, needed
the revenues from oil a sv*t*m , ™3ys e was created in which groups of
companies tended to ensure access to oil
their n • •
°UrCeS 3nd t0 m^™^
gains in a world in which thP v h*Hmc ey had control over most of thefactors of production.
The on copies buttressed by an entrenched
^ ,nte™"- 1 «« ana convinced of the
inability of producer governments tn i n+o intervene in oil matters either
directly or otherwise, unilateral i„ =k,ly abrogated the posted prices of
Middle East and Venezuelan crude oil in t„
,
n
. „
, a
011 ln the SP""9 ° f '959. Furthermor
Au9ust I960, the oil companies reduced posted prices of Hiddle
^st crude oil which precipitated consultations between Venezuela
and the Middle Eastern countries on measures to deal with the lower
"I PHces. This unilateral reduction of posted crude oil prices
(which incidentally was a basis on which royalty payments were made
to producer governments) by the oil companies indeed, became the
first recorded instance of major conflict of interest between the
latter and the producer governments. The incidence formed a basis
on which a more careful and closer scrutiny of oil matters by
producer governments became the norm. Although the excuse given for
lowering the posted price of crude oil was ostensibly due to
"expanded production" resulting in a "world surplus," the producer
governments have long felt cheated and exploited and this incident
provided the spark to act. In fact, the oil companies forced the
producer governments to respond by uniting in a co^on front against
this highly provocative activity.
The shock suffered as a result o^f reduction in posted
P"ce led to the formation in I960 of th* n •
F + .
° e Conization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC)
. And, as Peter R n rf.nK
-
0dell argued in his
; :;
er
;
eptive book
- ^o^w, .,he oil Producers sought
collect.ve!, to enhance their bargaining power by^
in order to prevent the companies from nUvinnr playi g one country off against
another in a situation of surplus oi ,
-eduction potential."'
Strategic considerations of the multinational oil companies
™tters of
..posted" price reduction, therefore, worked immensely
against their interest because strategic thinking failed to take
-to account the hehavior of other actors, inching the
OH sanies. ,n other words, the logic of strategic moves should
according to sociologist Jessie Bernard, depend on plans or policies
or choices of hehavior which always involve some expectation regarding
the behavior of others. As a source of conflict, the oil companies
failed to anticipate the consequences of their moves or simply
neglected such consequences as trivial. The result was that
multinational oil companies, as never before, were subjected to
rigorously and even rigidly limits in their economic activities
and socio-political behavior. Now there is the sober recognition
and acute awareness that corporate planning must be achieved with
the "knowledge that they may be checkmated at any point" by other
actors in the international oil system. In the case of African
producers governments, however, the lack of regional cooperation
and coordination argues Nicolas Sarkis, director of the Paris-based
Arab Petroleum Research Centre (APRC), and adviser to several
Afncan states on oil mtters
, leaves Afr1can states ^ ^
bargaining position." This is so because oil companies are large
worldwide inter-locking conglomerates with powerful political and
economic machinery which individual African nations can rarely match.
This lesson on strategic thought has the curious effect of
making the oil companies more secretive and manipulative because
they do not have a free situation in which they can maximize their
benefits. They are in a system in which every choice of behavior
on their part may be nullified by some choice of behavior on
the part of someone else. 8 They are faced by countervailing forces
very much willing to redress past inequities. This interplay of forces
inevitably leads to a situation where sociological conflict not
only dominates the psychological constitution of negotiators but
threaten to becloud their professional judgment. More energy is then
expended not on coming to grips with the substance of the negotiation,
but of creating an atmosphere conducive to serious and fruitful
outcome. In this scenario, decisions on policy are not simple
problems of maximizing one's gain in a situation of game, but
problems of maximization under adverse conditions, that is, under
conditions in which other players are also attempting to optimize or
maximize their gains, so that a situation of
interference occurs. Moreover, under this antagonistic atmosphere
no amount of astute or clever diplomacy can "force moves or deflect
policy" because psychology is fixed and no concessions must be made
to the probable behavior of an opposing groups.
The breakdown of mutual trust necessary for any negotiated
settlement on controversial issues inevitably leads to quest for
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manipulation, deceit and a deliberate bedouding of an otherwise
calm situation. The foliation of policy consequent ly degenerates
-to an orgy of mutual distrust and accusations, m 1970 when the
Libyan government started negotiations with the oil copies
resisted, followed by production cuts and nationalization by the
Libyan government led by Colonel fihaHaff,- •..uy u i Ghadaffi.it was rumored that that
was a "communist plot " Ghariaff-i h„ uPi . ad f has, however, built a reputation for
"leap frogging" on agreements already reached elsewhere in the Gulf
states. Thus confronted with the OPEC Cartel and Libya's tactics
the mutational oil companies "seemed to have evolved a coherent
counter strategy" insisting on one global negotiation to avert the
Libyan "leap frogging." I„ pursuance, thus, companies sought to
negotiate as a group rather than as individual entities. Oil companies
were in luck, concerted global strategy, which itself was a violation
of U.S. antitrust regulations, was cleared with the Departments of
State and Justice. Hence, the companies were set for negotiation, but
prior arrangements failed due largely to political interference from
producer governments.
The truth of the matter was the absence of a conducive atmosphere
which parties need for a negotiated agreement. For example, it has
been the policy of the Nigerian government to create conditions
which stimulate and ensure meaningful and mutual concerns on matters
affecting her oil industry. However, the oil companies operating in
the country have repeatedly engaged in price manipulation to increase
their profit. Such corporate behavior leads to conflict situations.
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"th tWrt™«tl«, secrecy the ,1, compani. es do not disclose whatP-fUs they make on the Nigerian operation, reports Man Hutchinson »
^ repeated demands from the. are made on the government for increasedProm margin. In view of these demandS) ^ ^ ^
^oleum and Energy, Alhaji Yahaya Dikko, replied that "the
9overnment would act after a logical and persuasive case has heen made
and the case must he dearly understood not on ly by those in government
,
but also by the Nigerian public at large." 10
Evidently a cognation of several factors have made it
Possible for the oil companies to engage in manipulative adventures
which lacked bold maneuver and daring, but which at any rate proved
effective and successful. One area where success was recorded was
on the supply of crude oi, to Rhodesia and South Africa where shipment
was boycotted by oil-producing third world nations. Shell-owned
tankers are being sent from ton to Durban, breaking the Arab Oil
Embargo against South Africa, the Observer Newspaper alleged in
London." Shell-BP also broke the Nigerian oil Smbargo to South
Africa. But Mr. P.F. Holmes, Chairman and Managing Director of
Shell vehemently denied the allegation saying "net a droo of Shell's
Nigerian crude oil reaches South Africa directly or indirectly." 12
It could be hardly disproved that this strategy or rather
tactic employed by Shell-BP and perhaps other oil companies contributed
to unnecessary upheaval in the negotiating process and may introduce
an element of conflict in a situation which least needs it. Perfidous
and treacherous behavior such as this undoubtedly pushes OPEC
countries to use their oil resources for "political purposes" which
it has, on occasion, lkpH • 119used
-
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"Agreements," observes Unde^
Secretary of state for Economic Affairs, William Casey,
"cannot in
themselves, of course, guarantee the stability nf
th „
o new arrangements orHe flow of oil.
-ese will depend on the good faith of the parties
as well as other developments in the world, including perhaps
political ones." u
The theory of games is essentially »
.
a theory of strategy which
takes into consideration exDPr^tinncexpectations concerning the actions of
upon the moves of the participants based largely on decisions as to
by the amount of information known to him or conversely by lack of
information. The availability of information or lack of it invariably
leads to a strategic situation and players under the oerils of
deprivation intuitively adopt a mood of conflict of interest. The
situation either degenerates into a problem of individual or group
decision-making under a mixture of "risk" and uncertainty or
stabilizes as an interaction where cooperation, mutuality of need
and reason reign. The general assumption is that the later scenario
is more desirable because everyone is a "winner." m reality, however,
this is not always the case. The need for negotiation hardly arises
P3rtiClPantS^ *~ - issues especial tnose of hJ,
Political nature. Under these conditions, if agreement is eve, reached
because participants decide to come to terms. Ga.es are "sets of
rules" comparab,e in the abstract to the rules that define economic
behavior. For example, decisionmaking in the international oi,
industry often takes the form of "games" in (•(,*+ ,that players usually
obey rules laid down by international political and economic events
and norms. However, rules that define international economic life are
no longer as definitive and constant as they were before the 1973
energy upheaval. There was, after this event, a deepening uncertainty
on the nature and supply of crude oi, on which most developed industrial
economies depend.
Decision-making on oil issues under these uncertain conditions
are subsequently susceptible to internationa, political and economic
developments. Zaki Yamani
,
in his discussions with Aramco and other
major oi, companies, informed them "again and arain" that any
agreement arrived at could be undone by deals elsewhere. Although
oil companies represent a major link between producer governments and
world market, these governments "were discovering that they can market
their oil in the global market independent of thi oil companies and
at prices higher than what major oil companies are offering.
Furthermore, the Tehran Agreement became a symbol of the fragility and
instability of international oil agreements. There was reason to
believe the agreement will be short lived. Again, Sheik Yamani in
a conversation with Exxon's George Piercy in Tehran on January 20, 1971,
African production, of the so ran«H .. - ,» wi ^"t? i>o-c
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7S inrelatMpt°—- of we ,ls drilled is amongstthe ighest in the world." For examni* k *f ple, between 1975 and 1979
exploration permits granted in Africa to the top twenty multinational
11 companies, totalled 1.8 m1111on square ^ ^
52.2 percent of all exDlnrat-i™p o ion acreage awarded around the world over
this period (South Magazine, January 1983, p . 61) .
Since the early
, 970s, the re has been considerable discussion'on
the notion of a "new international economic order,. Among the demands
of this new economic arrangement has been the overriding desire of
"developing" nations for a just and adequate share of the global
economic prosperity. The impetus for a revisioi in the global economic
order was indeed occasioned by the new found strength of the oil
producing exporting countries, OPEC, who, having been rallied around
by a majority of the "third" world, sought a major overhaul in the
international economic system.
Although OPEC member countries in thier "historic" meeting
of the Sovereigns and Heads of State held in Algiers in March ,975
issued a "solemn declaration" reiterating their "profound faith in
the capability of all peoples to bring about a new economic order via
international consultation and cooperation rather than confrontation,"
' iv':::::r 7-—- -~
protest ^
6XamPle
>
"« « « Of...a revolt against the highhandedness of the mult1national oil'~ which thas] held sway in soverefgn^
produced and sold our oil as if <*OH ,f lt were their own. we
, the host
countries, were not consulted; the multis deterged prices and
Paction in accordance with their own interests and those of their
national foreign policies." 14
Thus the game which the producer governments wish to play is
one conditioned and legitimized by ..changing circumstances „ anrf
new develops in the international arena. ,„ the fjrst place
the events of 1973, coupled with the rapid increase in energy
consumption by the developed countries inevit,b,y introduced
numerous uncertainties in the decision-making processes of the
international oil industry and ushered in an erain which fundamental
policy making decision on matters of crude oil production and
pricing primarily reside with producer governments. This development
effectively shattered and clouded long term strategic decisions
already made by international oil companies. The producing
governments in turn suffer uncertainties on whether the oil produced
could fetch its share of the market value. Under these conditions,
a curious situation develops; actors who supposedly have conflicting
interests band together to bring "order" to the oil enterprise.
This apparent identity of interests does not however, remove the
sociology of conflict described earlier in this chapter. Producer
governments and multinational oil companies, obeying the highly
convenient doctrinp nfc.i n . 123o Bebua Slc stmiibus have ^ occas . on
unilaterally abrogated terms of contractor h„
.
act have amended it so as tosuit their purposes. This issue will be treated in h •u c deatil in the next
chapter. What to bear in mind, however is thatu , renegotiation clauses"« -creasing,, becoming a permanent feature of international legal
-actions. But new African oil-producing nations have sparingly
tanged basic legislation governing company-state relations over the
Past decade. Such policy of judicious protection of interests
became necessary in a climate where decisions are made under uncertain
conditions.
The instability and unpredictability of the outcome of any
9ame as decisionmaking in the international oil industry could be
dearly stated by referring to recent concrete examples. These examples
are political as well as economic. By the early
, 970s, OPEC's power
had increased as did demand for crude oi, grew more rapidly than
supply. In June 1968 OPEC adopted a ••Declaratory Statement of
Petroleum Policy in Member Countries" which stated the intention of
OPEC countries to obtain the maximum control of their oi, and set
the framework for future activity within OPEC. This was done firstly
by obtaining more revenues for their oil through a series of
negotiations with the oil companies and later abrogating the terms
of these agreements. There were several agreements most importantly
the Tehran agreement, Tripoli agreement, Geneva agreement and the
OPEC participation agreements. 15
These agreements were individually and collectively altered,
abrogated or neglected due to institutional safeguards. The Djakarta
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Agrees of 1965 in effect provided that the OPEC position should be
the moderate one; however, individual members would be permitted to
depart fro. that position if they so desired. Leap frogging by
individual member countries stewed from that agreement and is not
regarded as a breach of OPEC unity. 16
International oil industry is fundamentally based on political
foundations; a proper analysis cannot be made unless one takes into
consideration the part played by political negotiations. The formation
of OPEC and what this organization hopes to achieve proceeds from
this assumption.
The OPEC Statutes of 1960, reaffirmed in 1968, are as follows:
1. Unification of the Petroleum policies cf member countries,
2. Stabilization of prices in international markets, and
3. Efficient economic, regular supply to consuming nations and
a fair return on their capital to those investing in the
petroleum industry.
In addition, recent developments in the international political economy
have made it necessary for the OPEC to add a numter of factors to its
statutes. These include:
1. Development of national petroleum industry
2. Equity sharing and control
3. Compensation for monetary fluctuation
4. Conservation.
These last four factors, borne of increased bargaining strength
of OPEC members, came as a surprise to major international oil
ng
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compares whose decisionmaking structures were al m0st rendered
•ineffective. As a result uncertainty was introduced in decision-maki
and the oil companies were forced to rearrange decision-making
structures in order to maintain "order" and harmonize interaction in the
global oil industry.
Inspite of this rearrangement, other factors brought to bear on
the oil industry. One of these was the Irab Israeli War and the
consequent embargo and supply shortage. On October 16, 1973, ten
days after the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli War, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, and Iran "declared themselves to be
the sole arbiters of price and unilaterally raised" their crude oil
posted prices by an average of $1.99 to $5.00 per barrel, effectively
nullifying the Tehran Agreement. Subsequently, the other OPEC members
announced similar increases.
Contributing also to this atmosphere of uncertainty is the
vagaries in the oil industry including the issues of "transfer pricing,"
production limits and manipulation by the oil majors and the instability
of prices since the traditional concession agreements were brought to
an end by the 1968 Vienna Conference. In order to secure "economic
and political justice for "our peoples," the producing countries
are demanding that changes be made in order to get the most out of
their oil. There are several methods which the different oil
producing countries have exercised to reach this goal: partial
nationalization (Algeria), joint ventures (Nigeria, Saudi Arabia),
nationalization (Algeria, Libya and Iraq), service contracts
(Indonesia, Venezuela, etc.) and finally participation which is.
the official OPEC option.
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These developments undoubtedly i„flue„ Ce the long term
decision-making strategies of producer governments, the oil companies
and the consumers. Firstly national control of oi, production would certainl.v
Produce complicated movement of petroleum, although almost impossible
to determine, could be analyzed with some precision by state owned
oil corporations who will monitor and control these movements. Projected
estimates of oil requirements (largely a duty of consumers and oil
companies) and price stability (mostly determined by producer governments)
could be theoretically brought into equilibrium. Secondly, prudent
measures will be taken by ,n concerned to intensify the efforts for
alternative energy sources and the reduction in energy growth rates.
Thirdly, OPEC members would have to reconcile themselves to the contin-
uance of output restrictions if they wish to ,void determining the price
structure. Fourthly, producer governments would be guided by prudent
measures on pumping of oil to meet declared development objectives
and needs. Thus, flooding the market with oil would be largely
eliminated. And on balance, concluded one report, "we consider that
the uncertainties surrounding international economic developments
are likely to intensify rather than to diminish during the next few
years with the concomitant implication for energy developments." 17
The international oil industry is an enterprise in dynamic
flux and hence susceptible to change, and any long-term strategy
designed to bring order and certainty in the industry is bound to fail.
Peter R. Odell in Oil and World Power has convincinqly argued that the
traumatic events in the oil world indicate that the interrelationships
of the several sets of actors involved have become more, rather than
18
less, complex. They have also produced a realigns of forces which
made the world of oil in the second half of the 1970s significant!*
different from the one to which we became used between 1945 and 1973
The vagaries of the international oil enterprise, especialiy in
recent developments, render decisions made in light of proven certainties
in the industry unreasonable and invalid. The strategy of games as
decision-making, then, can be fruitful only in the short term rather
than in the longer term because only those arrangements which prevail
at a particular point in time can be trusted. Serious negotiations
between actors in the global oil industry take this fact inot
consideration.
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CHAPTER V
NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY
this chapter, I analyze the traditional
"concession
contract system in the international oil industry as they evolved
over the years, the strengths and weak nesses of this system, and the
constraints on it, dictated primarily by the doctrines „
and of "changing c instances." These doctrines, presently, offer
Producer.govern.ents impetus and tremendous leverage over transnationa,
OH corporations on matters affecting international oil negotiation
As a result, efforts made by oil corporations and recourse to inter-
national rule of the game have proved largely ineffective.
There is no law or rule of law presently under international
law which has precisely and coherently addressed the issues of
"changing circumstances" and "sovereign act." And because this is so,
transnational oil corporations have found themselves mercilessly at
the whims and caprices of producer-governments demands. In my view,
a state's legitimate right to permanent sovereignty over natural
resources take "precedence "over contracts between it and a. third
party. This is the inalienable rights of sovereign governments.
Thus in the language of international diplomacy and law, permanent
sovereignty over resources is a "higher law" than contractual claims.
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Sovereign acts present,, constitute defense mechanisms as well as
o^ensive devices through which producer countries have sought redress
for historical and l0ng-standing excitation of their natural oil
resources by the oil companies.
This decision hy producer-countries (most notably those members
of OPEC) to get even with oil companies is inherently ideologically
motivated and implicitly stated in major speeches and press releases 1
Thus bargaining theory cannot fully explain the evolution of an
agreement, as other extraneous factors and "conflicting goals"
impinge on the negotiation outcome. Economic rationality which
presumably govern these negotiations may therefore not apply.
Moreover, in the conduct of oil negotiations, much energy is expended
in order to incorporate the element of the "new economic order,"
than coming to grips with the substantive content of negotiation. The
general emphasis is on setting a transformational framework of
negotiation aimed at radically altering the traditional mode of
international oil negotiation rather than understanding concretely
the nature and content of particular petroleum deals. 2
Altering the traditional method of petroleum agreements
has inevitably led to producer-governments recourse to those elements
of international law which can be advantageously employed in dealings
with oil companies. But invoking these clauses have economic as
well as political costs in the relation between states. A state
which habitually resorts to invoking a rebuc sic stantibus in order
to escape its international obligations would lose its credibility
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and agents should be obeyed, and record shows that
Sovernments can be iegally blameless when a Rebuc sia stmt^
invoked or claimed under the tenets of Internationa! law, for
revoking a long-standing agreement with an „<ia s'ccnie i n an oil company. The
standard practice of the international co^nity is one of Paata
Sunt Servanda. Until the international legal community settle
the issue of the status of what Uohan Galtung called non-territorial
actors, (such as the oil companies), under international law,
producer-governments win continue to enjoy an advantage in most
oil negotiations.
In this chapter also, I argue that government-oil company
'
negotiation approach to petroleu* matters is anachronistic and does not
justify the trust placed on it by the governments of major
industrialized4 nations including the United States. I submit, in
its place, an alternative method; producer-government versus
consumer government negotiation. This will have the advantage of
reducing contract uncertainties and introducing concurrently elements
of contract stability because producer-governments would understand
the mutuality of sovereign power (supreme poteetas)
. Moreover, taking
into consideration the fact that the United Nations acting as a
134
*«. „ Me has legit1mi2ed severai ^
Z adV3nta9e0US t0 -d~tHes, consumer-governments, also7erS " ^ U" ited— «*, act as c„untervai, ing force ,
T;
0
""- Internat10" al 011 « ncn.te.U0Ha, actors
and hence non-members of the United Nations
My argument is not that n-no,l companies be left out entirely of
the international 0 i, deaIings
, rather ,^ ^
comprehensively and generally agree on petroleum matters with the
on companies playing peripheral parts and sorting out the substantive
and detailed aspeot of the international oil industry.
Before I elaborate on the structure and the constitution of
this alternative approach to international oi, negotiation, it is
necessary that a discussion of the traditional international oil
agreement approach follows.
Negotiation Based on Gnvem^nt-Comoany Appm,,..,
To understand fully the mechanism and the regime under which
this approach operated or rather operates, it would be useful to
theoretically analyze the evolutionary trend which characterizes these
"petroleum contracts." The process of evolution seems best in
describing our present international oi, industry and understanding
its dynamics and negotiating behavior demands that one focus on
evolutionary trends. For purposes of analysis, description and
•ft
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filing for permanent sovereignty over natural resourcesTh 1S gave impetus to the agressive "natural resource ideology
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clarification.
, have divided the pen,d which JC°mPany aPPr°-h Phases. These 1nclude:
1
.
The Hegemony Phase
2. The Direct-Response Phase and
3. Tacit-Agreement Phase.
The Hegemony Pha<: 0 (1 9QU1957) 5
The Hegemony phase was characterized by the granting of full
c-essions to the major oil companies. Across the hoard concessiona
Power and advantage meant '.effective control by the oi, copies of
the entire range of petroleum activities,' The State exercised no
real voice in either the management or conduct of oetroleum
operations6 or the profits that accrue from said operations except
the receipt of "royalty."* Especially in the Middle East, their
control over levels of production was absolute and was determined by
their ability to sell
.
7
Producer governments played less active role because then,
knowledge of petroleum uses and its worth were virtually absent, and
the technology and management needed for extraction were lacked.
Moreover, the resource and poverty ridden nations were relieved by
the much needed royalty payments. A closer investigation of this
hegemonical relationship and the "far reaching rights exercised by
the oil companies" would indicate the dynamism of exploitation,
domination and imperialism by the industrialized nations. 8 This
Amount paid by oil companies to producer nations as "owners
marke
e
t°oir°
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"
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traditional concession and the inevi+aMn+ * L6 l Ability of hegemony "was by its
very nature a state within a state anH i+ ,„nate, d it was a matter of time
before the state „ou,d assert its legislative and executive powers"*
to that which belongs to it. Gabon, the smallest OPEC member
Producing around 7.! million tonnes
, ftp example( ^ ^ ^
of domination under the traditional concession system. This nation
has been struggling against the wishes of El f-Acquitine, the French
state-controlled group, to increase its equity in Elf-Gabon from
twenty five percent to between thirty five and forty one percent.
But Elf organization proved difficult and very strong for tiny
Gabon. Elf indeed has tremendous bargaining power and leverage
over the state, for the company produces about eighty five percent
of the country's output.
Another example of a state which seeks gradual transformation
in concession agreements and increased state's share of her oil
revenue was Congo against Aquitine and Italy's Agip. The reaction
against Congo's request was "sharp": payments of taxes were halted,
and all new investments were halted. The government was, however,
forced to work out new arrangements. Oil revenue provides about
half of the nation's revenues.
The dominance of the oil companies persisted through the
two world wars, with two major exceptions; the Soviet Union nationalized
its oil industry following the October Revolution of 1917, and Mexico's
expropriation of domestic assets of foreign oil companies in 1938. 10
Dominance was hegemonic; its advantage was strategic, and strategic
Wactlon was a cent,, feature involving M1 *
co.pan.es and producer-nations no matter how small or trUU] ^
negotiations were.
Access to oil was not the only driving motive behind
finance, strategic behavior increasingly became manifest. Choice
of action employed by the international oil companies became contingent
upon its estimates of the actions or choices of producer-nations
"hich was in most cases minimal. The 01, companie$^
th,« situation and turned negotiations into series of strategic
interactions and strategic choices made possible by the passivity of
governments. Strategic behavior consequently degenerated into a
game of assymetrica, choice, when in theory, choice and behavior
should be independent and strategic interaction measured by outcomes
controlled by interdependence. 11
Change in the regime and mechanism of negotiation and
concession was inevitable. The process of change was economic and,
increasingly, political in nature. 12 By the late fifties, expanded
production capacity of oil resulted in a world surplus of available
crude oil, and in the spring of 1959, oil companies unilaterally
lowered the posted prices of Middle East and Venezuelan crude oil.
Further reductions in the posted prices took place in August 1960
precipitating consultations between Venezuela and the Middle Eastern
countries on measures to deal with the lower prices. 13 The product
of this consultation was the birth of OPEC in September 1960,
138
which was an act of protest a Munu...
a
revolt against the highhandedness of
the multinational oil companies. 14
The Direct-Response Phase (1957-1966^
The formation of OPEC marked the demise of the Hegemony phase
based on visible dominance and exploitation of producer-countries
Direct-response period ushered in regimes of concession measurements
based on joint venture agreements, ^^s^^ became also
Part of the package of transformation included into joint ventures
which included creation of state oil companies. Transformation of
this sort is characterized by an "increasingly active state role
in the conduct of oil company operations."
Political considerations played an important part during
this phase in the sense that producer-nations wished to redress past
exploitations stemming from the fact that multinational oil companies
explored, exploited and "sold our own oil as if it were their own,"
and the explicitly stated intention of producer governments for
"participation"^ the running of the international oil industry. 15
Not all governments experienced the hegemonial, or direct
Phases of negotiation, but most are experiencing the tacit phase.
For example, Nigeria did not enter the direct-response phase until
she joined the OPEC in 1971, although a series of legislative and
executive moves were made to regulate but not direct the activities
of the international oil companies. 16
If the Hegemonic period was characterized by dependency
relationship between oil companies and producer-nations, direct-
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Elements of independence adopted are various h„t „, bu the most significant
these are the establishment of state ,„ companies wh1ch^
an important policy instrument in forging self.re„ant
matters concerning petroleum development an* ,„i , o concurrently
"increasing
the host country's equity position" a „H m, *y P^mon
,
and the formation of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
The creation of these elements of independence was based on a
radical transformation of the existing structural relation in the
international oil industry and the inducement of a regime change
"hose inspiration and conception was primarily pol1tically
and managed.
For example, in 1973, ninety three percent of OPEC production
which amounted to 27.9 million barrels per day, went to major oil
companies on long term basis. By 1979-1980, this amount dropped to
about fifty percent of OPEC exports and forty two percent of world
trade in crude oil. Concurrent to these developments, OPEC
nations' ownership
"entitlements" of crude oil produced rose from
two percent in ,970 to eighty percent in ,980. Currency, the thirteen
OPEC National Oil Companies (NOCs) directly market more than
fifty percent of OPEC exports compared to virtually nothing in 1970
and barely five percent in 1973.
Important points to note in this phase are that the bargaining
strengths of producing countries became increased and stabilized with
the creation of the elements of independence mentioned above. Most
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gave^ ^
bargaining position of producing countries. Strengthening thebanning capacity of oil-producing nations inevitably led to
structuring of the fabric of international oil industry and the
rearrangement of the rules of the game. Hegemony and dominance gave
way to direct negotiation based on strategy and
.animations
Strategic interaction assumed a strategical situation; its iogic one
of opposition and conflict. Substantial energy became expended in
order to outmaneuver the opponent and hence gain an advantage In
essence, the whole strategical behavior degenerates into one of
"games" whereby each player must ta ke the other fel,oWs thoughts and
"»ves into account, 17 because in theory each was expected to make
an optimum move based on strategical considerations.
The point, however, is that in conditions of direct response
negotiating phase, it is generally assumed that each player usually
examines strategical relationships before any move is made. This is
based furthermore on the unproven assumption that rules of the game
has been identified and that rules should define economic and
strategic behavior. A closer investigation of strategic, economic
behavior of most African governments, for example, indicates otherwise
A study by Robert L. Curry, Jr. and Donald Rothchild on the economic
bargaining between African governments and multinational companies
reveals that "impatience" and "reciprocal demand intensity" usually
prove decisive in most negotiations.' 8 Although the oil industry
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-Presents a un1,ue case, several^ natjons with potential
-serves in their bid ha1t excessjve ^^^^
hard foreign exchange, are i„ a hurry t0 conc]ude ^
transnational oi, companies. These nations may not a,„ays get the best
deal on their resources. The issue of impatience however may not
be a major concern of those developing nations where large proved
reserves of crude oi, have been discovered and where there has been
a long history of oi! dealings with transnational oil copies.
Mature oil-producing developing countries have particularly
endeavored to understand this phase in their negotiations with
oil companies.* Therefore, they have insisted on joint ventures and
production-sharing contracts, and in soTO cases, outright participation
in day to day operations of the oil industry. The extent of
successful
"participation-in the affairs of their oil industry differ
from nation to nation. For example, a review of the contracts
signed by Indonesia (which pioneered the concept of production-sharing)
in 1979 and 1980 indicate that Pertamina has suspended its "joint
participation" scheme with Conoco. 19 However, production-sharing was
a success and was widely adopted by the new producing countries as
well as those with no traditional petroleum industry. Outside
Indonesia, production-sharing has been adopted in countries as
diverse as Egypt, Libya, Chile, Nigeria, Angola, and India. 20
"Service contracts" have also been a main feature of the
direct-response negotiating phase. These are two types of service
For Nigeria, the direct-response phase may have begun in 1971
when she. joined OPEC as a full member. Prior to this date, attempts atparticipating in her petroleum affairs was mostly in the form 0 f scatteredlegislative enactments geared toward regulation of the activities of
oil companies.
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contracts: under one kind, the governs bears all or s0me part of
exploration risk, hiring an oi, company as a contractor to provide
the nation's oil industry with needed services. A good example of
Wns ,s the Saudi Arabian arrangement with the Aramco consortium
whereby Aramco provides a "full range of exploration, development
and production services to Petromin" : the state-owned oil company,
for "reimbursable Costs plus a fee of less than twenty cents per
barrel of purchased crude; under another kind, the oil company
furnishes all capital necessary for exploration and development of
petroleum fields. The producer government would in turn reimburse
'
to the company over a period of years after the field comes into
production. This is done either in cash with interest or in crude
which the company's entitled to purchase. On the whole, service
contracts are most applicable in cases with proven oil reserves and
therefore may not provide an available option to some countries.
However, this sort of contract recognizes the status of producer
states as owner of the oil produced with international oil companies
as providers of technical services. This kind of contract first came
into use in the late 1960s, particularly between oil-producing
countries and the companies which desired to gain access to assured
supplies of crude oil. 21 Service contracts agreements were concluded
in Iran in 1966,. in Iraq in 1968 and Venezuela in 1971. Similar agree-
ments have been recently signed by oil companies with the state oil
companies of Nigeria, Brazil and Vietnam.
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The extent of success recorded by various governments
"modern" concession regime vary. Modern concession agreements
-elude as detaiied earlier service-contracts and production-sharing
contract, and typicaHy, they might include a United contract area
a United life or duration with possibility of extension, royalties
due to producer-nation is calculated on the value of production and
Producer governs has authority to review and control company
decision and activities, and finally provision for governs eguity
participation. These provisions imply the increasing power of
producer governments over oil companies. Often success is a factor of
how technologically, economically and managerial ly advanced a nation
is. However, the "tendency of governments to copy parts of agree-
ments from other countries" render these innovative concession
regimes more of a framework on which specific agreements are reached.
For example, in April 1971
, terms of a five-year agreement on oil
revenues were agreed "in substance" between Nigeria's government and
Shell
-BP. The agreement follows "closely" the pattern set in
Teheran and Libya. 22 Again, in May 1971, following the Shell-BP
agreement of April of the same year, Nigeria signed a five-year oil
settlement for all companies. "It is patterned almost identically on
the 1971 Libyan settlement" 23 except for the temporary freight
premium which was established at nine cents/bbl.
In sum, the direct phase of negotiation represents a period
in the history of global oil negotiations in which strategic behavior
and interaction took the form of exchange relationship of buyer and
seller each trying to "maximize" his gain an. „ f
U"
. ..
S 9 1 d of course minimize lossm the process, a curious distortion usually ta.es place; first of
-operation and then of conflict. Conflict more than cooperation
-ally characterizes this period because situations have been createdin wh,ch several possible outcomes will result with respect to which
certain preferences are desired. Though' payers may have some
control over the varices which determine outcome they do not in most
cases have full control. 2« "hen such is the case, then, the
one with more determinate control over variables usually ends up
calling the shots. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that
a state of perfect control has been reached in which action cannot
be nullified by some choice of strategical behavior on the part
of an opponent.
Tacit-Response Phase (1966-1979?
)
This phase represents the most recent period, although beyond
that, events in the international oil industry have not fully
crystallized and predictions based on post 1980 events are merely
assumptions and not concrete. Tacit-response phase can be further
divided for analytical clarity into 1966-1973 and 1973-1979, and "was
marked by the emergence of the oil producing states as fully active
and controlling actors." 26 The yea rs beginning from 1966 to 1973
represent the emergence of producing nations as the "arbiters" of
their petroleum resources because their bargaining strength was
increased due to the politically and economically instigated creation
of elements of independence including production sharing contracts
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and service contracts. These two methods of concession regimes are
innovative and aimed at eroding furthermore, the powers of the oil
companies and entrenching the position of the state.
In terms of concrete realization of bargaining strength,
the tacit response is remarkably important in the history of the
international oil industry because it witnessed the entrenchment of
OPEC goals and ambitions. This was particularly so in the early
1970s, when, according to Fadhil J-Al
-Chalabi
, a "radical transformation
of the international oil industry took place with bargaining
advantages accruing to producer-governments." 27 Analyzing the
interaction and interdependence of the international legal and economic
dimensions of government-company relations in petroleum development,
and the changing roles of the multinational oil companies operating
within the market, Kamal Hossain correctly placed 1970 as the
turning point in relations between producer governments and the
operating companies. He traces the course of change in the bargaining
power against the oil companies and suggests that the establishment of
National, State-owned companies have been instrumental in strengthening
the producer-government position. 28
If the direct-negotiatinq phase was usually a period of qreat
tension and maneuver, the tacit response period was characterized by
situational acquiescence of the oil companies to demands made by
producer-governments. The logic of this phase was transformation
buttressed by a favorable shift in the bargaining position; its
success depended considerably on the advantages of a coalition
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strategy adopted by major oil producing countries.
Moreover, the major emphasis was on direct control over
development and production strategy of oil reserves. The oil company
acts merely as a contractor, providing technical services and in many
cases assuming the exploration risk. 29 The consequent result
of this policy was a "steady advance in the terms and conditions of
arrangements" between various actors in the oil industry. The nature
of the arrangements prevailing at particular periods between particular
actors usually reflects the bargaining strengths of each. However, the
general mode of concession arrangements have been set, one which
takes into account the new powers of producing governments and of
course the eroding powers of the oil transnational s . It is my
contention that producing governments over time will acquire more
strength through the process of economic growth and technological
diffusion and development, and will eventually displace the
transnational oil companies in matters affecting domestic crude
production and refining. I submit that this is so after a careful
study of State oil companies as instruments of government policy,
and the introduction of innovative-type concession agreements.
It has been argued several places 30 that sovereign states
are "feeling naked," and that the "structural transformation of the
world economy through globalization of Biq Business is undermining
the power of the nation-state," the fact is that as represented by
tacit response phase, it is the multinationals who are really feeling
naked. The nation-state, particularly the powerful ones, possess
enormous powers to deal with transnational corporations including of
course the recourse to "sovereign acts."
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The years 1 973- 1 979 marked the indiscriminate use of sovereign
acts by major oil producing governments particularly those of OPEC
organization. As governments on their subunits increasingly
became part of the global economic and commercial domain, they
continued to claim and enjoy total i„nity for their activities even
in a competitive environment, and individuals and non-state actors
doing business with them were placed at an unfair disadvantage.
As a recognition of their newly found wealth and strength (as a result
of the events of 1973 and its effect on the international oil
industry), producer-nations quadrupled the price of oil,
nationalized certain oil companies, 32 dictated the agenda to operating
oil companies and generally assumed political control of the
international oil industry.
The response of the oil companies to the new posture of
producer governments have been varied; each company is different.
But it is possible to make broad generalizations as to how each
company reacted. Generally, the companies have accommodated the needs
and concerns of producer-nations, however, the logic of concessions
was mostly strategic. The essence of it was access to production; the
strategy behind it assumes fundamentally that debt should be incurred
in lieu of equity. For smaller companies, acquiescence became a means
of challenging the "majors" traditional control over the world's main
oil producing areas. For example, Occidental in 1970 agreed to
terms with Libya which were significantly more favorable than those
applying in the major's concession areas in the Middle East. 33 As a
148
rule, these oi, companies through various inter and intra corporate
transactions and through manipu,ative
.echanis.s as "transfer pricing"
eventual either get even or profit
.ore from oi, transactions with
producer nations.
Althought the economic analysis of global oil may have some
validity in earlier periods, and presently, it "tends to obscure the
Political significance" of tacit response phase. Several regimes and
mechanisms of concession including service contracts and production
sharing as practiced in this phase "undoubtedly emphasized the
status of host State as owner of the oil even after recovery, relegating
TNC to the role of a general contractor" and provider of technical
services. The oil companies understand in general terms this
transformation and the advantage conferred on host states, thus their
policies have been one of cooperation rather than confrontation.
As for earlier governmental and intergovernmental considerations
of forming what Walter Levy (possibly the top American private oil
consultant), has called a "countervailing power" to the oil
-producers
cartel OPEC, most top U.S. oil officials have concluded that such a
"confrontation organization" would be counterproductive." 34
Cooperation, rather than confrontation most observers assume, would
ensure access and production and alleviate the tendency of what the
then Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William J. Casey,
described as "an increasing Balkanization of the oil market" as each
country seeks its own oil policies and preserves.
Negotiations in this phase are therefore delicate and fragile.
Any false move from the oil comapnies may invite sovereign acts
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from host governments and hence efforts are made toward developing
appeasement packages and rhetoric which presumably should have
soothing effect on producer.government-co.pany
relationship For
example, African oil contracts in the 3ulf are not merely commercial
increasingly, they are being negotiated in the context of complex
explicit or implicit, military and political relationships » 0i,
negotiations are in effect only part of a tacit
.package dear involving
broader ties."
Cultivating broader ties thus leads to injecting extraneous
affairs in the negotiating process which in many cases are fundamentally
politically inspired. On the other hand, on several occasions, producer-
nations have indulged in political manipulation of supplies to
extricate concessions from oil companies and their governments. Such
linkage strategies tend to serve immediate demands of actors,
defeating a major purpose of long-term relationship which in the
first place it is meant to cement.
It is obvious then that dealings in the international oil
industry could not be only understood in economic, commercial terms.
Undeniably, elements of political interplay are increasingly important
and essential as a medium and means of play. There are arguments
.
which purport to convince us that politics and political variables are
unnecessary in determining the dynamics of global oil. To the pro-
ponents of this argument, I caution the dangers and folly of
ideological proclivities and their simplistic view and interpretation
of global politics. In response, I submit the primacy of politics
over economic postuUtion and argue that the present crisis of g Ioba,
011 cannot be understood on economic terms aione. A thorough ana, ysis
and grasp of fundamenta, knowledge of internationa, politics is needed
This study proceeded from that assumption.
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Throughout the tacit response period, there has been a "stead,
advance" in the terms and condnions Qf ^ ^
Producing states and the oi, companies. This stead, advance of
arrangers produced enormous political and econo.ic advantage for
Producing-nations while simultaneously creating a steady deterioration
of the bargaining positions of the oil transnational co.panies.
Gradual erosion of the powers of the oil co.panies came as a
result of the creation of OPEC and it "demonstrated clearly that the
balance of power in the oil world was moving away from oil companies
and in favor of the nations with oil resources." The oi, companies
felt vulnerable and apprehensive.
To improve its bargaining position and reverse the fastly
deteriorating hegemonical position in global oil industry, the major
international oil companies created what has been called the London
Policy Group (LPG). The establishment of this international association
of petroleum companies, in which all consumer nation's petroleum
companies which play a substantial role in the international
petroleum industry would be represented, was directed to the objective
of maximizing the bargaining leverage of companies in their dealings
with producer governments and expanding the understanding of consumer
governments of the limits of the companies bargaining position. 36
The formation of London Policy Group was therefore a product of the
general admission that the "companies are no longer able to effectively
bargain with producer governs over price" and other major
-sues such as access to and the detection of production leve, of
crude oil
.
Thus the institute goa, of London Policy Group (henceforth
referred to as LPG) was the enhancement of their bargaining position
through
"coordinated planning and strategy," supported and encouraged
by their respective governments. In other words, the logic of LPG
was the provision of countervailing power; its essence was the
assurance of continued access to favorable treatment in oil matters
and the avoidance of risks, and castastrophe even when conditions
have changed and the perils and threat* nf n^v a n s of producer governments imminent.
Although oil companies still maintain a "residue" of the
market power which ensured almost half a century of global oil
dominance and control, this power has been gradually eroded by the
increased strength of producer governments. Transnational oil
companies subsequently faced a premonition of catastrophe and
subsequent effort was judiciously directed towards ameliorating their
weakened position in future negotiations. One of the factors of
catastrophe was the "extreme vulnerability of certain companies to
threats of production cuts or nationalizations which thereby reduced
the ability of the companies to maintain a united front. A second
important factor was the "shortsighted policies of the United States
and other consuming governments which not only impeded the ability
of the companies to coordinate their 1970-1971 negotiations in Teheran
and Tripoli, but actually undermined their position by making concessions
to producer governments at the diplomatic level. 1 ' 37
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in contrast to the Native cohesion of the OPEC governments,
governments of consuming nations tend to act independently and in
so** instances at each other throat. Reacting to the possibility of
a future oil shortage, consumer governments have sought to protect
their interest by seeking special access to sources of supply. One
major consequence of this policy is aenerS l ire •*Hv. t t g al insecurity which might
induce consumers to bid up prices th,K ,t™ tl ., nus strengthening the
negotiating position of OPEC governments.
Until the early 1970s, the United States had no consistent
and comprehensive national policy regarding energy with the result
that during the "energy crisis," she found it almost impossible
to convince her allies of the need for cooperation on energy matters.
The European Parliament went along, however, Japan, which imports
more than ninety percent of its energy needs, refused to join a
"consuming group." Such a state of affairs was hardly conducive to
the efforts of oil companies at negotiating effectively with producer
governments.
Most importantly, the State Department's attitude toward a
united bargaining front for oil companies was negative. The U.S.
antitrust laws posed a major problem for industry cooperation of
this sort. This concern for "maintaining competition among its
companies in the acquisition of foreign supplies has not only been
unappreciated by other consuming nations but has contributed materially
to the inability of these companies to negotiate lower prices from
OPEC governments. In addition, diplomatic sol utions proved
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unpragmatic and IH-tlned. The » Irving Hission „ tQ^ ^
conflicting signals both to the London Policy Group and producerSevens as well. The mission instead of com^unicationg effectivelyif desire that oil companies present united front on bargaining
Positions, the Shah of Iran maintained his unacceptance of this
strategy. The Irving Mission acquiesced. Henceforth, the London
Policy Group was unable to negotiate as a group.
How successful LPG would have been without government
assistance is open to question; however, one point is clear - the
successive meetings held by this group only served to cement the
cooperation between oil companies and producer governments. Why
cooperation instead of conflict became the outcome was not clear,
but it seems plausible to think that oil companies cannot afford
a prolonged risk of confrontation with a strengthened producer
government.
It is highly paradoxical to infer that LPG which is
supposedly a countervailing power, would engage in overt cooperation
with producer nations. Inference such as this may form part of
the inexplicable mass of strategic interaction and behavior which
has confounded observers of global oil. Peter R. Odell explains
that this cooperation was a "development of immense importance, in
the distribution of world oil power. The immediate impact of such
cooperation was strongly felt in oil price rises and shortages in
many consuming countries in the period between 1971 and 1973. 1,38
One possible explanation of this strategic cooperation was
the desire of the oil companies to accomplish their objectives of
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-proving company bargaining strength through tacit cooperation and
acquiscence to the demands of producer governments. The companies
needed a "safety net" and this was found largely in cooperating with
other actors. There is considerable evidence to indicate that oil
companies may have received numerous orders from their respective
governments on the need for cooperation rather than confrontation.^
Several factors combined to render the companies incapable
of bargaining individually and left their attempt at "shoring"up
their position through the LPG largely
"fragmented and ineffectual."
One of these factors is the perception by the members of the
London Policy Group that they operate in an "apolitical environment"
and that dealings in the global oil industry is mostly com^rcial.
Consequently, negotiations on price, for example, was pursued solely
on the economic laws of supply and demand. It was thought that
the dangers inherent in diplomatic confrontation over price levels
may be replaced by subtler effects of indirect coordination of supply
arrangements so as to maximize the incentive and opportunity of
producer-governments to compete. This approach and assumption
is fundamentally wrong! Once a member of OPEC, member governments
usually obey the laws of a cartel which in this instance is
highly politically strengthened. Economical considerations are
usually made, but the oil-producing nations regard disposition of
their most vital resource as a subject for governmental negotiations,
and they have in fact been making government-to-government agreements
with some European countries for years. 40
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Although the U.S., deviat1ng from 1tf ^
laws, encouraged the gathering of the oil maj0 rs in London for a
discussion of issues of mutual interest, the Policy Group Was
basically a failure. It was a failure because of its treatment of
global oil as economic matters, and its proven failure to recognize
tbe fundamentally political nature of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Evidently acting on the instructions from
ttair respective governments, oil companies (who on most
occasions serve as instruments of foreign policy) refused to
recognize the political nature of OPEC.
On a more technical level, the various individual oil
companies have divergent views and interests and could not therefore
form a coherent, consistent front against producer nations. In
addition, the idea of a formal countercartel to OPEC has lost a great
deal of ground because of fears of arousing the producers' ire. A
respected oil economist, Professor Walter Meade, says that the
exclusive supplier negotiating with the exclusive buyer is a classic
example of a "bilateral monopoly," which "inevitably leads to
stalemate."
Bringing "order" back to the world oil market was supposedly
the mission of the London Policy Group. This order was aimed at
reversing gains and the advantages accumulated by producer-governments
since the formation of OPEC, and improving deteriorating position
of companies in world oil. This "order" was never achieved; instead
several arrangements based on tacit consent and cooperation emerged,
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governs.
011 ccnpanles were forced to reach V„n •
»*th oi, producers wMle .
* C C0 ' leCtlve ^ments"
0PEC t
-'"fining the
"appearance" of f1ghtjng
"
0° th
^ ~" ™ ^— - as they sought t0 kfiep
es hopes of future promabiiny ^^ ofsum. vai(depended
;;;™ fui c~ - * 011 Producing countr1es
...thus OPEC/oi copies cooperation became a fact of the oil-
power system of early 1970s. 42
The faHure of the London Policy Group effectively entrenched
the tacit-response phase of bargaining in international oil, and
«-»*«, recognized the dominant position of pacing nations
It furthers,
"forever" ended the era in wh1ch the companies cou]d
dictate price levels and production limits to producer governments
though this failure has not completely nu„ifi ed the ab111ty of ^
oil companies to negotiate price in times of excess global capacity.
Producer-governments were aware of the shrinking and
eroding powers of the oil companies and took advantage of this
situation by gradually but effectively transforming their position.
Jhejomics of Transformation- Nigeria. OPEC. an d the
^Jj^.
In the earlier chapters, attempt was made to explore, analyze,
and explain theoretically the dynamics of global oil taking into
special consideration the bargaining strategies inherent in the oil
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realigns of forces and the political „i„ to maintain and
sustain the new position. Efforts to this end usually are accompanied
by new political and economic issues which threaten the viability
of the new regime and works to support the established order The
first strategy breeds discontent and revolution leading to systemic
instability; the second only strives to sustain implied legitimacy.
The politics of global oil is strategy; its objective is
access based on particular interests. The outcome of strategy could
either be predicted, called with certain amount of accuracy according
to the role of each actor and the environment of action. Limit has
been placed on the number of actors to be dealt with here because
of space and most importantly scope. I have chosen to discuss the
position of Nigeria within the framework of OPEC and the politics
of transformation which by no means is limited to the oil sector.
The politics of transformation in the Nigerian context extends to other
fields of economic enterprise. This extention will be discussed
later in this study.
Nigeria is rich with large amounts of hydrocarbons.
Indication that Nigeria might be a potential oil-producing country
led a German company known as the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation to
take a license for its exploitation. in 1908. But this company
folded up at the outbreak of the first world war.
Two decades later, the Anglo-Dutch Consortium Shell D'Archy43
entered the stage. The company's search for oil in Nigeria began in
1937. The operations of this group were also disrupted by the
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second world war. However, In 1956 perseverence and effort paid off
and oil was discovered in promising quantities at Oloibiri in Jenagoe
Province. This find was rapidly developed and two years later and an
expenditure of 25M (British pounds Sterling), Nigeria was in
the oil business. 44 At that time the government and the company came
to an agreement that profits which might derive from the company's
activities should be divided on a 50/50 basis which was in line with
prevailing international practice. Initial agreements were quite
elementary, reflecting the assymetry of bargaining strengths, with
oil companies of course enjoying the advantage. In fact, serious
interpretation of available data indicated a process of unequal
exchange. Today, the 50/50 sharing agreement has subsequently
been modified in favor of the government. For instance, by the
present equity share the government receives 98.2 percent of the
profit while the companies get 1.8 percent based on 60/40 joint-
venture agreement.
Subsequent modification, creation of new agreements has
substantially transformed the government position from one of
unequal partner to one of comfortable, full-fledged actor,
reflecting among others, historical developments which confer
advantage. The government position gradually was transformed from
one of bargaining inferiority to that of roughly equal strength based
on the fact that hegemony favoring oil companies gave way to direct
bargaining phase and finally to tacit-response phase. These
164
chronological adaptation of the history of global 0ll reflects ^
eroding of the powers of the oil companies and a massive transfer
of instruments of power to producer-governments. The transfer of
Power and how it operated was analyzed earlier in this chapter,
and in the Nigerian context such a state was reached largeiy through
political means and by the instrumental role played by high level
bureaucrats whose contributions remain highly controversial even up
to the present.
In Nigeria where pluralism is most pronounced but where
autocratic tendencies flourish, choice of instruments and techniques
in the planning process usually tend to be formulated and presented
by high-level bureaucrats in morsels of unquestionable dogma. This
means that the conduct of policy usually entails "disagreeable
debates and controversies conducted in terms of personal abuse with
a conflict of personalities and largely by those who cannot fully
appreciate the meaning of the great issues at stake,"
45
because there
has always been a conflict of interest between the "political class"
and the bureaucrats.
The political class in Nigeria "is not articulate" and
consequently policy formulation and execution has largely been
left solely to the bureaucratic regime legitimized by occasional and
incoherent compromises forged in concert with the ruling or political
class. The result was that policies formulated took bureaucratic
forms and imperatives, and popular participation when possible and
desirable denied. Bureaucratic dominance naturally led to several
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abuses of power and corruption, and resulted accidentally in the
complete control of the machinery of government. Thus, the bureau-
cratic group drawn fro. the intellectual and professional class play
a disproportionately significant role in the determination of
development objectives particularly where the political class is not
articulate. 46
Bureaucratic dominance of policy formulation is highly
dangerous in a country so diverse and large as Nigeria. In the
process, the Nigerian character was subdued and bureaucracy inevitably
became an instrument of national policy. The abdication of the powers
of policy formulation by the then military government (who presumably
are the guardians of national growth and welfare) to a bunch of self-
seeking bureaucrats constitutes one of the most political mistakes
in the history of the Republic and invariably destroys the legitimate
participation of the body politic in affairs which determine their
future. This abdication is dangerous because the spirit of policy
and that of bureaucracy are diametrically opposed. The essence of
policy is its contingency and accommodation; its success depends on
the "correctness of an estimate which in part is conjectural." But
that of bureaucracy is its quest for "safety" and calculabil ity
based on a given legislative mandate. In this sense, policy
involves an adjustment of risks and demands; administration an
avoidance of deviation.
Analyzing the role of the bureaucrat in policy formulation
and execution of development objectives in Nigeria is necessary
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because one cannot understand fully how critical decisions
(especially those on petroleum matters) are arrived at, unless a
thorough analysis is made of the bureaucrat and his power in the
government machinery. I„ other words
, negotiations ^ ^
m N.geria can be analyzed and understood when the significant role
Played by the bureaucrat is considered because apparently they were
and still are the main actors.
The kind of game Nigerian "planners" decided to play in dealings
with international oil companies was not one of bold maneuver
which risked prudence and caution on a quick checkmate. Rather,
it was deliberate, cunning and purposeful; a game where the
advantage lay in a gradual transformation of the position, in which
the opponents moves were utilized first to paralyze him and then
force him into submission. It was a game whose daring resided in
the protection and advantages of an alliance through which it has
to by played, when one wrong move might mean disaster and loss of
confidence might spell isolation.
The principles of the game have been formulated and executed
with the conviction that a transformation of the government position
on matters concerning her natural resources was indeed necessary
and sensible. The need for transformation reflects the urgent need
on the part of the government to maximize benefits from natural
resource extraction.
It is a common knowledge however that several resource-rich
nations of the "third world" do not have the financial and
technological base to exploit those resources.
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In order to tap those resources, nations have resorted to
either one or all of the following basic methods:
1) undertake joint ventures in which foreign investors supply
management and technology and markets as well as a portion
of the capital
- with remaining capital furnished by the
host country,
2) institute management contracts whereby experienced foreign
corporations offer management and technology only, and the
host nation supplies the capital and tries to market the product,
3) do without foreign participation entirely and furnish
management and technology, capital and markets itself.
The British colonial government in Nigeria, as "soleowner"
of petroleum minerals in Nigeria implemented the first method. 47
But the government of the independent Republic of Nigeria presently
employs options 2 and 3.
However, at various points in the negotiating process, Nigeria
has demanded from the oil companies options 1, 2, and 3 depending on
the package deal presented by companies and more importantly depending
on how government negotiators perceive each deal. Reliance on these
options as guidelines for her oil industry was not completely
attractive to the government of Nigeria and governing legislation for
petroleum operations in the country contained in Mineral Oil Ordinance
(Chapter 135) and its subsequent amendments as well as Petroleum
Decree 51 were published on November 27, 1969.
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Petroleum Decree 51 seems to be the most important and perhaps
the most powerful government pronouncement on petroleum matters up
to date. It repealed some of the previous scattered legislation and
provided for petroleum rights under defined terms. 48 Decree 51
also made it clear that "no further" petroleum mining rights
be granted and that henceforth all rights would be granted in the form
of production contracts through the government's national oil company. 49
Furthermore, the decree provided that "special terms and conditions" -
including government participation and "special provisions applying
to any national gas discovery" - may be imposed on a prospecting
license of mining lease "if considered to be in the public interest."
'
Existing rights were allowed to remain in force at the government's
discretion.
A clear definition of government's policy and purpose was
therefore instrumental and influential in determining the future
course of oil exploitation in Nigeria. In addition, clarity of
purpose had tremendous impact in the formulation and execution of
policy by high-level bureaucrats, and also in preparations for
strategic bargaining and negotiations with the international oil
companies
.
Following the drastic changes in concession terms which began
in the Middle East in 1970, Nigeria, following such example and trend,
transformed her position into one of advantage. The 1970s ushered in
an era of increased production and increased revenue and consequently
of boom for Nigeria. The 1970s also represented an era of increased
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dynamism in the Nigerian oil industry characterized largely
by the direct-type negotiating strategy.
Nigeria's entry into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in July 1971 gave tremendous boost and impetus to
her bargaining position within the international oil industry. In
fact, Nigeria's entry into OPEC had an immediate impact on her bargaining
position. Not only was she able in the short run to enjoy the wealth
of OPEC experiences which proved tremendously helpful in the series
of participation agreements reached with various oil companies, the
huge increases in the price of oil during the 1973 Yom Kippur War
swelled her treasury. Before 1973, the top quality Bonny Crude was
selling for less that $3 per barrel; in January 1981, it hit the
record high of $44 per barrel on the spot market. Thus between
1977 and 1980, Nigeria earned $53.4 billion as oil revenues.
Before 1971, Nigeria's control of its oil industry was
virtually nil. Oil companies were given free hand to operate the
industry as they saw fit and the country "drew whatever small revenues
were offered." After 1971, and immediately after accepting membership
into OPEC, all these measures changed. The nation has taken greater
control of the oil operations in terms of participation and equity
share-holding, expatriate quota and the employment and training
of local manpower. Major steps such as these have contributed
immensely to confidence building measures which the nation enjoys.
Before she joined the organization, Nigeria relied mostly on
the traditional concession and contract agreements with international
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oil companies for the production and disposal of her crude oil.
Recently, "innovative" agreements such as production-sharing and
service contracts regimes, drawn upon the pool of international
knowledge and experience, has dominated contractual agreements. In
general, these innovative contracts are designed to reflect the
growing strength of producer-government and the gradual erosion
of the powers of international oil companies. This has been so with
Nigeria and indeed with major, mature oil producing countries.
Since her inception into OPEC, Nigeria has achieved enormous powers
and advantages over the oil companies which represented an important
step toward the fulfillment of her economic development plans. However,
on several occasions, these triumphs have proved to by pyrrhic
victories.
Several major concession regimes and contracts concluded
during the 1970s reflected for the most part the increasing strength
of the government and her ability to transform without much
difficulty a stated position. Moreover, elements of independence have
been judiciously created and where necessary have displaced foreign
establishments or have, when complete displacement is impossible,
entered into joint- venture arrangements. The aggressive stance of the
government stems in part from her increased sophisticated knowledge
of the intricacies of the global oil and perhaps more importantly on
the international knowledge and experience on which the majority of
her agreements have been drawn and based.
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The nature of agreements concluded with major oil producers
indicate attests at following closely those arrived at with OPEC and
Us members. This trend increasingly reflects the importance of member-
sh,p ties to this organization by the government of Nigeria, but
recently, arguments abound within governmental circles whether OPEC
as a cartel is indisposable to the needs of Nigeria. In other words
Nigerians membership in OPEC became controversial. Several authoritative
figures have voiced "we do not need OPEC," but I argue that Nigeria
does need her membership
,„ the organization. A short survey of major
agreements reached by the government and significant international
oil companies will undoubtedly shed light on the various arguments.
However, before this can be done, it is necessary to take a look at
the major agreements.
In April 1971, terms of a five-year agreement on oil revenues
were agreed "in substance" between Nigeria's government and Shell/
British Petroleum, the nation's major oil producer. A new clause
refers to "a new schedule of producer capital allowances" under which
Nigeria reduced capital expenditure that companies may offset against
tax liability. The overall effect may be to reduce capital
allowances by between ten and fifteen percent. Effect of reductions
will be granted for companies operating offshore such as Mobil,
Texaco and Gulf, which have more production costs than companies
operating onshore, such as Shell-BP. The agreement closely follows
a pattern set in Teheran and Libya. 50 A new posted price for
Nigerian 34-gravity API crude was fixed at $3.41 per barrel. This
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represents an increase of 85* over basic posted price of $2.36 fixed
m Septenber 1970. The new agreement also contains the 2 h percent
'
escalation rate to insure against inflatinny r * mriatio and 5* per barrel annual
price increase from January 197^ a lrv ™' d iy/j. A 10* per barrle with 2<£ annual
increase premium for sulphur is akn nar+ *ui^n lso part of the agreement because
of low sulphur quality of Nigerian crude.
On May 3, 1971, the five-year oil "settlement" was signed.
It was patterned almost identically on the 1971 Libyan settlement except
for the temporary freight premium which was established at 9 cents/bbl.
Libya's freight premium was set at 6 cents/bbl. The Nigerian
settlement is effective on March 20, 1971 just as the Tripoli-
agreement, and includes the same 10* low-sulphur premium escalating
upwards U annually, the same temporary short-haul premium (adjusted
for Nigeria's geographical posi tion)
, the same inflation escalation
provisions and the same rise in the base tax rate from fifty percent
to fifty five percent. 51
These new arrangements, although it undercut significantly
the profit base of major oil companies, nevertheless kept the
companies operating in Nigeria. This is because many economic and
political factors influence oil company operations in the country.
These include, but are not limited to, assured access to crude oil,
rate and extent of exploration, rate and extent of sector development,
financial arrangements with the government, rate of production and
level of output, transfer of skills and technology, sharing of financial
returns, pricing and so on.
In the case of Shell-BP operations in Nigeria, these factors
have contributed to the forging and establishment of linkage"
meChan1Sm Wh6reby 3 10SS in the "upstream" operations is compensated
with a gain in "downstream" operations in Nigeria and elsewhere. This
-
made possible by the vertical network of corporate arrangement
and by the interlocking directorates among international petroleum
companies which made it possible for the "establishment of a common
oil policy throughout the world." Thus, a loss in Nigeria could
translate into a gain in Indonesia, for example, and vice-versa
Moreover, ownership of factors of production and distribution is
"shared." Such a network of joint ownership obviously provided
opportunity, and even necessity, for joint action. 52
In fact, a temporary setback for Shell-British Petroleum
has not discouraged her from exploring and producing Nigerian oil
because the company's strategy has been mainly one of access and
assured production of crude oil. In addition, as Pearson has pointed
out, concrete economic factors include the location and quality of
Nigerian crude. Advantages of location include both international
shipping charges and security of supply routes. 53 Therefore, it is
understandable why Shell-BP including other oil "majors" are very
much interested in Nigerian crude even at exorbitant prices, which
occasionally go beyond the official postings of OPEC. Despite the
price hike, the activities of Shell-BP logistically and otherwise
have increased dramatically.
Like most oil companies, Shell-British Petroleum has a vast
collection of diverse affiliates with different functions operating
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in different countries hnth +u »bo m the
"upstream" and "downstream"
operations. These include exploration and production, refining
operations, petrochemical, sh1ppl„ g and distribution of products
research and deve lopment. Although major oil companies pl ace a great
deal of entasis and Importance on access to crude oH production,
when access proves unprofitable, recuperation usually follows with
enormous profits made fro. downstream operations such as refining
of crude oil and petro-chemlcals.
Therefore, Investment patterns of major companies tend to
be highly diversified. The head nff,v„ ^m n office of the entire
"integrated"
operation systematically reassess it* ni^,,i its global marketing position and
then reallocates production to its various producing areas by
choosing the most promising and profitable investment alternatives.
In this; the overriding strategy is to maximize profits on a global
scale. Christooher Tugendhat observes that oil companies are not
philanthropic organizations, nor are they for the most part instru-
ments of government policy. They are independent commercial concerns
trying to make money. 54
Corporate directors and executives have this notion of healthy
return on investment before them while making investment decisions.
Host governments normally are aware of this need and tailor their own
demands during negotiations in such a way as to control and check
profits earned by companies. This attitude has on many occasions
given rise to reciprocal demand intensity whereby both parties are bent
on achieving the best possible results on given set of bargaining
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issues. Inevitably, the central question edging fr0m this situation
is, What will be the benefit-to-cost ratio that is simultaneously
acceptable to each agent? 55
The directors of Shell-BP in Nigeria over the years have been
"Pushing" for increased crude oil output - a concession the government
granted in return for increased royalty payments. Though head offices
Plan globally so as to balance supply and demand, in the case of
Nigeria, production has been geared toward maximum output, but during
time of "glut," exploration has been halted requiring the government
to grant tax incentives for a renewed effort. This was so in 1977
when the government was forced to "arrest the decline in oil explora-
tion activity by granting several incentives." 56 However, keenly
aware that petroleum is a wasting asset and that current world prices
are affected by oversupply, some Nigerians, anxious to make the
best possible use of potential oil revenues to spur agricultural and
industrial development, have called for restraints upon production
in the short term. 57
It is enough to say that oil companies through a concerted,
coordinated effort, deliberately reduce production in order to
maximize profits. However, this trend does not entirely capture
Shell
-BP's long-term investment goal in Nigeria where total investment
currently, according to British financial circles,, approximates or
varies from 210 million (Financial Times) to 600 million 58
(British pound Sterling). The strategy is to produce as much oil
as possible, refine some at home base and most abroad and then in turn
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resale the refined crude and allied products at exorbitant profits
to Nigeria and other buyers. This lucrative business continued
until Nigerian government nationalized British Petroleum. Before
"Nigeria's axe fell," British Petroleum was getting 2.4 million
barrels per day from all sources, so it could afford to resell
400,000 barrels per day after 2 million barrels per day must have
gone to satisfy her internal demands, Nigeria's chop cuts out
240,000 barrels per day, leaving a mere 160,000 barrels per day to
resale. The 240,000 barrels per day nationalized was sold in the
"spot market." Monty Pennell, BP's deputy chairman predicted this
will act as a "destabil ization factor" on world oil prices. 59 It
did, but however the effect seemed trivial since the excess figure
represented what BP would have at any rate sold to customers all
be it on contract basis.
Another major agreement was between the government of Nigeria
and Elf's Safrap under which the company "is to be allowed to resume
operations in association with the government, which will acquire a
35 percent interest in the Company, scaled to rise later to 50 percent
One important feature of this agreement and all others is the
provision for government "participation" and ultimately control of
oil operations. The government announced in 1972 that no further
rights would be granted under Decree 51 and that henceforth all
rights would be granted in the form of production-sharing contracts
and service contracts through the government's national oil company.
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By decree of April 27, 1971, the Nigerian National Oil
Company (now Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC) was
established. This organization, although it "had no statutory duty
to regulate and supervise the operations of the oil industry in Nigeria
nevertheless became the instrument with which the government was able
to concretely carry out her participation policy. NNOC requested
thirty five percent participation in 1973 from operating oil companies
in Nigeria, and in 1975 raised its request to fifty five percent and
in 1979 to sixty percent. Most companies, including Agip, Marathon,
Texaco/Chevron, Phillips, Mobil, and others signed "agreements of
assent to participation" in early 1974. The policy became effective
April 1, 1974, and "covers all production." Under the agreement,
the government obtained fifty five percent participation, but allowed
producers options to buy up to 86.25 percent of total production. 61
In pursuit furthermore of Decree 27, NNOC was empowered to enter into
contract or partnership with any company, firm or person, who, in its
opinion, will "facilitate the discharge of its duty." Negotiations
as a result became more difficult and protracted because the
national oil corporation "shall have powers to do anything which in its
opinion is calculated to facilitate the carrying out of its duties"
and because the "Commissioner" was granted enormous powers. 62
Enormous and unproperly defined powers inevitably led to finding
faults where there was none and consequently some of these
participation agreements were slow to finalize. Texaco and Standard
of California announced final agreement on fifty five percent only
in January 1978.
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Safrap Agreement was signed 1n 1972
. Under ^ §
1,81 thl>ty
—
"»^«« in an „f Satrap's interest
was obtained to be Increased 1„ stages to .^^^ ^
the JOint venture's crude oi, production reaches 400,000 barrels per
percentage has been review *n *vis d to sixty percent in conformity with
the general rule.
By far, the most controversial of these agreements was signed
with Ashland Oil (Nigeria) Ltd., on 3une 12, 1973. This agreement
» ^sed on new innovative concession regime known as production sharing
described earlier in this chapter. Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) actina on hohaif „* *ul g be l of the government appoints Ashland
Oil Company to conduct petroleum operations. Ashland bears
exploration costs "and has economic interest in development of crude
oil deposits in the contract area." The company also bears risks if
no commercial discovery is made. Proceeds from the sale of up to
forty percent of crude oil produced, known as "cost oil," is set aside
for the recovery of capital invested by Ashland and the company's
operating expenses. A percentage of the remaining part is set aside
for the payment of all fiscal dues by Ashland. The net remaining is
shared between the government and Ashland in the ratio of 65-35
percent basis for output of up to 50,000 barrels per day and 70-30
percent basis if output exceeds 50,000 barrels per day.
Although government's policy on new agreements were in general
tough, and although government officials followed prudent measures
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on negotiating deals, Ashland agreements were embroiled in
controversy. It was generally thought Ashland earned a better deal
by enjoying the uniquely newly introduced marketing commission on
specified quantity of NNPC oil disposed by the company. Moreover,
Ashland secured access to the much needed low sulphur Nigerian crude
for a comfortable period of time which under older concession regimes
would have otherwise been difficult. Although it is because of the
"measure of its success" in Indonesia (which pioneered it), that
production-sharing was adopted by Nigeria and by other major country
producers, advantages went to Ashland because "the overall management
of petroleum operations by the State" which is one of the provisions
of production sharing regime, was left largely to Ashland Company
due to technical reasons. Nigerian planners presently have not,
unfortunately, mastered the intricacies of petroleum production
technology. Although the state legally retains overall management
control, in practice, the oil company exercises day-to-day control.
A major reason for the adoption of production-sharing contracts and
service-contracts by the government of Nigeria was because of the
political significance of the new legal arrangements which was a
factor in quieting informed public opinion on issues of petroleum
concession regimes. Although in practice, the control of the
petroleum operations tended to remain in the hands of the contractor,
the ownership factor was not without significance. 63 The essence
of these innovative contracts was its attractiveness based on the
notion of national control. At a time when calls for "natural
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resource ideology" became a cliche, production sharing and service
contracts were engaged largely to cement the politics of transforma-
tion and add legitimacy to this transformation. Indeed Nigerian
public opinion needed that, and the notion of control became
synonymous with supervisory effectiveness and efficiency.
In pursuit of her policy of diversifying agents for the
country's crude oil production, Nigeria also granted an oil
Prospecting License No. 90 to Occidental Petroleum of Nigeria
commencing October 1, 1971 and good for five years. This, of course,
was subject to the Petroleum Decree 1969 and the regulation there-
under. This agreement was the joint venture type and different from
the more innovative types described above. The government, through
its agent, the NNPC, participates in an undivided working interest
with Occidental in the proportion of fifty one percent for the
government and forty nine percent for Occidental. This arrangement
is different from innovative methods because "all investments, costs
and expenses of operations borne by in proportion to respective
percentages interest provided" however, until discovery of petroleum
in commercial quantities Occidental shall advance all funds necessary
and shall be solely responsible for all investments, costs and
expenses
.
Unlike the production sharing agreements of Ashland Oil
Company, arrangements with Occidental place enormous financial
burdens on the company while the government retains a de jure control
of operations. Occidental's strategy has been one of gaining access
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to Nigeria's oil fields, and although the financial rewards are
based on gating instincts, the company nevertheless went along with
the deal. An unprecedented loss on the company's side will, of
course, be written off as tax deductible in the parent country. There-
fore, on the whole, the arrangements were attractive because from
discovery of petroleum in commercial qunatities, NNPC shall pay
currently its share of all investments, costs and expenses, 64 and
Occidental won the right of management and "as operator" of the
joint venture.
In general, the outcome of negotiations leading to agreements
tend to depend on the nature of demands made or not made by partici-
pants. However, I submit that the presence or absence of certain
crucial variables alter the bargaining situation and strength of
either participant in the negotiation process. It is evident that
company's operations in both resource and product markets are
often influenced by impositions made, or not made, by the government
of Nigeria. Conversely, it is clear that company's operations in
the country is dependent on how favorable the country's commercial
and foreign investment laws are to it. This situation, thus, results
in bargaining between actors in which each negotiating agent is
intent upon obtaining the most preferred conditions. However, in
Nigeria, investment and commercial laws have been most favorable to
oil companies who are exempted from the several rounds of
"indigenization" decree.
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This is, of course, not to argue that negotiations and
arrangements in Nigeria's oil industry have been smooth and devoid
of conflicts demands and factors. Intense bargaining and negotiations
characterize it, and usually bargaining in these situations involves
the perception of a desired position or an outcome dually acceptable
to negotiators. Participants juggle for a position which enhances or
"maximizes" a "desired state of affairs" in which the perceived
benefits outweigh costs. This realtionship which approximates the
direct-response phase of negotiation, is typical of the bargaining
model developed by several writers. 65 The central focus of the bar-
gaining model is upon the impact the variables of impatience,
flexibility, dependency and reciprocal demand intensity have on
the cost-to-benefit ratio established in a bargaining situation.
The suspicious nature of government officials, initially
unaware of the many complexities surrounding the international
petroleum industry, have combined lack of oil experience with a very
justifiable feeling of rationalistic caution regarding foreign
exploitation of a depleting natural asset. This view that oil is
not a "lasting natural asset" and- therefore one has to make the
maximum out of it dominated the mentality of Nigerian oil planners
and negotiators. Because oil is a much needed commodity, Nigerian
negotiators were extremely patient in negotiating oil deals with
international oil companies operating within the country. In addition,
Nigeria is first and foremost a rich agricultural country, 66 and
this fact gave the Nigerian authorities added boosts and more
bargaining chips in the negotiating process. They know that if the
0,1 sector falters, recourse to agricultural sector is inevitable
Unfortunately, the faith placed on agricultural production has been
-Placed and distorted. Agricultural sector is performing dismally
Poor and paradoxically this sector has proved to be the Achilles Heel
of Nigeria at the negotiation tables. Nigeria has to feed her
teeing millions; the authorities know this, the oi, company
are made to reach agreements with these companies with the necessity
for averting national catastrophe. The perils of not reaching
agreements are compounded by the fact that Nigeria is a developing
nation and hence needs every dime of the oil revenue. Nevertheless,
efforts are always made at extracting the maximum concession from
the oil companies by insisting on reaching the "bargaining reference"
(that which is reasonable to seek) based on internal and global
conditions of the oil industry.
Nigeria's entrance into OPEC was a giant step into
realizing substantially the dreams, power and wealth which comes with
ownership and production of petroleum, but she has, on several
occasions, broken ranks with this organization fundamentally on
matters affecting national interests and security. On the fence
posture of Nigeria regarding her membership in OPEC reflects the
acrimonious fact that membership has "remained an issue of public
debate" and very controversial ever since the country joined the
"cartel." This shaky relationship has been largely so because of
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the topsy-turvy nature of the international oil industry and because
Nigeria which has, since the "oil boom" depended precariously on the
oil sector as the major source of foreign exchange and development
finance, have on several occasions experienced "many ups and downs"
in the oil enterprise. Dependence on OPEC (an organization dominated
by Arab states) for crucial and sensitive policy decisions simply
did not augur well for Nigeria. And right from her inception into the
organization, skepticisms, debates and controversies have characterized
her membership, and occasionally, questions from respectable
quarters have been heard on whether Nigeria needed OPEC membership,
dismissing in effect, the benefits and costs inherent in being a
member of OPEC. Clearly, a necessity for choice exists; dismissing OPEC
as an institutional burden is not a logical step or alternative to
follow in situations calling for reflection.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
was formed on September 9, 1960 as "an act of protest... a revolt against
the highhandedness of the multinational oil companies," 67 who
have kept oil prices "artificially low." One of the functions of
the organization is therefore to ensure a fair price to oil and
"such price shall be determined by the government. 1,68 Realizing
that oil is and will be an important commodity to advanced industrial
nations and that the supply of this commodity is limited, the
thirteen countries which make up the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries have been bargaining from positions of enormous
strength. In addition to possessing the preponderant share of the
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Free World petroleum reserves and accounting for nearly ninety
percent of the oil moving into world markets, the OPEC countries
"have banded together to form a highly effective bargaining unit in
dealings with major oil companies. However, OPEC nations may or may
not be able to maintain their cohesiveness in future years." 69
But what is OPEC? and why has the organization been a
fascinating subject of study for political scientists, economists
as well as statesmen? We shall begin to answer these questions by
mentioning the various stages of the development of that organization,
its behavior within these various stages, taking into consideration
four fundamental theories explaining behavior. Conventional wisdom
endorses the view that OPEC is a cartel. But what kind of cartel is
it? We make the distinction between ordinary commercial oligopolies
or cartels and political cartels organized by intergovernmental
solidarity. We believe although international oil has undeniable
economic consequences, economic considerations tend to serve
political goals. Depending on how one characterizes OPEC and the
consuming nations, events in global oil is best understood as an
interplay of competing interests and we would wish to emphasize on
the uncertainties and complexities which characterize the global
oil industry.
Following a conference held in Baghdad in September 1960,
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was
established by the then five major producer countries: Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Kuwait, Iraq and Venezuela. Events that led to the formation
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of this organization included the realization that the price of oil
has been kept "artificially low" by producing oil companies. Producer
governments became gradually aware also that substantial economic
rents from the world oil market could accrue to them if they pressed
demands. In addition, and perhaps the most important feature in ex-
plaining OPEC behavior is that "OPEC would no longer allow its fate
to be tied to the world oil market but rather would insist upon
being insulated from the market." 70 Hence the use of "shadow prices"
as a basis for tax payments to producer governments.
Market conditions, as James M. Griffin pointed out, "greatly
limited" OPEC's set of possible action. 71 A surplus of oil flooded
the world market and the emergence of new oil producers aggravated
the situation further. Thus neither OPEC protests, nor subsequent
negotiations with the oil companies restored prices to the former
level s
.
By the early 1970s, however, demand of oil outstripped
supply and OPEC's strength increased dramatically. Thus three major
systemic developments were put in motion: (1) Participation
arrangements, (2) Production controls, (3) Changes in the tax
structure. Libya, under Colonel Gaddafi, spearheaded the drive for
more government revenue. In order to strengthen its bargaining
position, the Libyan government ordered a series of production
cutbacks, and won out over Occidental Oil Company which was "singled
out" for pressure. Libyan success sent waves of protests over the
entire Gulf region and "leap frogging" became a regular feature
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of oil negotiations. The Libyan negotiations thus were of critical
importance to the entire structure of international oil pricing. 72
Between December 9-12, 1970, OPEC countries met in Caracas,
Venezuela and adopted Resolution Number XX 1120 which called for a
fifty five percent tax rate for all member countries as well as various
other adjustments. Major concessions were won from the oil
companies under the terms of the following negotiated agreements:
Date
February 1971
April 1971
June 1971
January 1972
December 1972
March 1973
June 1973
Agreement
Teheran
Tripol i
Mediterranean
Geneva
OPEC Participation
Iranian Consortium
Geneva Supplemental
Countries involved
Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq
Kuwait, Qatar, and
Saudi Arabia
Libya
Saudi Arabia and Iraq
Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq
Kuwait, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia
Abu Dhabi, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Saudi
Arabia
Iran
Abu Dhabi
,
Kuwait,
Iran, Iraq, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia
The Teheran agreement provided for an average 30<t per barrel
immediate increase in government take escalating to 50<t by 1975.
In addition, "its provisions constituted a "binding settlement" on
the parties for five years for the purposes of establishing security of
supply and stable financial arrangements. This agreement lasted for
only six months after which fresh negotiations started.
li
Teheran Agreed was closely followed by a March 20, 197,
Tripoli settles which resulted in an Mediate increase in Libyan
governs take of 65* per barrel. This increase is on the average
about 20« to 30. per barrel higher than what the government achieved
in September and October of 1970.
The Geneva and OPEC participation Agreements were unique
and very much unlike Teheran and Tripoli, Geneva agreement
adjusted for the ,971 U.S. dollar devaiuation. The Supp,ementa,
version increased the posted price to adjust for the second U.S.
do„ar devaluation. The Participation Agreement provided the host
countries with a twenty five percent equity in the companies'
operations to be increased gradually to fifty one percent by 1982.
These percentages act only as guidelines; members of the organization
retain the right under Djakarta Agreement of 1963 to demand what
percentage suited the national interest. Thus in Nigeria, this
percentage escalated to sixty percent while in Saudi Arabia it is
one hundred percent.
On October 16, 1973, just days after the outbreak of the fourth
Arab-Israeli war, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Iran and Abu
Dhabi declared themselves to-be "sole arbiters" of price and
unilaterally raised their crude oil posted price by an average
of $1.99 to $5.00 per barrel. This increase effectively nullified
the Teheran Agreement. Other OPEC members subsequently announced
similar increases.
In November 1973, the international oil companies protested
this unilateral OPEC action. But it was clear that the era of negotiated
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Pricing had come to an end. Shortly after this, there was a one
hundred thirty percent hike in the posted price of oil to $11 65
While the origin of the Arab oil embargo was political, the international
supply crisis it created drove up market prices and while OPEC did
not raise international oil prices in 1974, member countries
continued to raise international oil prices. By 1980, the Iranian
revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War sent prices to over $32
per barrel and considerable differences of opinion, arose over the
appropriate price increase among OPEC members. OPEC, argues Fereidum
Fesharaki, has never any clear, long term policy but to get the best
price it could given the various systemic constraints, 73 and neither
did the members agree on any unified pricing schedule. The question
of differential pricing schedule has been a very difficult one
and despite millions of dollars and uncountable computer time
devoted to this issue, there never was answers.
Inspite of these problems, OPEC recognizes immediate and
long term prospects of the global oil market. Realizing the
dangers of flooding a soft-market with oil, OPEC has prudently
instituted production cut-backs and quotas to shore up a sagging
market. The present $29 per barrel of OPEC oil seems to hold
until 1985, however, the OPEC group must contend with non-OPEC
producers who are increasingly cutting. into the market once held by
OPEC.
This brings us to the question of OPEC behavior. Is OPEC
really a cartel? We think it is a cartel with the same goals as
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any other but a different sort. An exhaustive analysis of OPEC as a
cartel is well beyond the scope of this work, but we do believe that
several energy experts have argued it is not. Several theories have
been advanced
-
some useful, others merely polemical - explaining
OPEC behavior. We examine some of these theories while conceding that
theories designed solely to predict behavior have inherent limits
to success or failure. For these purposes, we examine models of OPEC
behavior, advanced by James M. Griffin and David J. Teece in
th61> b00k
> OPECjm^eha^^ (1982)>
the authors categorize model behavior into two major groups:
(1) Wealth-maximizing models and,(2) Nonweal th-Maximizing Models.
These categories are further broken down as shown:
Monopoly: Dominant Producer Mo de 1
Weal th-Maximizing Models
Competition: Property Rights Model
Target Revenue Model
Nonweal th-Maximizing Models /
NPol itical Models
The monopoly or dominant producer model sees Saudi Arabia - the
OPEC member with the largest oil reserve - in the role of setting
price allowing the other producers the option of selling "all they
wish." Thus essentially, Saudi Arabia is the "swing producer"
capable of absorbing fluctuations on demand and supply in the world
market in order to maintain monopoly price. The Property Rights model
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attributes the dramatic increase in the price of oil before and after
1973/74 to the change in ownership patterns which began in the early
1970s. However, it could not explain the equally dramatic
doubling of oil prices in 1978/79. Thus we look closer to other
models for answers. Target revenue model posits that production
and pricing decisions are made with reference to the requirements
of national budgets. But we do know that several OPEC members
including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have produced oil in excess of
what they need to meet national development budget. This model
is a more adequate description of OPEC behavior in the short run
than in the long run. This brings us to the last model - Political
models. While economic wealth or determinism is important, it is not
the sole factor in guiding decisions. From the view of OPEC
nations, while wealth maximizing models seem a guide through global
oil market, the overriding factor in the disposition of their oil is
political influence and security. Theodore Moran makes this point
in the context of Saudi Arabia political decision-making process. 74
We argue that although wealth-maximizing models seem
important in determining energy policies of producer-governments, they
only serve long range political goals - goals which embody political
models. Dealings in international oil is thus generally political
in nature. These models should attempt measuring not so much wealth
an OPEC member might make in the world oil market, but the power to
control, to nationalize, and the power to cut production and set
prices. OPEC nations, unlike other cartels with rigid agreements on
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Prices, production controls and market shares, merely agree on
production quotas and on the price of OPEC marker crude oil. Ordinary
commercial cartels can easily incur the wrath of puhlic consumers
and the disciplinary powe rs of governments under which they operate-
OPEC cartel is an association of sovereign, independent nations with
no central authority to account to, and with a large segment of
world public opinion in support of the call for a New International
Economic Order.
The formation of OPEC largely meant the effective control of
"ember nations over their natural petroleum reserves and this control
has been translated into a success in achieving their objectives.
OPEC is essentially a cartel; a coalition of a group of oil producers
whose intention is the control, and maximization of benefits
derivable from their commodity. In this, there was an implicit
assumption that there is an advantage in banding or coming together
over a declared purpose. In a sellers market where great advantage
lay in forming cartels, any seller "who fails to attempt a coalition
in such circumstances will lose or, more exactly, will gain less.
On the economic premise that man seeks gain, it follows that he
must attempt to form a coalition." 75 Coalition, in this sense,
is based on "cooperative agreement" or arrangements which assume
the possibility that two or more players will cooperate to beat
the rest. However, arrangements for coalition does not
necessarily mean or imply integration of decision-making. If at
all, it means integration of functional decision-making, which in
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the case of OPEC, has occasionally been fragile. The "logic of
isomorphism" which is understood to underlie most need for
integration 77 exist in OPEC only to the extent of forging a
united front against the "highhandedness" of the international oil
companies. Using as a major indicator, the "volume of transactions"
as advocated by Karl Deutsch, 78 to determine the extent of inte-
gration in OPEC's decision-making structure, one finds that
volume or level of transactions as indicators may be misleading
because members largely act or reach decisions on issues largely from
the perspective of national interest. When decisions are mutually
or collectively arrived at, it is not always an indication of the
harmony of national interests; rather it is an indication of solidarity
behind the organization which is susceptible to "break up" when
crucial and difficult issues face her. This single assumption
explains why the organization is presently going through a rough
period. The assertion that OPEC is about to break up is at
best a premature prognosis; worst of all, it could be a cry from
anxious consumers eager to see the cartel fold up. I submit that the
present crisis is temporary and strategical; one where advantage
lay in gradual transformation.
Identifying OPEC's long and short term strategy in detail
is beyond the scope of this study, but one point is clear - that
major decisions reached must reflect the collective interests of the
members of the group which in many cases replace the interest of
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irnal
individual
.e.bers. In a collective sense, OPEC, despite inte,
rivalry and differences, has managed to catalogue a list of
objectives and achievements.
First, the OPEC countries have sought to gain control over
production and pricing decisions of their crude oil. These have
usually taken the for. of service-contracts and production-sharing
agreements with each nation's petroleum companies. Arrangements
have been termed "innovative" because of emphasis on "control."
In pursuance of this, Resolution 90 demanding participation was
passed by OPEC in 1968, however, serious negotiations to this effect
started in 1972. Resolution 139 permitted other member nations
to independently negotiate their own "participation percentages."
Second, a remarkable success was achieved toward increased
government revenues. The rising royalty and tax payments per barrel,
coupled with growing volumes of output, are occasioning some very
large increases" in the total financial income of the OPEC countries.
Mr. John McLean, chairman and chief executive officer of Continental
Oil Company, has estimated that "in the 15-year period (1971-1985),
the total funds flowing to the OPEC countries will aggregate at
least half a trillion dollars - approximately nine times the amount they
received in the prior 15-year period." 79 This huge transfer indeed
represents the "mos't dramatic expansion of wealth and financial
power" ever transferred to a "small group of countries."
Thirdly, the creation of what I have earlier termed elements
of independence gave added impetus to the need for control
. OPEC
19;
countries are increasing training their own nationals in the
technical and managerial skills required for the intricacies of the
OH business. Today, most OPEC nations reguire that the oil
companies employ nationals in key operational activities and in
prescribed percentages.
Fourth, on several occasions, OPEC countries have sought to use
their oil resources as a weapon for political purposes. Most
notable of these are the
-ceaseless agitation against every vestige
of colonialism, neo-colonialism and white racism" and of the
"humiliation of the colonial past." In some cases, these are more
than rhetoric. Agitation and reaction carries weight and for the
Arabs, Nigeria and Venezuela, the early 1970s served as an
appropriate time to apply "excruciating economic and political pressure-
on the west. For the Arabs, the main beneficiaries are Israeli's
adversaries, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO);
in Nigeria's case, insurgent blacks in South Africa. Its early
effect was primarily to make North-South relations even more tense. 80
There are reports of Libya's nationalization of British Petroleum
Companies properties in Libya allegedly for aiding the Shah of Iran
in the "takeover of three small islands at the mouth of the Arabian
Gulf," claimed by Arab countries. British Petroleum was punished
because oil was used as a "weapon of Arab self-defense." No less
a personality than Sheikh Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister, who
proclaimed openly that his country may not expand production as
"programmed to meet the requirements of the United States and other
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free world countries over the next decade unless a suitable
political climate prevailed" over the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Inspite of these achievements, which was largely possible
because of the collective will of its members,
"pronounced
differences" among OPEC members in terms of pricing decisions,
allocation of production "quotas," economic conditions and
political ideologies, threaten the survival and even the existence
of the organization.
More importantly, external forces apparently would like to
see the cartel weakened or preferably dead. The United States,
which consumes more than forty percent of OPEC's oil, has
engaged extensively (both covert and overt actions) with allies in order
to weaken the cartel. Says M.A. Adelman, "instead of talking about
'destroying' the cartel, we should take measures to contain or
81damage it." Although the means of inflicting damage on the cartel
vary, a fundamental agreement among western industrial nations is
that OPEC's power must be curtailed and contained. Cooperative
arrangements through the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),, it
was argued, could ease individual member nation's energy
difficulties, albeit temporary, and organized policies instrumentally
executed through these organs may act as a united front against
OPEC's policy.
Peter Odell reports that
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By 1975, the United States conscious of the near futurelikelihood of the enormous strains in the Western
system
- has reversed its earlier, pre-1973 policy
of seeking cooperation with the OPEC countries. Insteadit began to see confrontation as the required - andindeed the only
- alternative. The formation of the
International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974 was related
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U WaS constit^ed as a means wherebyhe worlds rich oil-importing nation's strategies and
tactics could be coordinated and strengthened and thisindeed, is what has happened in the six years that
have now passed since its creation. 82
In fact, the policy aims as embodied in the IEA, inter alia
invites policies which are geared toward exploiting the differences
and diversity within OPEC with the aim of sowing seeds of discord
and animosity where possible in order to ensure OPEC's demise.
Diversity in this sense has worked precisely well to the advantage
of the creators of IEA. Containing OPEC's economic and political
power was the game; the strategy to this end was effectively
exploiting the internal weaknesses of firstly, the organization,
and secondly, the member nations. And OPEC, despite avowed
solidarity and commonality of interests, became a victim of internal
squabbles and intrigue. As I argued elsewhere, the present crisis
within the ranks of OPEC should not be readily interpreted as
leading to its demise. To do so would mean rendering hasty judgments
devoid of concrete judicious analysis. Moreover, the present crisis
reveals a period in the history of OPEC through which they must pass.
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Although divisions within OPEC run deep, such divisions
are inevitable in one stage of its life; this is the stage and it should
not be confused with the possibilities of the cartel "losing its
clout." A day hardly passes without the international petroleum
industry and OPEC making news. Recently, news was that OPEC's
failure to agree on production quotas and prices "could bring it
down." While this has been largely true, it reflects the needs -
political and economic conditions of member states - and the state
of global economy which has contributed its own quota of "oil glut"
and falling prices. Member states of OPEC have on most occasions
based their decisions and judgments on matters affecting the
organization solely on the dictates of national interest. Although,
at several points, there was a need for centralized decision-making
within OPEC on specific issues, such as the allocation of production
quotas and the maintenance of specific or established prices, and
although each member "agreed to a quota," the "pact proved to be
a sham." Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Venezuela and Iran all exceed their
ceilings. Desperate to boost output and revenues, they started
cheating on price as well.
In this context, I dwell on Nigeria and her role in the
organization, exploring and analyzing the advantages and costs of
membership, taking into consideration recent debates and controversy
over the nation's membership in OPEC. Debates and controversy arose
in part because Nigeria has recently experienced a series of upheavals
in the oil industry which repeatedly threaten its development plans
and indeed political stability.
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In terms of decision-making within the OPEC organization,
Nigeria has essentially followed a two-track and, at times,
multi-track system whereby contingency plans are drawn up to be
followed should an OPEC decision outcome prove to be detrimental
and inimical to the interests of the nation. This strategy has
consistently underlined the strategical behavior of Nigeria on
matters of crucial and important OPEC decisions. During the
Arab-Israeli War of 1973, when Arab countries inflicted an oil
embargo on the industrial west, Nigeria broke ranks with mainstream
policy and supplied the United States, Holland and other interested
buyers of her oil. Production quotas set by OPEC including price
levels have on several occasions been broken by Nigeria and other
members including Indonesia and Iran when not compatible with the
national interest. Difficulties in keeping faith with OPEC
commitments and resolutions arise in part because of what I call
factors of vulnerability. OPEC members who have consistently reneged
on commitments are those who have "teeming populations," are engaged
in massive development projects and hence need every revenue they
can get from their crude oil, and in general whose economic fortunes
are closely linked with developments in global oil industry.
Indeed, Nigeria has experienced unprecedented upheavals and
crisis after crisis in her dealings with the international oil industry
As global oil sales took a beating and swung downwards, and as the
"oil boom" gave way to oil crisis, "it will be recalled that in
1977-78, the crude oil market was so depressed that we have to
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resort to barter. We gave oil in settles for some of our
COmmitmentS '' 84
^ in > 1n ^e first quarter of ,982, Nigeria
"confronted formidable problems on both the external and domestic .
fronts" because a sharp decline in output resulted in "serious cash
flows" which had a disruptive effect on her Fourth National Develops
Plans. On the domestic front, the oil companies
"agitated for a higher
profit margin" threatening to abandon new oil fields if the
government did not respond favorably to their demands. Industry
sources said the action was a sequel to the increasing high cost of
production and failure of the Federal government to review the
profit margin due to oil companies. One oil company reportedly
halted the development of an oil field in the Otuo area, which
could increase Nigeria's output by about 4,000 barrels per day, unless
the official profit margin on a barrel of oil is improved. 85
Similar measures extend to companies operating in Escaravos in the
south-east, off-shore areas. On these matters, the Federal
government has maintained "inexplicable silence" suggesting deep
and comprehensive policy measures. By the present equity share,
the government receives 98.2 percent of the profit while the
companies get 1.8 percent, based on a 60/40 joint venture agreement.
In February of 1982, a slackness in the global oil market
developed which was unexpected by oil producing nations, including
Nigeria. Slackness was in part due to the global economic recession
and massive conservation measures adopted by the oil consuming
nations. Nigeria was forced simultaneously to cut prices and reduce
Production. She was generally believed to be . »tW when , n^
the British National 01! Company (BNOC, cut he. North Sea oil of
comparability. Nloeria, from $35 per barrel to S3,
the lead set by Britain and Norway, cut the price of her low sulphur
hi gh q ua 1 i ty oil by$5
. 5o perbarrelto$30perbarreK
AlthQugh
9reat dlplomatic maneuvers usua, ly underlie these price-cutting wars
n was general,, reasoned that With a huge but poor population to
feed and the eighty-two oillion dollar Develops P,an to
and break the OPEC line. 86
The fact is that Nigeria, including a few OPEC nations
for. the "weakest link in the OPEC chain." They possess factors
of vulnerahility in the magnitude far greater than other memhers.
Thus, they are vulneraole and are liable to suffer costs imposed
by external events even after policies have heen altered. 87 Memhers
of OPEC who constitute the weakest link are also susceptible to be
"sensitive" on policies enacted outside their borders because
"responsiveness" within the OPEC policy framework usually is swift
and geared towards the avoidance of transiting changes in a member
country into costly changes in another. Interdependence within the
organization is thus seen as a means of securing the benefits of the
cartel while minimizing costs by transforming the position when
national interest demands it. Although "sensitivity involves degrees
of responsiveness within a policy framework," vulnerability is
201
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particularly important for understanding the political structure of
interdependence relationships because in one sense it focuses on which
actors are the "definers of the ceteris paribus clause," or
can set the rules of the game. 88 On this score, Saudi Arabia, which
controls the preponderant portion of OPEC production output, and
which has developed a "special relationship" with the United States,
is in a unique position to influence prices and hence production limits.
This is of course not to say that the Saudis are not vulnerable.
They are, and recent developments in the oil industry prove it. With
substantial cuts in oil price by Britain, Norway and Nigeria, the
Saudi Oil Minister, Zaki Yamani has made it clear that his government
will do everything possible to maintain the established price of
crude oil and defend the country's wealth. The point to make within
the policy framework of OPEC is that the degrees of sensitivity and
vulnerability displayed by each member nation varies with factors of
vulnerability, and in turn, generally explains the tendency toward
reneging on concerted policy actions.
Nigeria remains vulnerable within the policy framework of OPEC,
and although she has gained tremendously in terms of huge price
increases of her crude oil, she is still nevertheless perched on the
fence. The idea of production quotas and price ceilings set within
the policy of OPEC was thought on several occasions to breach her
sovereign authority. A nation that has not suffered a loss in
policy authority finds it almost difficult to accept one arising
from a central organ because acceptance means a loss in sovereign powers
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which in many cases have been considered dangerous. After bei
targeted by British diplomacy to reduce its crude oil price
Nigeria came under "tremendous financial pressure" and was forced to
hold the line by other OPEC members. She decided to hold the
price line and accepted on her volition the 1.3 million
barrels per day production quota alloted her by the OPEC March 19
Vienna agreement. Soon after production slumped to 600,000 barrels
Per day "oil tankers were leaving her shores empty because of the
prevailing price" and major oil companies operating domestically
served her "phase out" notices. Even third party buyers who
normally buy at arms-length prices, "simply walked away from their
contracts .
"
Tremendous pressure put on Nigeria forced her to reexamine
her role and relationship within OPEC, and more importantly, the
nature of commitment made to this organization. In the making of
certain commitments, it was thought that some strategical interests
were also lost to OPEC, and strategical game played by government
planners increasingly assumed a defensive posture. This is so
because the success of game theory in providing rigorous normative
solutions to decision-making problems does not hide the fact that
some realism has been sacrificed in the process. It has been
proposed that the concept of commitment be used to bridge the gap
between the normative formulation and the typical behavioral process
89in decision-making. This theoretical process of commitment in
policy-formulation has been a cornerstone of Nigeria's idea of
inery
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^-^^ the OPEC
The nature of the game to be played was one of tea. play; moreover,
it was one which does not risk everything on a quick checkmate. Rather
it was deliberate and purposeful, one where the advantage lay in the
gradual transformation of the position.
However, the necessity for collective action embodied in OPEC
Resolution (XXIV-134) offered attractive forum on which the
government of Nigeria thought it could gain and muster knowledge
needed to control her oil industry. Collective action also offered
collective security and risk-sharing, but this has, through experience,
been tempered by a necessity for choice. Participation by member
countries in oil production stipulated by Resolution 90 of 1968
became for most OPEC members a formidable instrument for initiating
control of their oil business. This resolution was further strengthened
by Resolution XXV-139 which reaffirms "the determination of member
countries to take immediate steps towards the implementation of
effective participation in the existing oil concessions. The
results of such negotiations shall be submitted to the conference for
coordination and in cases that "negotiations fail to achieve their
purpose" objectives will be enforced through concerted action. 90
Participation by producer-governments in their oil industry
is judged generally successful as a means of gaining eventual control,
but the "coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of
member countries and the determination of the best means for safe-
guarding their interests, individually and collectively" in light of
ion
le
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experience is proving to be perhaps far from successful. Resoluti
VIII-55, establishing the "commission," and promising "to examim
the position of petroleum prices on a permanent basis" has not been
very successful because the market as well as political developments
have tremendously influenced what was once thought as a formidable
organization. OPEC's charter has not completely lived up to
expectations and this loophole has afforded several members reasons
and avenues for departure. Several members, including Nigeria,
have come to base OPEC decisions on "opportunity" costs - the values
which must be sacrificed in order to achieve some other values. 91
In the process, rules of the game are usually bent, introducing a
situation of conflict because instructions and arrangements previously
ordained have been breached. The rules of the game are now the
rules of nature, i.e., survival in the game of international politics, i.e.,
national interst. The new rules thus are invariably dependent
and legitimized on the assumption of unequal distribution of factor
endowment which subsequently forms part of the new rule.
From a sociological point of view, the concept of coalitions
may be very important in theory of games of strategy. Although the
idea is that often two players or more in combination can gain more
by playing together as a unit, the actual process of forming
92
coalitions is a competitive one. "As a rule a great deal of
bargaining will precede the determination of a system of gains or
93
profits among the members of the coalition." Thus, as Nigeria
experienced production cuts and later in the second quarter of 1982
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recovery came and production c,i mbe d up once more, some Gulf producers
•
led by Saudi Arabia demanded that Nigeria increase the differentia,
on the price of her "sweet" crude from 50* per barrel to $3.00 per
barrel. This move of course would make the price of Nigeria's Bonny
H9ht crude $37 per barrel, meaning that the crude is much less
competitive than the North Sea crude, which sells at $34 per barrel.
The implication simply is that the sale of Nigeria's crude win
stagnate, leaving others, including Saudi Arabia, to reap the
profits of extended sales. The proposal by the Saudis on the
price differentials is obviously unacceptable to Nigerian authorities
who have taken appropriate measures to safeguard the sale of the
nation's crude oil. In a sense, the determination of the distribution
of payments within OPEC might be considered an "auxilliary game or
subgame" since emphasis has been laid on political solidarity and
unity, however, normative deviations have occasionally been met by
induced collaboration and sometimes threats. Solutions have usually
taken the forms of alternatives formulated so that they withstand
"upsets from outside," while maintaining stability. Collectively,
alternatives eliminate the danger of revolutions but the balance
struck is most delicate and unstable and even becomes more sensitive
as the number of players increases.
The rationale of group decision-making primarily assumes that
each member ranks "motions" („ a definite order of preference. In
this sense, the member in question will always try to maximize the
mathematical expectation of his gain or utility in a game involving
"Sks. But there is abundant evidence that individua, decisions in
situations involving risks are not always made in ways that are
compatible with the assumption that decisions are made rationally
•nth a view to maximizing the expectatjon Qf^ ^ ^
example, recently slashed the price of her«-r«e her low sulphur crude oil
fro, the OPEC benchmark
„f $34 per barrel tQ ^ pfir^
the British and Norwegian lead. Al though she can rational ly exoect
"
to maximize her gain by sticking with OPEC's benchmark price she
nevertheless chose to cut price, triggering a chain of price cuts
from other members. Decision to cut price strictly was not made
with profit maximization as a goal. Rather, it was deemed most
appropriate in a situation involving risk to her domestic policies
because OPEC proved unreliable as a guarantee of continuous, tolerable
flow of oil revenue. Milton Friedman and L.J. Savage have correctly
Pointed out that the rejection of utility maximization as an
explanation of choices among different degrees of risk was a direct
consequence of the belief in diminishing marginal utility. 94
In Nigeria, there is the belief among policy makers that
strategies on oil matters must always be planned within an
institutional framework which will at least take into judicious
consideration the internal needs of the nation. And because the
"fortunes of the economy.
. .are closely linked with developments in the
oil industry,... my administration expects to maximize the value of
our crude oil resource." 95 Maximization of value has on several
occasions taken the form of political and ethical considerations. The
significance of political moves and considerations may be explained
208
m an Section year, whe
„ the incumbent Shehu Shagari professes the
desire of getting re-elected, he needs an infusion of oil revenue
at any cost, in order to execute the passive develops projects
at hand. Loss of oil revenue moreover, is bad news, no .after how
Justified, in an election year. Therefore, optimization of gain
took the for. of price slash to win customs of crude oil
. The
logic of the policy was undoubtedly optimization in the face of g,obal
adversity; its strategy and success was mostly pol itical ,and
political victory represents the optimal choice.
When strategical relationships within OPEC are examined, one
might be tempted to conclude that Nigeria's actions are, on the whole,
a bluff. Strategical relationships limits independent action,
but does not do so in situations where a choice between different
risks have to be made especially in a game where players are
unpredictable, even in terms of probabilities. In situations of
strategical competition, the best move of an actor usually depends
on the move of one's opponent and his actions; but the decisive move
is made independently of the opponent. Independent moves are necessary
in order to forestall any move by the opponent where advantage lay in
the transformation of the position, even when this implies bluffing.
Bluffing in itself is necessary in strategical situations and even
desirable to create uncertainty in the opponents mind as to the
motive behind a particular move. In this sense, Nigeria has shown
real resolve and false impression of strength in position of real
weakness by misleading her opponents in the international oil industry.
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made
I^essions such as these secure the desired gain, however, a
converse design may mean disaster and isolation fro. both friends
and foe alike
- a result of incorrect bluffing.
The destruction of pure opposition of interest within OPEC
n^t be said to be a prime reason for several strategical moves
by Nigeria and some OPEC members, including Iran. On most occasions
these moves are based largely on bluffing, and the importance of
"bluffing" lies not in the actual play, but in the protection which
U provides against the opponent's potential deviations from the
good strategy. This is essentially a "defensive" bluffing and used
widely against opponents who are far more powerful. Bluffing, when
used wisely, ray be largely interpreted as a law of survival. However,
in some games the pay-off function is of such a nature that secrecy
or bluffing or outright deception would not help any player. Knowing
what an opponent was going to do would not improve one's bargaining
position. Situations such as these are called games with complete
information; and they are said to be determined. 96 In the global
oil industry, games are played with incomplete information, and the
outcomes are usually not determined except of course on politically
arranged games. And therein lies the sources of advantage and costs
of membership to OPEC members.
Agitation and conflict within the OPEC is borne of diversity
including ideological differences which have on several occasions
threatened the solidarity, and viability of the organization. Several
periods in OPEC's history have witnessed the forces of reaction and
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agitation within its ranks threatening disintegration. 1982 will _
.
^wn as one of the ^ turbulent „ because Qf^
^
in the international oil indust™ i+ ...dustry. It saw the seller's market of
the ,970s turned into the buyers market of the early
,980s, while
lingering internal dissension and schisms raised fundamental
questions about the very survival of the organization. 97
This scenario set the stage for renegades and internal
dissension among the ranks of OPEC, precipitating, in the process
occasion on which to assess advantages and costs of membership. On
this regard, I assess the costs and benefits of Nigeria's membership
It has been asked "What does Nigeria gain by being a member nation of
the OPEC?" Indeed, it is a question worth asking and it is necessary
to state there are inherent costs and benefits of membership which,
of course, may not be equally and rationally allocated. The crucial
question for all coalitions then arises: how to divide the coalition's
gains and losses between two or more members? In Von Neumann's game
he has turned up some extraordinary revelations, for the price
of remaining in the coalition for any one player must be no less than
the cost of defection that the opposed single player could pay to
break the coalition. 98 Cost of defection may sometimes be high for
weak members "but under certain conditions weakness is not a
disadvantage," and for that reason, it does not always follow that
the fittest will survive. Within OPEC this principle has taken
the form of big actors, encouraging small. ones to hold the line for
the sake of the organization's survival. Thus for Nigeria, when times
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were tough, Saudi Arabia promised a one billion dollar, six month
interest free credit bail out. But "for some curious unexplained
reasons," assistance never materialized. Nigeria was forced to
"solve" her financial crisis independent of the big brother - the
Saudis. Emotions ran high on disappointment and other OPEC
failures, however, this is not to say that gains and losses have
not characterized Nigeria's membership.
Gains from Membership
In theory, two or more sellers or buyers of a commodity
form coalitions if there is an advantage in doing so. Nigeria's
policy to join the organization is not far from this assumption. A
major problem facing it and indeed the other members of the group
is one of determining exactly what the rules of the game are or
should be. This is a sticky issue within the organization presently,
but on the whole, members have benefited tremendously.
Nigeria has gained enormously in several ways: 1) the
bargaining strength of Nigeria has been greatly enhanced in
negotiations with international oil companies, because of knowledge
derived from international experience. This is reflected in the
"confidence" she now possesses leading to the creation of what was
earlier in this study referred to as elements of independence.
2) Membership has meant the enormous increase in the nation's oil
revenue in some cases by three hundred percent and between April 1979
and February 1980, oil prices increased from an average of $19 per
barrel to $34 per barrel, an increase of ninety percent within a
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Betore 1973. the tnn «,. an+„ d
was
Period of ten months. 9 * f , top quality Bonny crude
selling for less than $3 per barrel; in January 1981, it hit the
record high of $44 per barrel, on the spot market. As a result,
Nigeria reaped huge foreign exchange revenues from the oil sale.
Between 1977 and 1980, she earned $53.4 billion in hard currency as
oil revenues. 100 In May 1971, royalties and taxes due to the
government per barrel of crude oil were substantially increased in
an agreement that became effective in March 1971. The agreement
increased the posted base price for Nigerian crude by $0.36 per
barrel and at the same time eliminated many previously permissible
corporate deductions. The annual escalations of 2.5 percent and
$0.05 were precisely the same as OPEC provisions. 101 3) A giant
step was taken when in 1973, NNOC, now NNPC, requested thirty five
percent participation arrangements from operating oil companies.
This is in accordance with OPEC Resolution 90 of 1968 calling for
producer government participation in the oil industry. This
resolution gave the government an added impetus when in early 1972
she announced that "henceforth no concessions would be given
under the terms of Petroleum Decree 51." Henceforth, rights
obtained are to be through the government's National Oil Company (NNOC)
Participation meant in effect "the right to be consulted by the
oil companies in all matters" of oil activity. 4) Through
membership, Nigeria gained access to "valuable" strategic intelligence
information. Information on the international oil industry is
particularly important because of its strategic nature, and because
213
intelligence information is a meaningful statement which has been
selected, evaluated, interpreted, and finally expressed so that
its significance to a current national policy problem is clear. 102
In this, the OPEC's secretariat
"promotes many authoritative studies
on all aspects of the oil industry and offers special technical
advice, economic and statistical analyses," at "minimal cost" to
its members. Strategic Intelligence production is therefore
essential to a nation's foreign relations particularly where
"manipulation" is possible due to lack of information or lack of
coordinate activities. 5) Another major objective of the OPEC
which might benefit Nigeria include the coordination and unification
of petroleum policies of member-nations which would discourage
renegade and independent action; the stabilization of crude oil
prices and the defence of an established price, hence the
permission of a "steady" income to producing nations. Fiscal
provisions also include Petroleum Profits Tax Ordinance 1959
as amended. These amendments include Petroleum Profits Tax Decrees
of 1967, 1970, 1973, and 1975. The 1975 amendment raised Nigerian
tax and royalty rates to the "standard OPEC" rates of eighty five
percent and twenty percent respectively. 6) Nigeria would gain
tremendously from the OPEC's goals to "gain control." of down-stream
operations. Thus, "she can share the experiences of others in the
areas of refinery establishment and management, marketing organization
and oil transportation. It's ambitious program on Liquified Natural
Gas (LNG) and the establishment of petro-chemical plants would benefit
because her membership to OPEC would "ensure reasonably fair and
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equitable deals" with the international oil companies. 7) Nigeria's
prestige in the international oil industry is elevated as a
consequence of her membership in OPEC. Successive regimes since
1971 have all enjoyed international recognition among bankers around
the world and on the strength of this recognition, Nigeria has run
up serious foreign debt. Nigeria's external debt has been estimated
as high as $14 billion but compared with other financially troubled
countries, such as Brazil, "its small potatoes." Because of its good
credit rating, the government has also accumulated huge trade
debts, which totals to an estimated $5 billion. Rescheduling for
these nonbank debts is being handled by a group of financial
advisers
- New York's Kuhn Loeb, Paris based Lazard Freres and
S. G. Warburg of London. However, the new military government of
General Mohammed Buhari apparently intends to honor agreements
made by previous administrations. Special relationships, where
desirable, have also been developed. For example, the governments
of Nigeria and the United States have embarked on forming special
relationships of mutual interests. Most important of these include
the recently formed "Joint Agricultural Consultation Committee"
which will trade excess American agricultural products for
Ni geria ' s oil
.
Costs from Membership
In coalitions, the introduction of conflict and competition
usually arise when questions of how to allocate the market, how to
divide the coalition's gain and partition or absorb loss because
OPEC COUNTRIES. RESERVES AND PRODUCTION
Pmv#*H1 III*
Reserved
Bn bis
S. Arabia 167 4
Iran
- j.j
Iraq
Kuwait (4.2
UAE 2.3
Qatar
Neutral Zone <.8
Total above 3'.4.
4
Venezuela 21.5
Nigeria !6.7
Libya 21.5
Indonesia 9.5
Algeria 9.4
Gabon 0.5
Ecuador 1.4
OPEC total 4 14.9
Domestic consumption
Export availability(c^
Production^) million b/d
Potential 1982 1985 1990 2000
10.5 6.5 6.0 6.5 8.0
3.0 1.9 3.5 3.5 4.0
1 c
L.j 0.9 3.0 3.5 2.5
2.5 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.5
2.5 1.2 l.S 2.0 2.?
0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3
0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2
21.2 1 l.S 16.5 17.9 19.0
2.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.5
2.4 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.5
2.0 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.5
1.6 1.3 1.6 l.S 1.4
1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.! 0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
31.0 IS.
6
25.1 26.4 257
2.0 3.2 4.2 S.O
16.0 21.9 22.2 17.7
(a) Proved reserves arc reserves proved by drilling and recoverable at
present prices and with existing techniques.
(b) Production includes naiural gas liquids; potential means volume of
output sustainable with present facilities; 1982 figures partly
estimated; last three columns arc projections by the East-West
Centre, Honolulu.
(c) Includes natural gas liquids.
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members more often than not are of unequal strength. This organiza-
tion feature emanate from their general economic and political
strength and aspirations. The outcome of how to reach an agreement
is highly unpredictable. Economic theory has not been able to
offer any substantive explanation. If there is an agreement, it
usually involves costs and within the range of what Professor Pigou
calls "the range of practical bargains." 103 This observation
certainly characterizes OPEC relationships.
1) What Nigeria losses by being a member of OPEC is essentially
one of sovereignty within the framework of OPEC decision-making
machinery. Although as a member she has a voice and a casting vote,
in theory decisions arrived through the collective will of the
organization is legally binding. In this sense, she lost the power
to make production and pricing decisions independently. The nature
and character of the international oil industry makes it necessary
that on occasion members strictly adhere to the organization's
rules and decisions and sometimes to independently arrive at one.
The issue here is when and how to optimize decisions which do not
clash and which are not contradictory.
2) Petroleum is the single most beneficial and most strategic
natural resource for Nigeria, the "freedom forgone" to unilaterally
determine production and price margins could be very painful, because
it means the abdication to a foreign body the inherent powers to
dictate the pace of economic, social and political progress in the
country. Recent renegade policies of the government towards OPEC
and the international oil industry is a direct challenge and
'.
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reversal of this trend. Nigeria wants to set policies regarding
her oil independently, based on national interest, and this is
where policy clashes with those set by OPEC which represents
the collective will of the organization. Opponents of Nigeria's
membership have termed this situation the "loss of Nigeria's
sovereign power" to an external power.
3) As a member of OPEC, Nigeria's foreign policy suffers considerably
when OPEC fortunes dwindle because the strength and posture of the
nation's foreign policy depends to a large extent on the flow of
crude oil and therefore "petro-naira. " The nature of foreign
policy which the nation wishes to maintain is incumbent on the
prestige and power which the possession of oil invariably confers.
As a function of foreign policy, domestic policies suffer as well
because a strong domestic front is a necessity for a stable and
strong image abroad. Petroleum has provided a "solid basis" for
Nigeria in the international arena, and if such a fortune is tied
to the whims and caprices of an external regime, it is inevitable then
that the nation is vulnerable and sensitive both in her domestic
and foreign relations.
4) Within the OPEC regime, Nigeria may be vulnerable to strategic
behavior and interactions of its various members. Strong groups
exert strong influences on members toward conformity, and for
those nations, bedevilled with what is referred earlier as factors
of vulnerability, this could be dangerous. These pressures may
be directed either toward uniformity of thinking and behavior or to
219the fostering of heterogeneity of views. Acceptance of either of
these conformity pressures may satisfy the political, economic
or emotional needs of some members while frustrating those of
others. 04 in each case, members may be forced to become
"victims of group think."
Cost-benefit analysis of Nigeria's membership in OPEC has on
several occasions been misunderstood, and in some cases, outriahtly
misinformed. Analysis has, on the whole, been an exercise in
muddling through. Arguments are characterized by high emotional
content making it indeed very difficult to base decisions on
concrete rational grounds. It is important to keep in proper
perspective and focus the real nature of the issues at stake. The
real issues which need informed attention is how the country could
maximize the benefits from her oil resources while minimizing
costs in the process. OPEC has, in most cases, provided the
vehicle toward optimization of gain while offering or shielding
members from rough times. The argument, then, should be to
what extent has OPEC offered the above goodies and protection. The
answer is definitely open to debate. Certainly, this is not a
place to set in a comprehensive manner the pros and cons of
membership. Such an attempt is well beyond the scope of this
study. Suffice it to say that any nation, or organization or individuals
for that matter, who decides to form coalitions for some common
benefit must expect and accept a measure of erosion of sovereign
powers
.
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Another argument to the contrary based on a different but
safer scenario, is a regime or arrangement in the international oil
industry where sovereign nations take over crucial negotiations
affecting the oil industry with oil companies playing complementary
and peripheral roles. This regime will offer alternative
bargaining model to the current company-government approach. The
need for alternative arrangements and choice is based on
experiences and concrete lessons derived from the history of the
international oil industry.
Alternative Model: Government-Government Approach
Transnational oil companies no longer play the traditional
dominant or hegemonical role in the international oil system, which
they once did. During the 1930s, oil concessions were granted
to the oil companies largely by Middle East countries. This type
of concession gave these companies the right to develop the countries'
petroleum resources and full ownership of oil produced. Outright
ownership of any oil produced thrusted enormous decision-making powers
in the hands of the companies concerned, and participation in oil
matters by producing countries was minimal and in most cases inferior.
Today, production and pricing revolution begun by the
events of 1973 to 1974 signalled the demise of the era of negotiated
price in the international oil industry and throughout the Middle
East and other major oil producing regions, the traditional concessional
system appear to be coming to a rapid end. Innovative agreements,
such as production-sharing arrangements, service-contracts or
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management agreements and someti.es outright nationalizations have
replaced the" outmoded concession system.
Sweeping transformation of the international oil industry
triggered massive revision in the modus operandi of major oil
companies and led to unprecedented
"unsettling shift" among them.
Recent "mega mergers" among oil companies point accurately to the
fact that oil wars which were largely fought in the oil fields
of the Middle East and other third world producing regions before
the 1970s, have now been shifted to the home fronts of the oil
majors. Thus in January 6, 1984, Texaco seeking easy and profitable
oil reserves, gobbled up Getty Oil with estimated reserves of
1.9 billion barrels of oil, for $10.1 billion. Combined annual
sales at merger is estimated at $53.1 billion. Closely following
the Texaco deal, Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) by March 5, 1984
completed its acquisition of Gulf Oil for a reported $13.2 billion -
the biggest offer in merger history to date - with a combined sales
at merger of $57.3 billion. For its part, Royal Dutch/Shell Group
announced a $5.2 billion purchase of the thirty percent of Shell
Oil Company that the Dutch Oil Group did not already own. There
are rumors circulating around corporate boardrooms of yet more
impending oil mergers with the apparent blessing of the Reagan
Administration.
A major reason for this unsettling shift in the industry -
one which should be taken seriously - is the widespread producer
government displacement of oil companies from their traditional
activities of "upstream" as well as "downstream operations around
the world. The oil crisis had indicated the myth of the
invulnerability of multinational oil corporations to national
sovereignty. In 1973, for instance, ninety three percent of OPEC
production or 27.9 million barrels per day, went to the oil majors
on a long term basis. By 1979/1980, this dropped to around fifty
percent of OPEC exports and forty two percent of world oil trade.
This decline is directly related to the outcome of the 1973 oil
crisis, the oil embargo which followed and most importantly, to the
political transformation affecting the international oil industry.
Displacement of oil companies indicates strongly that politics
can still override Pronnmirs. We cannot afford to underestimate
the changing politics affecting world petroleum markets.
Stripped mostly of their concessionaire reserves around the
world, the major oil companies are swallowing up each other through
mega-mergers. Recent examples are a tip of the iceberg in an
economic activity which promises more intense concentration than
either the steel industry or the big automobile conglomerates.
Declining oil reserves, slack demand and depressed oil prices - all
contributed to the consuming desire of major oil companies to
-cannibalize each other ostensibly for the achievement of
efficiency of production and the control of scarce reserves.
One observation should be remarked in the recent wave of
merger-mania: the big oil companies have begun to "detect the
whiff of death" and the only avenue of escape from the imminent
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catastrophe is to retreat to home base, rethink their bullish
instincts and strategies, and concentrate through merger struggles
what oil reserves remain in home territory and friendly regions.
We dare predict the fight among the oil companies has just begun;
it will be a bitter one pitting the strong against the weak. We
also predict that as the fight progresses, the smaller or
"independent" oil companies will be gobbled up, a high concentration
of the oil industry will ensue and governments will be forced to
intervene to restore competition by directly negotiating with
other producer governments for access fo crude production and sales.
The changing structure of the international oil industry,
the doctrines of sovereignty and "changing circumstances" and the
rapid industrialization of certain parts of the globe since 1930,
the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
and the emergence of "national resource ideology," all have contri-
buted to alter the bargaining positions and strengths of actors
in the international oil industry. Changing circumstances have
posed numerous challenges to both consumers and producers of oil.
I submit that a new approach based on government-to-government
relationship (with oil companies acting a minor role) is needed to
maintain order, stability and legitimacy in global oil industry.
The Arguments Stated
Negotiations between sovereign governments on matters
affecting global oil activities is desirable and indeed necessary
because of the breakdown of the traditional arrangement whereby
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oil companies controlled decision-making powers and producer
governments granted access. This is no longer so; there is,and
continues to be, significant power shifts in favor of producer-
governments creating as it were a situation of tacit response
and acquiescence from oil companies. The oil crisis of 1973-1974
provides a good example. The price of a barrel of crude oil,
largely politically determined, skyrocketed. On October 16, 1973,
OPEC announced immediate increase in posted prices from $3.00
to $5.11 per barrel representing a seventy percent increase.
Subsequent embargo and production cuts of ten percent by Saudi
Arabia led to $17.00 per barrel in the spot market. Spurred by
this unprecedented increase in oil price, the Gulf Committee led
by Iranian delegation fought for higher producer revenue. The
result was a one hundred thirty percent hike from $5.11 to
$11.65 per barrel. On the whole, the price of a barrel of oil
quadrupled.
Traditional regime in the international oil industry is
unstable and dangerous to the actors concerned. Petroleum is a
precious commodity with wide application and uses both in industry
and the military. It therefore affects directly or indirectly the
national security of most nations. Entrusting petroleum matters
to the discretion and whims of 'international oil companies is in fact
myopic, unstable and generally damaging to national security.
Government-to-Government arrangement, offers a more secure, more
balanced approach to international oil negotiations.
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The arguments in favor of this approach are:
1) Fundamental dealings in global oil are political in nature.
Strategic decision-making, arrangements and conflicts are politically
managed and resolved. Increasingly, crisis mark the international
oil industry and oil companies are ill-equipped for crisis-
management. They lack foresight, skill and statesmanship which
governments are presumed to have on matters requiring largely
diplomatic maneuvers and settlement.
It has been argued that some governments (especially the
United States) keep hands off company negotiations "on the grounds
they are commercial in nature." The fact is that international oil
negotiations have undeniable political repercussions and consequences.
Even the General Accounting Office (GAO) in a report to Congress,
disagrees with U.S. policy makers on the "hands off" policy. It
concluded that oil negotiations have "undeniable political elements"
although it "considers it premature" for a direct government partici-
pation in the negotiation process. 105 This study considers it timely
for governments to take direct charge of oil negotiations which
ultimately will affect the nation's consumers and security. Unsettling
shifts in the international oil industry and recent wave of
"mega-mergers" sweeping across the industry proclaim a distressing
and unstable period for oil companies who, largely displaced from
traditional activities by producer governments (NOCs), are
currently fighting for oil reserves within their reach. With oil
exploration now deemed economically unfeasible, oil companies are now
gobbling up each other.
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Given the interests at stake and the political climate,
some degree of increased government involvement seems inevitable.
The question is how much and for whom because the oil companies,
whose once-privil edged positions are under mounting attack from
foreign governments, are beseeching the [U.S.] administration to
come to their aid. 10* It is rea sonable to assume that under
conditions of mutual equality, the call for sovereign aid should
not be made. Oil companies are vulnerable in this aspect and
only sovereign deterence would help.
2) I call for government-to-government interaction in the
international oil industry because it is now the custom within
international oil system. In early 1974, immediately after the oil
crisis, throughout the Middle East and certain producing regions,
the concession system appeared to be coming to a rapid end. This is
evidenced by the decreasing share of the world oil trade for the
international oil majors from ninety percent in 1970 to less than
fifty percent today. In addition, direct state to state sales of
crude oil by OPEC members rose from 1.5 million barrels per day
in 1973 to about 8.5 million barrels per day today. This was
largely made possible in part due to the fact that OPEC nations'
ownership entitlement of crude rose from two percent in 1970 to •
almost eighty percent in 1980. Consequently, the international
oil majors reaction was to satisfy internal demands reducing sales
to third parties. In 1970, the oil majors sold between six to seven
million barrels per day to third parties; this amount dropped to
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3.7 million barrels per day in 1978 to less than one nrilH,ion
barrels per day in 1980. Oil companies are undoubtedly detecting
the whiff of death, without government a ssistance to ensure access.
Access to energy and policies designed to ensure this, should
be considered a major instruments of a nation's foreign policy.
As instruments, oil companies have failed to live up to global
challenges. For instance, "at home in America, Exxon or Mobil
may loom as Big Oil, but in their dealings with national oil
companies of the [13] OPEC organizations, the U.S. companies
are proving to be weaRl ings !
"
107
Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn)
recently complained that the United States companies are "in an
unequal contest" against the "combined bargaining power of OPEC." 108
Evidently, companies are afraid of direct governmental control an
"political management" according to Mr. Alvin J. Wirtz, special
consultant of Petroleum Reserves Corporation. Fear of political
management and government control may stem from the fact that the
basic goals of the companies such as profit maximization in an
integrated global operation, may not be met. They need not and
should not be so in the opinion of Mr. Wirtz, who stated that
If the government coul'd control certain of the fundamental
policies of the company which were affected by the
public interest, that there should be no basic difference
between the ownership of a control "and the ownership of a
minority, in so far as the achievement of the basic aims
of the corporation were concerned 09
In effect, what we are saying is not that companies cease
to exist, or forego its profit motive; rather what we are saying
is that governnents assume
.ore important and landing positions
with other governnents on
.atters dealing with oil ,„ such a .anner
as to reflect and take into consideration the dictates and needs of
changing circumstances.
3) It has been argued that oil development
"can best be handled
by private enterprise." 1 ™ Arguments include (a)^
reduce the political dangers inherent in the international field.
The fact is that while private operations reduce political dangers,
they are weak and dependent in situations where there already exists
political pressures and "dangers." Energy policy is more tractable
and better coordinated when governments' make their policy
directive more pronounced and clearly stated. Concerted national
energy policies would guard against any major oil crisis in periods
of political upheavals. Presently, the international oil system is
fraught with political considerations and conceivably cannot operate
without the political component, (b) That private enterprise is the
best source of the venture capital required for the undertaking. The
fact is that in the past few years, oil companies have "faced a
triple assault": declining oil reserves, depressed prices and slack
demand. Although increasing channels for capital is abundant ani
available to oil companies, uneconomic activities will be translated
directly to increased prices at the gas pumps. On the other hand,
most nations can comfortably arrange finance and are capable of doing
so. For the poorer nations, there are several sources of gaining
capital including the World Bank, and regional financial institutions.
As a matter of fact, private enterprise is not the "best" source of
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"survival through preserving the minimum necessary of Internationa,
trade and other exchanges and of course, the prevention and
avoidance of a major war. 1 " As a means of fostering meaningful
interdependency among nations, bilateral relationships have been
developed based on the notion of linking issues which demand
concerted action from interested nations. Internationa, oil companies
are i„-equipped to handle linkage issues which go beyond their
immediate goal of profit maximization. Governments, on the other
hand, understand their mutual needs and can usually, through
bilaterial deals and policies, provide for them. Examples of
bilateral agreements abound; U.S./Saudi Arabia cooperation on oil
matters and the U.S./Nigeria agreements on Joint Agricultural
Consultation Committee offers nations the forum and opportunity to
trade off commodities. The East bloc nations also engage in
bilateral deals, based largely on agreements concluded between
and among nations whereby, for example, energy is supplied by the
Soviet Union to nations who need it for those commodities the
Soviets need. It is my argument that stability of access to oil will
be ensured and maintained when cemented by bilateral arrangements
based on mutual economic and political interdependence of sovereign
nations
.
4) International oil companies acting as "middlemen" or agents are
no longer attractive to many nations including those of the
"third world." Peter Odell argues that:
230
venture capital because of the enormous risk in global oil
activity. They cannot absorb the costs easily as governments could.
(c) That private enterprise can best supply and develop the requisite
managerial and engineering techniques. Although this may be generally
true, several nations on several occasions have solicited the
advice and services of the United Nations Department of Technical
Cooperation for Development. Furthermore, regional cooperation on
"information" sharing now seems possible and useful.
(d) That oil operations involve exploration, production, transporta-
tion, refining, and distribution. Governments entering the oil
business in one area will soon find themselves extended.
. .into a
far-flung complex of international complications. The fact is that
the present state of international oil is indeed complicated and
needed the visible hand of the government in untying the knot. Today,
several nations are seriously engaged in every facet of the oil
industry from "upstream" to "downstream" operations. For example,
in "down-stream" activities OPEC members are pushing forward: 1.5
million barrels per day of refined products was exported in 1980
and the volume is expected to quadruple over the course of the
decade - 3.5 million barrels per day by 1985 and 5.7 million barrels
per day by 1990. Marketing of refined products is promising as a
major source of profits for OPEC exporters challenging the oil
companies whose aggregate profits since 1973 has fallen by more
than twenty five percent.
5) Dependency and interdependency characterize the modern
international system "as a condition of their existence" and
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The role of oil companies as agents in international oil industry
is on the wane. For the oil majors, decreasing share of world
oil trade is indeed obvious: ninety percent in 1970 to less than
fifty percent today. Again, as said earlier, direct state to state
discussions and sales is on the rise; in effect decreasing the share
sold by the oil majors to third parties.
In pursuit of the creation of instrument of economic policy,
most nations including the most industrially advanced (except
the United States) have formed state owned petroleum corporations.
These corporations are largely responsible for concluding arrangements
with other state-owned corporations on petroleum matters, while in
most cases, bypassing the international oil companies who are
accused of "exploitation" and cost adding agents.
It is- therefore necessary that governments "assert" pressures
in oil arrangements. This option has been given impetus by the
increasing presence in international petroleum affairs today of
both producer and consumer government-owned companies. Such option
argues Robert B. Krueger of the law firm Nossaman, Waters, Krueger
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and Marsh in a ,974 study for the U.S. governs, and" citing the
French exa.ple, would "create a vehicle for realizing a national
oil policy." 113
Although is has been argued that
"government-to-government
crude oil acquisition agreements have been tried by a number of oil
importing countries without any particular success," 114 I submit
that such approach is necessary for lower crude prices- because
OPEC as an intergovernmental organization, no matter its failures,
sets prices to its crude oil, moreover, the major international oil
companies "lacked the will and resources" to resist demands made
on them by OPEC members and other oil producing nations.
6) The exercise of permanent sovereignty over "their" natural
wealth and economic activities by the developing countries (where
a substantial and disproportionate amount of global oil lies), means
economic nationalism and oil companies are known to meet demands
arising from this ideological convictions. They cannot do much
to change the situation; their threats are mostly judged not to be
effective, except on occasions where government backing is
expected, for example the U.S. government involvement in International
Telephone and Telegraph's (ITT) case in Allende's Chile in 1973.
A government-to-government interaction will therefore offer
situations where mutual deterence, mutual threat and mutual respect
under international law will prevent the abuse of the "sanctity of
contracts." It will also prevent the unilateral abrogation of
previously concluded contracts by threatening retaliation backed by
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sovereign resolve. Indeed, what this approach seeks is not
confrontation but rather cooperation among actors involved noting
in the process that global oil is politics in an interdependent world.
7) It will be exceedingly difficult to break the tight grip which
OPEC has over global oil market without direct government
participation in oil negotiations. This in part is due to the
radically changed bargaining strengths in international oil
industry favoring producer governments. Present relationships
between actors "serve to reduce competition among those governments
for market outlets." And "alternative measures" are needed according
to the Federal Energy Administration, to modify existing
relationships between the companies and OPEC governments. 115 Alterna-
tive measures will greatly benefit from the advantages of enhanced
government role in the negotiation process. Government participation
will considerably reduce the anxiety and suspicion held by most
consumers that oil companies are simply agents of OPEC governments
and would expend tremendous efforts to maximize profits benefitting
both parties.
"At one point," Secretary Connolly (of the Department of Treasury,
Nixon Adminstration) made the remark that the "U.S. qovernment
ought to be more aggressive in oil negotiations." 116 This would be
in response to the huge government budget deficit,.among other
problems, which massive oil import has largely contributed. Most
nations realizing the great havoc huge oil cost might inflict on
their balance of payment position, have taken steps to include
meaningful government participation in oil negotiations.
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8) Multinational companies are mostly able to negotiate with
producer countries on the-basis of economic rather than political
objectives. Company objectives are largely based on making or
achieving the greatest return on investment. On the other hand,
producer governments would prefer economic aid and assistance tied
to oil activities. On this linkage issue, for example, "it would
be difficult" says Jerry McAfee, Chairman of the Board, Gulf
Oil Corporation, "to eliminate political considerations from oil
negotiations between the U.S. government and the Middle Eastern
governments." 117 On this basis, for instance, the United States-
sovereign power might be used to negotiate on behalf of the U.S.
companies where "they are unfairly disadvantaged." This power could
also be employed into investigations aimed at testing whether
or not company negotiations with OPEC governments are in fact
consistent with individual national interests.
Yet another major reason for a government-to-government
bilateral or multilateral negotiation "would be a situation in which
one or more producing governments indicated a strong preference for
dealing directly with consumer governments" and not with private
international oil companies. Such a preference might arise from an
ideological distaste of private enterprise or, more likely, a desire
to deal with pruchasers who can pay for petroleum in arms or
other goods and services which cannot readily be provided by
118petroleum companies.
9) The language of global oil is diplomatic; oil company
representative are in theory not diplomats and therefore not in
Proper positions to conduct negotiations which largely demand
diplomatic skills and decor™. Although every move would be seen
and interpreted "in a political contevt"v iu i x and every agreement would
be called into question if "political disagreements" between
actors arise, it is necessary to point out that the process of
conflict and cooperation of crisis management and crisis resolution
are politically instigated and on most occasions politically resolved
For instance, if OPEC members should be persuaded to reduce the
price of their crude, this will have to be done by governments - not
by oil companies.
10) It has been argued that major oil companies have historically
"acted as a buffer" between governments in international oil matters.
C.C. Garvin, Jr., Chairman of the Board, the Exxon Corporations,
argues that:
By concentrating on commercial matters, International oil
companies have deflected political pressures This is
not to say that political developments have had no impact
on the international oil industry. Clearly, they have,btill, I believe that the buffer exists and that it is
relevant to the suggestion that longterm contracts be
approved by the U.S. government. H
9
.
Governments are increasingly attacking and hence violating
the "buffer" zones in the international oil industry. Attack and
violation is a result of vast disruptive developments in global
oil and the necessity to adjust to the changing circumstances.
Moreover, governments, especially those of the developing world,
would rather generate political moves in global agenda concerning
the issues of the "new international economic order" based on
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their new powerful positions in the global economic arena. I n thi
sense, buffer zones provided by the oil companies are weak and
ineffective and might be disruptive in alternative arrangements and
regimes. In terms of "commercial give and take, the companies
are reasonably well
-equipped," but however when linkage of issues
characterize major negotiations, the need for, and the advantages of
government participation becomes evident. In these circumstances,
Mr. Garvin of Exxon Corporation believes that "guidance from the
government is frequently useful and sometimes essential." 120
The view from Europe also supports the necessity of government
participation in matters concerning oil negotiations. In
pursuance of this objective, almost all industrial nations of the
continent have either created a state-owned oil corporation, or are
in the process of creating one. It is believed that bargaining can
only be carried out within the existing national framework and
cannot be dictated from a distant point. Although explicit calls for
a government-to-government negotiations are not made, Mr. Geoffrey
Chandler, Director, Shell International Petroleum, Ltd., London,
apparently believes that the invitation of governments to the
negotiation table is necessary since in the event of a dispute, for
whatever reason, it must be apparent to all that the sovereign
power of government is paramount. 121 The deterent offensive and
1 22defensive power of an aggrieved nation could be brought to bear on
the offending nation in several ways, barring the invocation of the
calvo doctrine, or a recourse to the requirement of exhaustion of
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national readies. It should be noted that companies of the Royal
Dutch Shell group have been nationalized in Somalia, Ethiopia,
South Yemen, Zaire, Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, Morrocco to mention
a few. Recently, Shell-British Petroleum (Shell-BP) was also
nationalized or "nigerianized" by the military government of
Nigeria
.
The wave of company nationalizations by governments engaging
in punitive expeditions indicates the vulnerability of oil
companies who are without the deterent backing of their respective
home governments.
I have attempted in the above paragraph to present a
proprosal for government intervention and participation in inter-
national oil industry negotiations with oil companies playing
an executionary and peripheral role. I have also presented and argued
why this should be so through reasoned analysis and through lessons
and experiences derived from history. I realized this suggestion
could be very controversial, however, I submit this approach is the
least dangerous and most stable in a changing world. It will not
lead to "endless political and international complications." On
the contrary, it will usher in a new era in international cooperation
based on global interdependence and justice.
Schematic Presentation of Government-to-Government
Approach to Negotiations in International Oil
Industry
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n terms of "innovation" concession agreements, Nigeriahas largely relied on agreements reached elsewhere with oil
companies, as a framework for negotiation text. For examplethe concept of "production-sharing" was taken from Indonesia'
and service-contracts" from Venezuela and other oil producinq
Latin American nations. Presently, production-sharing
and service-contract regimes dominate Nigeria's oil negotiation
strategies.
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re information on "non-territorial actors," see Johan
Galtung, The Non-Territorial System" in The Multinational Corporation-
A Collection of Essays published in the International Humanist and
Ethical Union, Utrecht, Holland, November 1976, p. 19-27.
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Major industrialized nations of Western Europe, including OECD
nations, have established state-owned oil corporations to coordinate
and supplement the efforts and policies of the major international
companies supplying them with oil. In most cases, these state
owned corporations have displaced to a large extent the traditional
activities of the "majors." This is in recognition of the changing
bargaining positions of actors in the global oil industry favoring
producer-governments. Governments realized the vulnerability of the
oil majors in the international oil system, especially immediately
after the events of 1973. Although the U.S. government was equally
vulnerable, its trust on the oil majors was not strongly shaken.
5
Time classification are not mine. They appear in a study done
by the United Nations. Centre on Transnational Corporations entitled
"Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining Agreements." I adopted
them for ana-lytical clarity and convenience. However, phase classifica-
remains mine.
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Oran Young, ed., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975). See especially
the section on "Strategic Interaction," pp. 5-19.
12
This observation is indeed right! As the struggle for the
restoration of posted price of Middle East crude oil was won by
producer governments, a gradual shift from economic determinism of
global oil was made in favor of political demands. Events leading
to 1973 oil embargo and the "quadrupling" of oil price; the struggle
for a "new international economic order," all were politically motivated
See "Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining Agreements, op cit
p. 2.
1
3
Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 5.
14
Consultation was by the invitation of the Republic of Iraq,
and composed of representatives of the Governments of Iran, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Venezuela. These countries are known as the
"founding members" of the OPEC organization, after having met at
Baghdad (capital city of Iraq), from 10th to the 14th September I960.
For details on deliberations, see Resolutions of the First OPEC
Conference, Baghdad, 1960, in OPEC Official Resolutions and Press
Releases, 1960-1980, op. cit., pp. 1-3 and p. 182.
15 .
Ibid., and "Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and
Mining Agreements," p. 2, especially on the assertion that "the
traditional concession was by its nature a state within a state."
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1C elements " of Production-sharing contracts are-
I Overall management of petroleum operations by the state-
2) Cost recovery by the company of all exploration, development
and production costs from a portion of the production-
and '
3) a "profit" split of the remaning production between the
state and the oil company.
(Adopted from the "Main Features and Trends in Petroleum Mining
Agreements," Ibid., p. 12). The key point or provision in
production-sharing agreements is the "overall management of petroleum
operations by the state." Thus the important point to bear in mind
is state control, which is largely political, not technical.
21
Like production-sharing agreements, service contracts areinnovation concession regimes. Unlike production-sharing, the
^distinctive feature" of service contracts is that the companies
typically get only the right to buy 20 to 50 percent of the oil
produced, at discounts from market prices ranaing between 3 to 10
percent, for a specified period. For more details, see "Alternative
Arrangements for Petroleum Developments," op. cit., p. 55.
22
See Barrow's Petroleum Legislation, op. cit., Supplement 5,
p . 39
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Ibid., p. 41.
R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: An
Introduction and Critical Survey (New York: John Wiley & Sons., Inc, 1957).
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30 c rbee for example, Raymond Vernon's Sovereignty-at-Bav
S^iTS^-l" Ny?,and Keohane > eds- Transnational Relation, andWorld Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971)- see
also Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Mueller, Global Reach: ThePower of the Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1974)
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Tne events of 1973 were traumatic to designated countries
and the international economic system in general. Although Nigeriabenefitted enormously from the "quadrupling" of oil prices, she
was not part of the Arab oil embargo against several western
industrial nations.
32
Complete state ownership of petroleum operations within a
state s jurisdiction necessitated "nationalizations" of certain
petroleum operations due to strategic considerations as for example
in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, or simply as a punitive measure as in
Libya and Algeria. In all, nationalizations are consistent with the
trends of the 1960s continued in the 1970s" reflecting in large
part the growing strength of OPEC and producer-governments in general
33
For details, see "Alternative Arrangements for Petroleum
Development," op. cit., p. 9.
34
Recently however, the U.S. government officials and
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CHAPTER VI
NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (NNPC)
.
The existence of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(henceforth NNPC) enables the Nigerian government to play a direct
role in the petroleum industry. Its establishment was based on a
complex set of economic and political considerations and factors,
which is of crucial and immense importance to national security and
interest. In essence, NNPC serves as a strategic instrument of
national policy.
Petroleum Act 1969 vested in the State of Nigeria the entire
ownership and control of all oil and gas upon any land in Nigeria,
under its territorial waters and continental shelf. 1 In early 1972,
the government announced that henceforth no concessions would be
given under the terms of Petroleum Decree 51, but that petroleum
"mining leases" obtained must be through the state-owned corporation
in the form of service contracts.
This requirement in effect means that:
. .
.all right to oil and gas in place within all areas
over which Nigeria has ownership and control, excepting those
areas comprised in existing grants of petroleum rights, butinducing all areas subsequently surrendered, relinquished or
forfeited by holders of petroleum rights, were reserved by the
Government for the Nigerian National Oil Corporation. One
effect of the reservation is that 6,267,220 hectares of
Nigeria's on-shore and off-shore sedimentary basin areas are
under oil mining leases operated by foreign owned oil companies
while the remaining areas became vested in the NNPC." 2
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NNPC is first and foremost an instrument of government
policy in the petroleum oil industry, both at home and abroad By
Decree 18 of 27 April 1971, Nigerian National Oil Corporation [(NNOC)
now was established. It was empowered to prospect for, mine
and market oil, and engage in all other activities associated with
the petroleum industry. The corporation was also empowered to
any'of the^sse'tf h,^™ 56 3CqUire 0r take over *11 oft ri ass ts, ousinesses, properties Driv-ilpnoc
contracts, rights, obligations and liab?? ties oflnv'business engaged in by the corporation. "4
ny
These powers are indeed politically potent and are devised to reflect
the importance attached to the goals of this corporation by the state
and the satisfaction of the state's divergent needs.
The establishment of national oil companies "flows from the
doctrine of state ownership" and sovereignty over its natural re-
sources and have "played a central role in the expansion of the
state's control over the conduct and management of petroleum opera-
tions." 5 For instance, since the 1970s, the government of Nigeria
has engaged in a policy of direct negotiations with the oil companies
operating within her borders and territorial waters, and a direct
participation in the operations and activities of the petroleum indus-
try to protect its interests. The government attempts to do this
firstly by "laying down sets of rules" and requirements to "regulate
petroleum operations on its soil" and secondly by establishing NNPC
to act as an instrument of national petroleum policy, both at home
and abroad. The National Petroleum Corporation has served the State
of Nigeria in OPEC proceedings since her inception in July 1971, and
as of June 1979, all thirteen OPEC countries had established their
national oil companies. 6 253
The main impetus to the establishment of national oil compan-
ies during the ,950s and the ,960s was the growing maturity in the
evolving petroleum po,icies of the producing countries.? m Nigeria
tins "impetus" came in the early
, 970s when she joined the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and when the govern-
ment began yielding to the highly nationalistic pressures to estab-
lish what I referred to earlier as events of independence, created
by NNPC. Moreover, the early ,970s ushered in an era when the govern-
ment embarked on a series of nationa, policies aimed at gradually
transforming the nation's economic and political positions. Because
of the "vital role" played by the oil sector in this transformation
and because of the fact that oi, sales provide almost 90 percent of
the nation's foreign exchange earnings, and about 83 percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP), the government therefore relied pre-
cariously on this sector and on the state owned oil corporation in
charge of it as a crucial instrument in the execution of domestic as
we,, as foreign policies. In fact, on occasion, this corporation
has played a decisive role in policies because in the long run the
government depends largely on it for oil revenues. In effect, NNPC
may be considered as purse holder and earner of the last resort.
As a long term policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria,
the state-owned oil company may be viewed as an instrument of gradual
and eventual displacement of the role of international oil companies
in the downstream as well as upstream petroleum operations in the
country. NNPC is definitely being groomed for a replacement role
254and hence enormous resoonsih-n it,,p sibUity, ambitions and goals have been
thrust upon her.
,„ this respect,
"the major aim of the Government's
oil policy is the eventual and compete national control of al,
aspects of the oil industry"* previously run by the international
Oil companies. The strategy was control based on ownership and the
need to use the industry as a vehicle for the "rapid economic develop-
ment of the country; however, its success depends to a considerable
extent on how effective transformation machinery is. ,„ other words
how prepared is the nation to tackle the enormous challenges posed by
the intricate operations of the oil industry? The answer is that
presently, she is, through the NNPC, very much il 1
-prepared. Although
given the "enomous progress" made so far by the corporation, it may
not be long before she reaches a stage of competency and maturity.
So far, NNPC has performed a supporting role for major oil
companies operating within the country. Although the government,
through various participation agreements, has acquired majority shares
(60%) in the major foreign producing companies in the country, its
performance ratio has been indeed very insignificant compared to
those of the companies. Several "seismic" missions have been under-
taken by the NNPC for the "search and discovery of new reserves" in
all parts of the River Niger Delta Region and some parts of the
Anambra River Basin and in the Chad Basin, known as "Bornu Trough"
without much encouraging news and developments. In fact, the NNPC
operates only one producing oil field on its own at present and that
is the Izombe Oil Field situated near the Oguta Lake in Anambra State.
She is, however, engaged through participation with major oil compa-
mes in Joint venture arrangement, on several major oil productio
2
;
5
si tes
As an instrument of qovernmpnt nnhv,yu e policy, therefore, the main
e"o rt of NNPC
.,as been success^ directed at obtaining a larger
snare of the oil revenues
. .
. the activities of ^ ^
thus essentia!!, co-erda! and administrative. They do not yet dis-
place the functions of the multinational oil firms or the1r spec .
1al ^foreign subcontractors to any significant extent (Ton, Forrest,
1977). The government and senior officials of the corporation are
faced with the awesome task of building the corporation to a level
commensurate with its mandate. Presently this is not happening and
may not happen in the near future. One major obstacle is technology
and the know-how to operate it. Transfer of technology has proceeded
very slowly; management and technical know-how is still in its ele-
mentary stage and manpower requirements are all but fulfilled. The
second obstacle is political and paradoxically so. The National Oil
Corporation has been kept weak; "selected foreign interests had been
served," and the alliance between the state and Shell
-British Petro-
leum (the highest oil producer in the country) has worked to
strengthen Shell-BP at the expense of the National Oil Corporation.
Gowon's regime acquiesced to the demands of the multinational oil
companies strategically calculated to weaken the state corporation.
Consequently, for a period, the nation did not have a coherent, con-
sistent oil policy designed to give NNPC a decisive and commanding
role. The policies of the oil companies prevailed. The role of NNPC
consequently was relegated to one of joint venture as junior nartner
with major foreign oil-producing multinationals.
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Actors for the most part engage in •joint venture" because
of the presence of common objectives and the view or promise that
each win benefit fro, such an arrangement. This type of arrangement
is the "most efficient form of extending technical aid to developing
countries" where the need exists for the transfer of technology and
technical Know-how. In the oil industry and especially in developing
nations, where the oi, technology patents belong largely to oil multi-
national s, joint ventures present themselves as the logical alter-
native to either buying patents (which is highly expensive and contro-
versial), or gradually developing one (which in most cases is slow
and inefficient). A typical reason, however, for joint venture
"marriage" is the "sharing of risks" and of course advantages and
profits which the arrangement makes possible. Joint ventures sub-
stantially reduce, by the amount of the partner's contributions to the
venture, the political and economic risks that are the principal
obstacles to direct foreign investment. 10
In the international oil industry, the "usual joint venture
is an arrangement" in which state owned oil companies (acting on
behalf of the state), and the foreign oil company "share equity in a
joint operation to explore for, develop and/or produce petroleum
deposits." 11 For those countries who have not built up competent and
efficient organizations for monitoring oil operations, joint venture
establishes the importance of having an organization within the
industry 1n a pos1tion to provide ^ ^^ J57
rellabTe Infomatlon gathered through experience in the field
Furthermore, these governments wish to protect the strategic interests
of the nation which obviously is not served when major international
011 copies are ,eft alone in the conduct of petroleum natters and
activities.
Joint venture enterprise in the oil industry has offered
the governs of Nigeria the necessary opportunity for acquiring
(through arrangements with oil companies) the technology needed to
run her oil operations. Petroleum Act 1969 requires that oil com-
panies operating within the country ensure that within ten years from
the grant of a lease:
1) the number of .Nigerian citizens employed in connection
with the lease in managerial, professional and super-
visory grades shall reach at least 75% of the total
number of persons employed in these grades;
ii) at least 60% of employees in any such grade shall be
Nigerian citizens; and
iii) all employees in lower grades shall be Nigerian
1 ?
ci tizens.
Acquisition of petroleum technology, "related to the goal of skilled
manpower" is being vigorously pursued by the government oil planners
to reduce the nation's vulnerability on foreign oil technology. To
this end, excessive reliance on the merchants of oil technology-the
international oil companies--!" s avoided wherever doing so is possible
and feasible. Technical assistance programs, instead, have been
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vigorously sought. For example> an ag.ee.ent was concluded by NNPC
with the governs of the U.S.S.R. and Rumania to supply the state-
owned corporation with some technical specialists, to be phased out
within a specified period of «». In addition to this, the govern-
ment commissioned consultants fro. Great Britain-COMERINT-to survev
project by project, the manpower needs of those aspects of the Develop-
ment Plan which deal with oil. The consultants recorded the train-
ing of 7,000-7,300 Nigerians in different sub-sectors of the oil
industry within the 1977/1982 period. In pursuance of these needs,
government negotiators in the oil industry require from oil companies
operating within the country the commitment to train and staff quali-
fied Nigerians in responsible positions. This requirement forms a
crucial part of several agreements on joint ventures reached with
major oil companies. The success ratio of this requirement is mixed,
depending on the company involved. In the case of Shell-British
Petroleum (now African Petroleum Nigeria Ltd.), the success ratio is
somewhat high. Though the company is increasing in personnel
, most
expatriate management positions are now gradually filled by quali-
fied Nigerians. This policy is in accord with recent government
indigenization decrees. As an indication of Shell-BP's success
ratio in the indigenization exercise, at the end of 1975, the company
had 3,400 employees (200 expatriates, 1,050 Nigerian management staff
and 2,150 junior staff). In fact expatriate staff have declined from
429 at the end of 1968 to about 200 at the end of 1975. This figure
is expected to reduce to about 100 by 1985. During the period of
1968 to 1975, Nigerian management staff increased from 100 to over
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1.000. This figure is Tikely to increase in the coming years This
"
so because the aim of most joint ventures (as seen by government
Planners), is the gradual but eventual displacement of foreign staff
by qualified indigenous personnel.
Joint ventures provide avenues for participation for a nation
interested in certain strategic economic activities within her terri-
tory or outside of it, and previously controlled and managed by trans-
national corporations. Realizing the strategic importance of petro-
leum production, the government of Nigeria has insisted only recently
on joint ventures with major oil companies operating within the
country.
"As of August 1 , 1979, NNPC holds an undivided 80% intentin the joint venture operations conducted by Shell
wS E^IT"^ Nigeria Limited ' "das of July 1,
'
NNPC holds 60% interest in the joint venture operations
oTn aert^l°fJ^V- Nigeria ' Gul? CompanyOf Nig ia Limited, Elf Nigeria Limited, Nigerian Agio OilCompany/Limited/Phillips Petroleum, Texaco/Chevron andPan Ocean Oil Corporation. NNPC participation in the petro-leum operations of these companies is as a consequence of
and a's^Sc £ !SPC a^ui ^ tion of Interest in the concessions
1979 "13
° producin 9 companies between 1972 and
Participation, of course, is consistent with OPEC Resolution 90 of
July 1968, calling for participation by a member producer-nation in
the operations of her oil industry. Participation has meant dif-
ferent things to the various member-nations of OPEC. The Djakarta
14Agreement of 1965 provides that each member is free to spell out
the nature of participation and how this may be carried out without
any binding strings from OPEC, although a minimum percentage is
required.
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I" Nigeria, participation in the nation's industry is recog-
nizee as necessary and essentia!. The process of participation has
been one of gradual transforation depending on specific needs and
strategies laid down by the government and executed by the NNPC
In general terms, NNPC was charged with the task of undertaking all
activities of the oil industry but in practice, the operations of
the corporation were restricted to oil and gas exploration. NNPC
(then NNOC) had no statutory duty to regulate or even supervise the
operations of the oil industry in Nigeria. Regulation requires
trained and skilled government staff to be effective. Nigeria had
only a handful of these, mostly engaged in NNPC operations and trying
to regulate or even control the oil companies this period was deemed
virtually impossible and ineffective. However, efforts were stepped
up to train indigenous manpower through overseas scholarships and
through institutional arrangements with the oil companies within the
country. The aim of these programs is to reinforce government con-
trol over petroleum operations by participating directly in the
management of petroleum activities. Moreover, a direct role in
management enhances the ability of the government to control the
operations of the oil companies by obtaining detailed and useful
information and knowledge of the international petroleum industry.
Recent practice in Nigeria with regards to participation has
taken the form of control and ownership of petroleum resources, with
the oil companies acting as service contractors or production-
sharing partners. For example, in 1979 the state-owned oil corpora-
tion, acting on behalf of the government, announced that all open
areas for petroleum production would henceforth be "opened" for Z
vice contracts and invited bids for oil company exploration. Terms
were not specified indicating the innovative nature of this new
arrangement and the willingness of the government to sit down and
negotiate with oil companies on details. However, these contracts
continue to have Decree 51 as a basic statute, and offer the govern-
ment up to 51% (later scaled to 60%) participation in new grants
'
and contain "substantial new requirements" for bonus, buy-back arrange-
merits, tax incentives, etc. It is necessary to point out that an
important component of recent participation practice is just not only
one of control, but also one of regulation. Government Petroleum
Decree 1977 established a "Petroleum Inspectorate" charged with
regulating the activities and operations of the oil industry. The
Inspectorate invariably confers more power on the NNPC in petroleum
matters, which previously was not the case.
Petroleum Decree 1969: Strengths and Weaknesses
A Major strength of this decree is that the "entire ownership
and control of all oil and gas in place within any land in Nigeria,"
under its territorial waters and continental shelf is vested in the
State of Nigeria.
The essence of Petroleum Decree 1969 was based on the need
felt by the then military government of Yakubu Gowon for a rapid
transformation of the government position on petroleum matters within
the country and abroad. Its strength and success depended to a large
extent on repealing some of the previously scattered petroleum
legislation which are regulatory and not fiscal. Fiscal provisions
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in Nigeria are covered by the Petroleum Profits Tax Act, as amended,
and by provisions in individual concession agreements. 15
Published with revised regulations on 27 November 1969 as
Decree No. 51, Nigeria's Petroleum 0ecreel969 ushered in the era of
her participation in the oil industry. Decree 51 provided that
"special terms and conditions"-including government participation-
may be "imposed on a prospecting license or mining lease" if con-
sidered to be "in the public interest." This decree provides the
ruling military government with a very potent instrument of dealing
with the transnational oil companies, who, following the Nigerian-
Biafrian Civil War, were confused as to which government to pay taxes
and oil royalties. As a consequence of Decree No. 51, the position of
the Federal Government of Nigeria was strengthened and the conflict
of interest was settled in her favour. Indeed, it might be argued
that a major reason why Decree No. 51 was enacted by the Federal
Government was to make it clear to the oil companies that petroleum
resources within the country belong to the Federal Government of
Nigeria and not to the Government of Biafra headed by Emeka Odumegwu
Ojukwu. Consequently, oil revenues should be paid to the Federal
Government. Moreover, the need for oil revenues to finance the civil
war became more acute, and government policy-makers and planners were
forced to devise means through government legislation of making inter-
national oil companies operating within the country responsive to
federal government demands. In addition, it was thought that with the
enactment of Decree No. 51, the Government of Biafra would eventually
give up her claims to the oil wells within her territory. Seen from
this perspective, Decree No. 5, was a smart legal move by ^ gQvern _
««t of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to wrest oil concessions and
hence oil revenues fro. the Biafran government while simultaneously
cultivating legitimacy and justification in the eyes of the oil
companies.
Petroleum Decree 1969, Decree No. 51, positioned the govern-
ment for the future role which she envisions to play in the domestic
and international oil industry. Decree No. 51 was indeed a harbinger
or forerunner of events to come. It gave endorsement and conferred
legitimacy to subsequent government "sovereign acts" in her oil
industry made possible by the doctrine of sovereignty over natural
resources. Although ownership does not automatically confer the
means to control, it made possible the exercise in gradual transforma-
tion practiced by the government in oil negotiations. 16 It also made
possible the creation of the state-owned oil corporation (NNPC) as the
sole government representative (and hence an instrument of government
policy) in the oil industry. As a result of the Decree, no new oil
prospecting license since 1972 has been granted to privately-owned
oil companies. In effect, it meant that all pending applications
since that date have been "cancelled." However, the NNPC is author-
ized by the government to negotiate contracts with foreign as well as
local oil companies for any part -of the "assigned area." In all,
Petroleum Decree 1969 has had tremendous effects on the Nigerian oil
industry because it is the only document of its kind before Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation Decree of 1977, which sought to
coherently and clearly articulate the wishes and policies of the
264governs on petroleum matters. Although It represents a strong
document of its kind, Petroleum Decree 1 969 nevertheless has some
noteworthy weaknesses.
A major weakness of Petroleum Decree 1 969 could be that
although it vested the entire ownership and control of all petroleum
m the state, it did not clearly establish the means of control as
did its later version-the Nigerian National Petroleum Decree 1977.
There was no institutional instrument or arrangement whereby the
regulations made by the "conxnissioner" of petroleum resources govern-
ing petroleum operations may be translated into an effective policy.
The implication of this failure was that oil companies were given the
opportunity to engage in numerous activities which in the first place
should be regulated and controlled. Sound exploratory practices,
including the conservation of petroleum resources, were necessary
and possible; the prevention of pollution of waterways; the keeping
of accurate records and statistics were not properly carried out, or
carefully checked and upheld.
Inasmuch as the commissioner represents the government in its
negotiations with oil companies, the powers conferred on him by
Decree 51 were vast and excessive. In a country where the ruling and
political class finds it exceedingly difficult to articulate policies,
the grant of excessive power to a bureaucrat and subsequent reliance
therefrom, is politically unwise and, in fact, dangerous. It could
have been a deliberate move on the part of the Military Government
Council to strengthen the position of the commissioner in the nego-
tiation process, however, it unwittingly undermines the powers of the
«. • i . ,
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Military Council which was charged with and responsible for formula-
ting policy. The co^issioner, under any circumstances, should not
decide which oil company will operate in the country and under what
conditions, but Petroleum Decree 1969 confers on him these powers.
In the words of the Decree, the Commissioner shall not give his con-
sent to an assignment unless he is satisfied that -
(a) "the proposed assignee is of good reputation, or is a
member of a group of Companies of good reputation,
or is owned by a Company or Companies of good
reputation." 17
The commissioner also "may revoke any oil prospecting license or oil
mining lease if the licensee or lessee becomes controlled directly
or indirectly by a citizen or subject of, or a company incorporated
in, any country which is -
(a) a country other than the licensee's or lessee's
country of origin, and
(b) a country the laws of which do not permit citizens
of Nigeria or Nigerian companies to acquire, hold
and operate petroleum concessions on conditions which
in the opinion of the Commissioner are reasonably com-
parable with the conditions upon which such concessions
are granted to subjects of that country." 18
These powers in effect mean the granting of large discretionary
powers, and the power to conduct international relations, and judg-
ment thereof, which of course should be the domain of the ruling
Military Council. Arguments may be made that the Military government
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decides on matters of broad concern and leaves the execution of sub-
stantive choices to the concessioner as a matter of discretionary
Politic. It should nonetheless be made known that discretion is not
United to substantia, choices but extends to procedures, methods,
form, timing, degrees of emphasis and on the whole to questions of
national interest and national security. National interest and
security suffers terribly when one man is made to decide on issues
directly impinging on the instruments of national survival. Excess
powers, needless to say, breed corruption and the ills associated with
it. In this case, power seemed absolute because there was no clearly
defined institutional check on it by the Military government. This
particular institutional weakness, including others mentioned earlier,
occasioned a careful revision of the Decree and a subsequent enact-
ment of perhaps a far stronger 1977 NNPC Decree.
Petroleum Decree 1977: A Stronger Invnr.at.inn
Decree No. 33 of 1 April 1977 promulgated by the Federal
Military Government created the Nigerian National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (NNPC)
.
Decree No. 33 was a more powerful government enact-
ment in that it sought not only to coherently articulate government
policy on petroleum matters, but also to consolidate firmly the gains
made since the 1969 Decree, by eliminating several institutional weak-
nesses of the later decree as described above.
The establishment of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (NNPC) offered the government an instrument for policy enactment
and implementation which the 1969 Decree clearly lacked. Concurrently,
the state-owned oil corporation became a vehicle by which the govern-
ment sought to break into thp n-n ,• ie oil mdustry and her subsequent control
of petroleum operations. The government decided through Decree 33
that its presence in the national and international oil industry is
urgently needed if she is to ensure the national interest and security
so precariously dependent on petroleum activities. This was done
firstly by laying down rules to regulate and control petroleum opera-
tions, and secondly, by creating a state-owned oil corporation to act
as an instrument of national petroleum policy. In this sense,
Petroleum Decree 1977 acted as an instrument of government transforma-
tion from a position of inferior partnership to one of controlling
interest. Petroleum Decree 1969 was unable to achieve this goal be-
cause it lacked institutional arrangements whereby government presence
is felt, i.e., the Decree did not create a body or organ which sought
to project government demands to other actors in the oil industry.
Certainly, it did not attempt to control or even regulate petroleum
operations within the country. Petroleum Decree 1977 seeks to carry
out these requirements as institutional necessity.
The establishment of a department to be known as the Petroleum
Inspectorate (an integral part of the corporation) acts as a "regula-
tory agency." This is a non-commercial branch of the NNPC and is
responsible for issuing permits and licenses for all activities
connected with petroleum exploration, exploitation, refining, storage,
marketing, transportation and the distribution of petroleum and
petroleum products. In addition, the Petroleum Inspectorate "enforces
the laws governing oil and gas operations, initiates regulations
relating to such operations and supervises the operations of companies
engaged in any one or more act1v1t1« „* «.
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Such powers are presumably granted in furtherance of the administrative
tasks of the corporation which is elephantine and which threatens to
swallow and make a mockery of the administrative organization of the
corporation.
Admi nistrative Org an ization of the NNPf
The creation of the state-owned oil corporation "marked a
remarkable change in the administrative structure of the public sector
of the oil industry" by merging the several organs formerly respon-
sible for the various state petrol affairs. As a consolidate
organization, the NNPC, am0n g other things, is according to "Article
21 0) and (2) of the decree, the dissolution of both the Nigerian
National Oil Company (NNOC), forraed by the Decree No. 18 of ,971 and
the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources," and their merger to
for. the new organization, the NNPC. The belief by the government
that a coherent, unified control of petroleum activities will result
including a better understanding and cooperation among member staff,
prompted the unification of the former NNOC and the Ministry of
Petroleum Resources to form the present Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC). The formation of this corporation meant the more
efficient and effective use of scarce, skilled indigenous manpower
and the improved coordination and unification of petroleum policy.
Unlike the NNOC which reported directly to the Ministry of Petroleum
Resources, NNPC reports to the government directly, reflecting the
more powerful position of the corporation.
Administrative organization of the NNPC is indeed complex,
reflecting to a large extent, the numerous and often diversified
tasks it is charged with. There are two broad divisions of the
NNPC: (1) the commercial division, and (2) the Petroleum Inspectorate
division. The commercial division is charged with carrying out the
operational and commercial activities of the NNPC, including pur-
chasing and marketing petroleum, its products and by-products.
Petroleum Inspectorate division is essentially a regulatory, "enforce-
ment and supervisory agency of the Government" in matters of oil and
gas operations. For the sake of functional clarity, and the "avoid-
ance of doubt, the Inspectorate shall not exercise any commercial
functions in respect of any activities of the Governs of the
Federation relating to the ^^^^ . nd(jstry „23 The|_e js ^ ^
Petroleum Conservation Department responsibie to the chairman of the
corporation. The reason for creating this department is not entirely
clear. Conservation measures apparently fall within the purvey of
Petroleum Inspectorate and it is only logical to incorporate petroleun
conservation department into the inspectorate.
Supposedly, for purposes of clarity and functional differen-
tiation, NNPC has been classified into functional categories or levels:
(1) the Planning Level; (2) the Service Level, and (3) the Opera-
tional Level. The Planning "level" organizes, coordinates, unifies
and controls petroleum activities and operations. The Service "level"
is responsible essentially for providing "management" with corporate
services. This level includes the Treasury and Accounting Departments,
management administration offices, Office of Legal Affairs, and so on.
The operational "level" is involved with the nitty-gritty, or details
of field petroleum operations. These levels of the corporation are
answerable through their sector chiefs to the chairman of the corpora-
tion in an intricate network of sometimes overlapping functional
classification. A casual look at the organizational chart of NNPC
portrays an elaborate, well-mapped out corporate framework through
which organizational tasks and duties are executed. A closer analysis
reveals an overburdened, badly arranged institutional framework,
poorly adapted to the execution of essential and even the most primary
tasks. Although the "organizational working plan" carefully laid
«own .,ffice,. and „departmms „ needed fQr executjng thecorpoJ
toon's tas ks
,
some of these offices and departs have not heen
inevitable result is inefficiency, ineffectiveness and organiza-
tion.l dysfunction, because the smooth flow of activities so elabor-
ately described by the organizational flow chart is indeed unopera-
tional
.
The Petroleum Act of 1977 provides for the NNPC a Board of
Directors, consisting of the Chairnnan, appointed by the President of
the Federation, and the following members, including:
(1) the Permanent Secretary Federal Ministry of Finance
(2) the Permanent Secretary Federal Ministry of Economic
Development
(3) the Managing Director of the NNPC, and
(4) three other members to be appointed by the President.
Appointment is made, also by the corporation, of a secretary, who is
not a member of the Board.
The administrative structure of the NNPC is unwieldy,
inefficient, and on the whole ineffective. A reorganization is indeed
necessary to save the corporation from complete chaos and bureaucratic
breakdown. And although there is a general agreement on the over-
hal, there is not at the moment a stated policy on how this will be
done. President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, on the occasion of the opening
of NNPC's third refinery in Kaduna on 25 October 1980, declared:
"From all observations it has been clear that a major
reorganization of the NNPC is not only desirable but
also inevitable. Its present structure is so unwieldy
as. to render effective management virtually impossible."
Following the allegation that the sum of 2.8 billion nairf
"OH money" was missing from the coffers of the NNPC, the President
of the nation ordered a public inquiry. A tr1bunal m% ^ up ^
that purpose and in the course of the inquiry" exposed the bureau-
cratically disappointing structure of the NNPC. The tribunal recom-
mended, among other things, a funda„,ental reorganization of the NNPC.
This recommendation and others arising from the inefficiencies
and ineffectiveness of the corporation, prompted the passage of a bill
by the Senate on 27 November 1980. This bill provides for the forma-.
Hon of five wholly-owned subsidiaries of the NNPC so that the
responsibilities for exploration and exploitation, refining, and pipe-
line transportation, gas, petrochemicals, marine transportation and
marketing activities of the NNPC will be apportioned among five
subsidiaries.
The creation of subsidiaries would mean less of a burden to
the overburdened, bureaucratical ly unitized NNPC. It would also mean
functional division among the five subsidiaries and the concurrent
separation of powers. In the former arrangement, enormous powers were
conferred on the chairman, prompting a Report by the tribunal criti-
cizing the "single entity structure of NNPC and the inevitable con-
centration of responsibility" and power in the chief executive of the
NNPC. In addition to decentralizing functions and powers, a reor-
ganization would ensure a proper focus on objectives and goals and
the most appropriate means of attaining them. It would ensure also
that corporate programs and activities do not overlap and tnat scarce,
manpower resources are not wasteful ly applied to duplicative programs.
Ultimately, the success of this reorganization will depend
considerably on how NNPC carries out its duties. It was argued
earlier that the state-owned oil corporation is saddled with enormous
tasks and responsibilities which the corporation in its present
structure and condition cannot undertake. Administrative tasks must
be commensurate with corporation abilities. And in the case of NNPC,
the tasks, to be fulfilled as required by the government, is well
beyond the capacities and orientation of the corporation.
Organizational power struggle between the various State organs
responsible for petroleum matters made it virtually impossible for
effective and comprehensive coordination of petroleum policy. Evi-
dence of serious and protracted power struggle emerged when by the
.
early 1970s, the NNPC backed up by a cadre of professional techno-
crats was locked in a fight against other players in the State oil
machinery for the implementation of the State's new policy of economic
nationalism. The cast of players included the powerful Ministry
of Finance under Abdul Atta, who consistenly advocated a strong state
role in the oil industry, the Ministry of Mines and Power which was
passive and remained in the background of events-its main function
was the regulation of foreign oil companies, although on several
occasions, it displayed resentment on encroachments made by the Minis-
try of Finance into what was thought as its "sphere of interest."
Other players of lesser importance included the Ministries of Economic
Development, Trade and Industries.
The field of play was ill-defined and rules of game hardly
established. Concerning oil policy, the interests of the Federal
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Government were handled by different ministries whose conception of
oil policy assumed bureaucratic imperatives. Thus the different
Ministries acted in accordance with what seemed appropriate to them
and not according to coordinated, consistent and comprehensive guide-
lines established by the Federal Government. Today, competition has
largely made ways for coordination and accomodation of the interests
of various minitries with the NNPC perhaps as the pHn^s inters
in the nation's oil industry.
Administrative Tasks: An El ephantine Problem?
A closer analysis of the tasks of NNPC indicates that it is
faced with an elephantine problem in attempting to execute at least
some of these tasks. The corporation is created on the assumption
that it should be a fully integrated corporate actor, engaging in all
aspects of the petroleum industry. Its "general duties" include the
fol lowing:
(a) exploring and prospecting for, working, winning or
otherwise acquiring, possessing and disposing of
petroleum;
(b) refining, treating, processing and generally
engaging in the handling of petroleum for the manu-
facture and production of petroleum products and its
derivatives;
(c) purchasing and marketing petroleum, its products and
by-products;
(d) providing and operating pipelines, tanker-ships or
other facilities for the carriage or conveyance of
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crude oil, natural gas and their products and deriva-
tives, water and any other liquids or other commodities
related to the corporation's operation;
(e) constructing, equipping and maintaining tank farms and
other facilities for the handling and treatment of petro-
leum and its products and derivatives;
(f) carrying out research in connection with petroleum or
anything derived from it and promoting activities for
the purpose of turning to account the results of such
research;
(g) doing anything required for the purpose of giving effect
to agreements entered into by the Federal Military
Government with a view to securing participation by the
Government or the corporation in activities connected
with petroleum;
(h) generally engaging in activities that would enhance the
petroleum industry in the overall interest of Nigeria; and
(i) undertake such other activities as are necessary or
expedient for giving full effect to the provisions of this
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decree.
Some of the duties of the corporation are explicit and clear,
but some are simply ambiguous and reflect the ambitious tasks prepared
by the government for NNPC. By implication, it could be argued that
direct state participation in the oil industry was based not only on
economic and strategic reasons, but also on political and social con-
siderations as well. There was a widespread public outcry for govern-
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nent pa.tldpat.on In the nation's oil industry based on ,m
role to be played by the state-owned oil corporation. In the
Process, competing and diversified demands were made on the oil
corporation.. A thorough analysis of these tasks and the 1977
Petroleum Decree mandate that accompanies It, Indicate that the
responsibilities and powers of NNPC are enormous, guite different in
scope and content from its predecessor-the NNOC.
This giant leap in government policies indicates that the
9overnment has, and intends to retain, complete ownership and control
of the nation's oil industry, m pursuance of the policy of complete
ownership and control, the government has demanded from the NNPC that
it work towards an
(1) increase in the Nigerian participation in the develop-
ment of oil or petroleum resources. This decision
must be seen in the context of the worldwide evolution
of government involvement in oil. It does not, for any
reason, mean the readiness of the government to manage
singly her petroleum operations;
(2) acquiring from various means a better knowledge of the
oil industry, necessary for performing the different
tasks as needed. Knowledge also included strategic
intelligence production, sophisticated enough to act
as guidelines for Government action. Information provided
by the NNPC will serve as a measure against which the
Government could judge private oil companies' performance;
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(3) The NNPC is required to serve as a useful instrument
"
for the Governs in internationa, energy otters and
international institutions, such as the OPEC;
(4) increased efforts and emphasis on Research and Develop-
ment, including the utilization of Nigerian personnel
and services, and the training thereof of adequate and
skilled indigenous manpower to manage the nation's oil
industry;
(5) The creation of NNPC does not represent a step toward the
nationalization of the oil industry; rather it represents
Government's presence in the industry and fosters national
pride and satisfaction, reduces vulnerabi 1 ity-a result
of dependent development and on the whole secures the
nation's interests.
Although it is clear that these goals are worth achieving, it
is equally clear that the NNPC is terribly ill-equipped to achieve
them. The responsibilities thrust upon the corporation are enormous,
only the creation of independent subsidiaries as is the case with
Brazilian Oil Corporation, 27 and a more focused system or areas of
responsibility will bring order and efficiency to a largely chaotic
and disarrayed organization. The growing importance of NNPC in the
national and international oil industry provides added impetus for an
effective reorganization based on diversification of functions and
responsibility. Perhaps in pursuance of this goal, prior provision
as contained in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 1977,
was furnished for any future creation of subsidiaries. Provision for
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subsidiaries Were made on the assumption that "a single entity" su-h
as the NNPC will with time be very unwieldy, uncontrollable and
inefficient. The assumption was essentially right. Today, the state-
owned oil corporation is a crawling, highly inefficient, overgrown
bureaucratic structure, incapable of implementing some of its essen-
tial mandates.
The government, on several occasions, stated objectives which
it would see the NNPC achieve. One of these objectives is the com-
plete functional integration of the oil corporation within the acti-
vities of the oil industry. Integration will include engaging in
downstream as well as upstream operations in the oil and gas industry.
Direct participation by the state-owned oil corporation in oil and gas
exploration activities constitutes a fundamental mandate from the
government and is consistent with policies already formulated under
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act (1977). NNPC has made
an "encouraging start" in the field of oil exploration, although, as
stated earlier in this chapter, achievements have been minimal and
insignificant. However, "exploration success ratio" has been placed
at an encouraging 67% range. 28 The bulk of exploration and exploita-
tion work, however, remains in the hands of major oil producing com-
panies in the form of service-contracts and production-sharing
arrangements
.
The need for integration also has been largely predicated on
the government's policy of self-reliance and self-sufficiency in those
areas of petroleum production which are of strategic importance to
the nation. The aim of this policy is to minimize dependency, first
on the major oil companies and second, on foreign imports. Self-
sufficiency is defined as having sufficient domestic production to
meet domestic demand. Complementary to this, is the ambition of the
Nigerian government's industrial policy of "exporting more and more
processed products rather than mere raw materials. To this end the
NNPC will increasingly displace the export of crude petroleum with
the export of petroleum and petrochemical products." 29 My argument on
this policy initiative or pronouncement dwells on the issue of
whether the NNPC is capable and ready to carry these mammoth tasks.
In the main, my arguments have been that the state-owned corporation
lacks the institutional capabilities needed for an effective and
efficient execution of stated objectives. Although subsidiaries have
been created for this purpose, evidence shows that objectives remain
unfulfilled. New subsidiaries are needed, tasked with attainable
goals, personnel and institutional capabilities, with NNPC as the
"holding company."
Downstream operations carried out by NNPC show a serious
dependency on foreign imported materials as well as technical per-
sonnel. Although downstream operations such as crude oil refining,
pipeline transportation, marketing of petroleum and its allied
products, etc., are indeed engaged in, they suffer terribly from
occasional shortages of needed construction and management materials
and most importantly, on skilled manpower. Some of these downstream
operations projects never got off the ground because of these short-
ages; those that did, had a high content level of foreign participation
For example, NNPC owns 60% in National Oil Company of Nigeria Limited
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(formerly Shel ,
-Marketing Company), 10M of the equUy shares
African Petroleum (formerly British Petrol Marketing Company, and
Unipetroi (formerly Ess0 , The ^^^
adequately compensated, was a political move, short of strict standards
of indigenous performance in the enterprise. The governs was
forced to acquire these shares pursuant to her policy of economic
indenization and "interna, self-sufficiency," and of course her
desire to reduce and when possible to eliminate entirely dependency
on foreign petroleum products. So far, this policy seems to bo effec-
tive and working; however, success must be measured in terms of inde-
pendence from foreign participation and input, and also on performance
measured with the passage of time.
This will be so because a major drawback in the implementation
of these projects apparently is the lack of, or rather the incon-
sistency of, the flow of finance capital. Government's precarious
dependency on her oil revenues seems troublesome, since revenues are
tied to oil sales and the state of global economy. Recent difficul-
ties encountered by the government towards executing some projects
reflect these facts. The construction of the petrochemical complex,
for example, slated for the 1980 Development Plan period, was parti-
cularly affected. Some of these programs have either been revised,
cut back, or simply dropped. But presently, the NNPC has a "monopoly"
on oil refining and the distribution of petroleum products. Although
monopoly promotes inefficiency and waste, the government has made a
policy of protecting the NNPC from competition. Acute shortages of
refined petroleum and petroleum products are, from time to time,
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experienced in the country due to inefficiencies and monopol istlc'
practices promoted by the entrenched m0nopoly position of the state-
owned oil corporation. Shortages still haunt the Nigerian consul
even though the NNPC "owns and operates three refineries at the
present tine" and has also built a "comprehensive network of pipelines
and 19 storage depots strategically located around the country," but
only eight of these depots are currently operational.
The government is expending tremendous efforts toward finding
solutions to the problems that face its oil company, especially in
the field of downstream operations. The importance of this sector of
the oil industry is constantly being emphasized by the government.
Addressing the occasion on the opening of the NNPC Refinery at Kaduna
on 25 October 1980, the President, Shehu Shagari, declared that:
"No doubt the Kaduna Refinery ... is a milestone in nnr
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In order that shortages "remain an experience of the past" the govern-
ment has commissioned other refineries, including the newly con-
structed Warri refinery, and has also declared a "policy of permitting
independent businessmen to construct and operate petroleum stations,
with the hope of combatting the shortage by making.available even to
the remotest part of the country, petroleum and petroleum products.
It is fervently hoped that NNPC operations will provide a
"springboard" for other development projects in Nigeria. The Presi-
dent, speaking on the role of the state-owned corporation in national
development and Industrialization referred to this hope when he said-
period r^lne^Mnduttrvt S5 yMrs Wi " be * b^
toward industria zation wil , I*
C°Untry
-
0ur mr<*
will play a major role 1 I ! T a " d the oil sect° r
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The extent to which NNPC fully participates efficiently and effectively
in the oil industry remains to be seen.
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Part III
CHAPTER VII
THE TRANSNATIONAL I ZATI ON OF NIGERIAN SOCIETY
ism
on
In this chapter, I examine the phenomenon of transnational
and its impact on developmental issues and processes, especially
the "developing" nations, with a particular reference to Nigeria. I
also explore and examine the different approaches to economic growth
and development- "world system/dependency" approach (orthodox Marxist
theories and neo-Marxist views)-in favour or against certain develop-
ment strategies and issues.
I argue that transnational ism represents an epoch of new global
imperialism where direct colonial exploitation, domination and sub-
ordination are largely absent; the modus operandi of contemporary
imperialism is subtle and disguise and does not involve the imoair-
ment of national sovereignty to any serious degree. I also argue that
imperialism through the transnational ization process, constitutes a
"system of privilege" involving exploitation, inequality and de-
pendency. A system of privilege is created, cultivated, nurtured and
protected by the alliance between foreign capital and domestic elites
and in some cases, in concert with the state apparatus.
Finally, I examine the logic of state intervention in Nigeria's
economy and argue that crucial public policy issues are analyzed and
resolved by the state acting as the site of class interaction. This is
also true when analyzing certain "prominent features" of the Nigerian
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state. The
, 091c of state intervention i„ the economy has the advan-
tage of relating state institutions, and policies to civil society
—
a larger scale, to the outside world. This log ic can then he
examined not simply
,„ instrumental, universal terms like growth
welfare and efficiency, or in terms of a single class, hut as the
resolution of certain economic and social forces (Tom Forrest,
,977;
taanuel Wallers tein, 1975; Richard L. Sklar, 1979).'
In most developing nations, the state is seen as the main agent
of societal development, including economic progress. Host often,
scholarly analysis on development issues and planning overlook the
crucial role played by non-state actors (whether internal or external
to it) in the system; conflict of interests based on Cass and class
interaction are not recognized, and when they do, their role is
institutionally obscured by the ubiquitous presence of state machinery.
Moreover, the state acting to control domestic economic and political
processes often ignores the international component of economic
development which usually operates in alliance with domestic trans-
national forces.
Transnational relations is characterized by contending perspec-
tives on the part of scholars as well as practitioners (Nye and
Keohane, 1976; Samuel Huntington, 1973; James Rosenau, 1980; Barnett
and Mueller, 1974; Kissinger, 1975, etc.). Differing perspectives re-
flect the diverse use of transnational phenomenon by actors in explain-
ing new global issues and events. There is not much to grumble about
these perspectives except the broad-based nature of their treatment.
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However, in this chapter, I am concerned w1th transnat1onal
as it affects international political econo.y of development. More
specifically, emphasis will be la1d on the issues Qf ^
dependency and what Peter Evans has aptly labelled dependent develop-
ment and how they affect DP^inho^i i •y dir pe, lpheral capitalism and accumulation,
social formation and transformations.
Dependent development is said to characterize those newly
industrializing peripheral countries (NICs) who are emerging from
"classical dependence" to dependent industrial development on the
more advanced "centre" nations for those goods and services needed
for economic development. A number of the larger and richer peri-
Pheral nations no longer stand at the edge of the international div-
ision of labour, exporting primary products to the centre and re-
ceiving manufactured goods in return. They belong instead to a dis-
tinct category, which Wallerstein has called the "semi-periphery"
(Peter Evans, 1979). Mansour Farhang calls them "subimperial ists. 1,3
Nigeria, as well as a handful of other rapidly industrializing "third
world" nations, belongs to this distinct group.
Dependent development cannot be understood properly unless the
global machinery and network of imperialism is first analyzed and
understood. It has been argued that neither the work of orthodox
Marxist theoreticians nor the non-Marxist views, which define imper-
ialism as a relationship of domination/subordination between actors,
provide an adequate model for describing the transnational realities
of contemporary imperialist relations. It has also been argued that
transnational relations created a system of privilege which undermines
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peripheral development and instead fosters its underdevelopment due
to interactions based on class structure and interests, and, of
course, on the structural relations among nations based on imperialism.
Mansour Farhang writes that "what is clear in the present
situation of international relations is the growing confluence of
interests" between elites in the center, that is industrialized
world, and the "ruling elites of the class-ridden societies in the
underdeveloped world." 4 Mansour goes further to state that
The coalition of elites across national boundaries per-ceive economic development in the poor nations as a necessitvnot only in terms of market expansion for WesLrn prSduc?
"
IS n? T >e h°?G ° f enlarging the smal1 midd?e
P
c^ ssIsa way of legitimizing the rule of the privileged few Thiskind of economic development has nothing to do with justiceor equity because the distribution of accumulated wealthtakes place in the context of the existing class structure. 5
This observation is precisely correct in the context of those
developing capitalist nations where state intervention in the economy
has ostensibly been carried out for the purposes of redistributing
the national wealth to the grassroot citizens. Efforts directed
toward these ends have been partially successful and on most occasions
have suffered defeat in a system of class-ridden and class-conscious
interactions. Nigeria, for example, represents such a system.
Efforts geared toward indigenizing the economy and spreading out the
economic benefits to the less fortunate have been minimally success-
ful due in part to the portent and formidable class alliance of inter-
national capital and the local elites. The role of the state, which has
beer, seen as one of control and "correction," seemed incapable of
breaking the alliance which thwarted its policies; instead the state
bureaucracy machinery on several occasions had joined the aliiance as
a balancing actor. Discussion of this trlpl, alliance wil, be made in
the latter part of this chapter, hot now, it is necessary to resurrect
the argumentative Marxist interpretations of economic imperialism.
Doing this is necessary in order to justify the future discussion on
dependent develops and how imperialism creates class structures and
class relations resulting in economic exploitation and domination.
The literature concerned with imperialism and related pheno-
menon is immense and most of the competent writers are of the Marxist
school of thought. These writings are opposed to earlier theories of
economic imperialism, for example, the works of J. A. Hobson (Imper-
ialism. 1900, 1902), and disagree among themselves on certain issues,
however they maintain agreement on fundamental thoughts about economic
imperial ism.
Marxist analysis and interpretations of economic imperialism
(based on the pioneering works of Marx and Lenin) center on the
development of the forces of production and production relations with-
in the system of capitalism. Imperialism is seen as an inherent part
of capitalism, forming a specific stage in capitalist development
(Kemp in Owen and Sutcliffe, 1972, pp. 17-22, and Sutcliffe, Ibid.,
p. 172). Imperialism involves domination, exploitation, dependence,
inequality ajid subordination. Domination is primarily economic, but
may overlap into the political and social structure, of "backward" by
"advanced" nations, based on the relative levels of development between
the areas, specifically in productive forces and production relations
(Bronfenbrenner, 1972; J. O'Connor, 1971; R. Zevin, 1972; Tikhomirov,
2931981). Contemporary imperialism is based on the "exercise and
extension" of control by economic means and mechanisms rather than by
direct formal political control, otherwise called colonialism. Al-
though some developments may occur in the dominated areas (or the
Periphery), it will be a dependent rather than independent develop-
ment. This type of dependent development characterizes, to a large
extent, the newly industrializing nations whose developmental
projects are fed extensively from the outside. Advanced capitalism
works to ensure that dependent development is preserved and, if
possible, perpetrated in order to sustain and guarantee the very
survival of capitalism.
"Neo-colonial ism" is the term often applied
to this process (Nkrumah, 1965; O'Connor, 1971; Barratt Brown, 1974).
A genuine development of the political economy of under-
development suffers from a lack of "responsibility" on whom to
blame, partly because of the nature of neo-colonial istic arrangements
which underlie and legitimates global political and economic relations
This arrangement is unlike colonialism where, as Kwame Nkrumah argues,
is subject to "public accountability." The new phenomenon of neo-
colonialism lacked this inner constraint of accountability, making it
the most irresponsible form of imperialism. However, neo-colonial ism
ushered in a stage which foresaw the disappearance of the most open,
direct form of dependence.
The features of contemporary imperialism which commands gen-
eral agreement among Marxist scholars are:
(a) The development of a monopolistic market structure
within capitalism;
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(b) unequal development between nations;
(c) the need for the advanced capitalist nations to con-
tinually expand and control markets, raw material
sources and investment outlets;
(d) growing international rivalry between capitalist
nations stemming from their support for home-based
multinational corporations;
(e) a fear among capitalists that socialism will re-
strict the area for capitalist expansion. 6
(A.Hodgart, 1977).
Around these features, Sutcliffe presents three points around which
Marxists debate economic imperialism:
I. Developments within and between capitalist nations;
II. The interaction between advanced and backward
nations within the world's capitalist system; and
III. Developments within the "backward" nations, parti-
cularly class relations and the mode of production. 7
The impact of transnational ization on a nation's economy can
best be understood in terms of external dependence on the develop-
ment process for factors of production and exchange mechanisms, as
well as technological and management expertise, and the formation of
external and domestic alliance structure which cements the interests
of actors. This is made possible by imperialistic links between
elite interests in the advanced "centre" countries and local elite in
the periphery nations, and from the point of view of the developing
countries' future development, this link is crucial and increasingly
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instant. It is then iterative that a thorough analysis be made
of internal development mechanism, taking into careful consideration
social conflict and social formation based on class structure and how
the interests of class alliances shape the politics and economics of
national development. Tamas Szentes writes that
'
n 1
5
s! lf
- evi'dent that the movement of the world
rH area? inn 6"3 ' 1
'
0" 1 P°1UicS W^«
relations of tlJ/JT ° n the internal life and externalhe developing countries, but the directionand intensity of this influence will depend to a deci 1
rlltnt Tf It rgrf 5 ° f the in ternal
P
chan sesults o the transformation of the inherited structure. 8
In Nigeria, the inherited structure from British colonialism
was based on an economy characterized by classic dependency. External
trade relations and the internal economic structure reveal that -
Nigeria is primarily an agricultural country despite the inroad to
industrialization, assisted heavily by the petroleum sector. The
consequence of this assisted development is that the economy is "dis-
articulated," is skewed without any meaningful linkages between the
various sectors of the economy. In essence, there are two economies
existing side by side: agricultural and the petroleum sectors. These
exist virtually without much structural relation prompting the
labelling of it by the World Bank as "economic dualism." The petro-
leum sector remains essentially an "enclave" industry with only
marginal links with the rest of the economy (Nigeria: Economic Memo-
randum, June 1976; Document of the World Bank).
Because Nigeria is essentially an agricultural country,
patterns cf global exchange of goods and services have historically
placed Nigeria among those nations which exported a large portion of
th-ir agricultural products in exchange for manufactured goods from
industrially advanced "metropole" nations. The colonial state en-
couraged and regulated the trade in agricultural products and on this
basis, the state supported foreign capital accumulation in commerce,
finance and metropolitan industry. The colonial state, moreover, had
a monopoly over economic activity and processes of state capital
accumulation. Private indigenous capital accumulation was, in fact,
minimal, and even discouraged, and capital formation suffered as a
result. Marketing Boards were set up by the colonial state to appro-
priate "peasant surplus" which were eventually transferred to the
colonial state. Sir Percival Griffiths wrote in 1955 that this
"means that the Development Board which operates Marketing Board sur-
plus funds in Nigeria, is in fact the only potential African inves-
tor." Griffiths went on to show how control over the network of
capital enabled metropolitan capital to monopolize large-scale com-
mercial activity. However, the rise of nationalism and the conse-
quent shifts of power within the Nigerian state after 1952 increased
nationalist demands for a share in the distributive trade. 9 This
weakened the position of British commercial capital, and opened up
opportunities for local entrepreneurs and hence competition. Local
entrepreneurs, lacking finance capital and management technology,
were unable to compete effectively with foreign capital.
Trade was dominated by subsidiaries of multinational companies
based in the metropolitan countries. Industrialization and the manu-
facture of goods were virtually non-existent and needed manufactured
goods were routinely imported from the metropole. Therefore, "the
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pattern of foreign investments which resulted underscored invest-
ments in the extractive and distributive trade against manufacturing
industries. " 0
As Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in i960,
there was an immediate emphasis on economic industrialization geared
toward the rapid transformation of the nation's economy from one of
classical dependence to dependent development.
The push for an industrial economy in Nigeria, as elsewhere
in West Africa, was a direct consequence of the nationalist agitation
during the 1950s. Although the growth rate of the manufacturing
sector has been impressive, it could be argued that since independence
the manufacturing sector remains highly underdeveloped relative to the
overall size of the national economy, and in comparison with other
countries at a similar stage of development. 11
The Nigerian state needed to hasten the industrialization
process and has provided finance, generous tax concessions and incen-
tives in the early stages of industrialization. In addition, relief
from import duty for capital goods and raw materials have been granted
by the government. Considerations of market strategy, various types
of state subsidy and tariff escalation due to balance of payment diffi-
culties in the early 1960s, all encouraged the expansion of foreign
capital from its commercial base into manufacture and prompted the
flow of new investments abroad (Tom Forrest, 1977). Despite direct
state intervention to build an industrial base for economic activity
and growth, "there is a pervasive sense of disappointment among many
officials, academics, and informed journalists at the little that
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has been achieved." 12
Lack of industrial progress and results can be explained
partly on the basis of dependent development and what James A.
Caporaso describes as "asymmetric international relations." 13 The
external sector of the economy mostly shaped and dominated by the
multinational companies has had a tremendous and "central influence-
on the domestic economy. And as Peter Evans argues, given the forms
on industrialization, there is no way of avoiding the multinationals
(Peter Evans, 1979) as agents of dependent development.
Dependent development is a special instance of dependency,
characterized by the association or alliance of international and
local capital. The state also joins the alliance ... the resulting
triple alliance is a fundamental factor in the emergence of depen-
dent development (Peter Evans, 1979, p. 32). Dependent development
also involves "capital accumulation at the local level accompanied
by increasing differentiation of the economy" based on varying de-
grees of effective industrialization and supported by foreign input.
This type of dependent development usually involves "dependency" on
the part of developing countries for factors of production from the
more developed countries.
Since developing nations depend to a considerable degree on
the imports from the more advanced nations for development, this
dependency 14 usually shapes strategic behaviors of all actors in-
volved, and invariably, affects considerably the processes of develop-
ment. Dependency by its very nature means "asymmetrical international
relations" resulting from global structural arrangements and promoting
:")<)
Internationa! division of labor. Thus with this arrangement, the
underdeveloped nations function on the one hand as a source of raw
materials and on the other as "limited" markets for manufactured
goods from the industrialized countries. The resulting outcome is
that developing world's commodity are undersold and manufactured
goods from the industrialized world overpriced in the process which
Emmanuel Aghirri has termed "unequal exchange." 15 Unequal exchange
is made possible by the international division of labor rooted in
dominance, dependence and imperialism. Galtung 16 sees this "vertical
division of labor" and the structural distortions therefrom as
essentially one of dominance and economic exploitation made possible,
of course, by "penetration" and "fragmentation" which are essentially
political means of perpetrating dependent and exploitative economic
relationship (Galtung, 1973). Exploitation, therefore, works to drain
the minimal resources needed badly by developing nations for develop-
ment. And despite the drain created and nurtured by the process of
unequal exchange, "development" as perceived by Third World nations
usually and unfortunately is based on dependent relationships with
industrialized nations, because dependent development essentially
means structural integration with the outside world.
Considering the nature of global economic systems, structural
relations invariably and inevitably lead to "symmetries" and
asymmetries among national economies precipitating dependence. More-
over, structural relations create structural linkages based on
sectoral and class interests. J. A. Caporaso argues that this de-
pendence orientation explains and seeks to
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which focuses on class st?uctur£ in Zal 1st .P*/ adl 9™>
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Continuing with "dependentista" analysis of Third World economic
development, Caporaso echoes dependency assessment which
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economic production structures and domestic politicalprocesses and the ways in which changes in the organ za-
Zl+ f caP\taVefine and redefine the Possibilities ofdomestic production and development. 18
The politics of transformation in Nigeria envisage stages of
gradual and occasionally drastic progression in the economic develop-
ment and growth of the national economy. It was thought by policy-
makers and the ruling political class that the stage has arrived
when the economy should be propelled from its historical position of
classic dependence to one of dependent development based on rapid
industrialization. In this case the principal agent of development
is the multinational corporation in concert with domestic economic
forces conditioned by state presence and intervention, and con-
ditioned also by structural linkages to the international economy.
Throughout the analysis of Nigeria's dependent development,
imperialism will provide a framework for investigation into the
nation's link to worldwide system of capital accumulation and the con-
crete relations which this entails in terms of social formation and
disintegration, class alliance and its solidification and the role of
in
fm-
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the state. The role of the state may not be seen in terms of repre-
senting the interests of a single class, but as the resolution of
certain economic and social forces. Although state intervention
the economy ostensibly was designed to correct the structural
balances between the domestic economy and its international branch,
and to ensure domestic control of economic activity, it is nighly
debatable whether this policy was successful or not. The measure-
ment of success or failure seems, at the moment, premature and un-
warranted. However, one thing is certain-structural relation of the
domestic economy to international finance works to undermine the
policy measure of controlling the domestic structure. I submit that
imperialism is an offshoot of an internationalized economy and
of dependent development which influence internal politics in order
to further their own interests at the expense of the good of the
society. Hobson (1900, 1902), provides a precedent for this argument,
which also has roots in Marx's classification of politics as part of
the "super structure" which is influenced by the economic substruc-
ture. I argue also that the cost of this imperialist policy, in
general, is borne by the working class in Nigeria, exploited and
dominated by the network of the alliance of commercial bourgeoisie,
foreign capital and curiously enough, the state apparatus. Sutcliffe's
last point (see pp. 245-246 of this study) dwelling on particularly
class relations and the mode of production is very pertinent.
Manifesting itself most clearly immediately after Nigeria's
civil war, the alliance between indigenous commercial bourgeoisie and
foreign capital, created on its wake a new distinct elite—the
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nouveau-riahe, who owe their vast wealth and power to the "oil boom"
and to links to foreign capital and interests.
The Alliance: Commercial Bojjrgeojsie
The State and Foreign Capital
In an effort to speed up industrialization and transform the
economy, Nigerians became aware that this could realistically be
achieved only through dependent development. Although Nigeria's
economic nationalism "does not imply restriction of international -
trade, but the progressive elimination of foreign dominance in the
national economy," it became increasingly clear that the multi-
nationals are the main characters in an economy based on dependent
development. It also dawned on most government officials, and the
"ruling class" that multinationals can at the same time be a machinery
for development and agents of imperialism. Government policy-makers
were therefore faced with a dilemma—a dilemma of choice which in-
volves careful analysis of cost-benefit ratio, and one which demands
diplomatic tact in negotiations with multinational companies. Policy
measures were arrived at, analyzed and choices were made which to a
large degree reflect private and class interests. Analyzing dependent
development in Nigeria must therefore, first recognize agreements
concluded which take interests of class alliances into consideration,
and second, which see the role of the state principally as resolving
the dialectics of this class interaction and alliance for the good of
all. Shortly, it will be explained why state intervention in the
national economy taking consideration of class alliances and foreign
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interests could eventually prove to be a dismal failure.
The politics of transformation postulates that the alliance
between the state, foreign capital and local commercial enterprise
is perhaps the only realistic approach to economic and political
development in Nigeria. To what degree of dependence on foreign
factors of production and their involvement in developing the economy
is exactly not known, but it is usually taken that political consider-
ations will eventually be decisive in such a calculation.
Although Nigeria is a country "groping its way out of classic
dependence," the country fits the essential characteristics of a
nation marching uneasily toward the path of dependent development
made possible by the deliberate guiding arm of the state. Moreover,
the social structural basis of dependent development-the alliance
of the multinationals, local commercial bourgeoisie and the state are
present in the Nigerian development scenario. The presence of these
allied actors is a necessary condition for dependent capitalist
development. The exact nature of this alliance remains to be clearly
defined and the actors identified. What is known about this alliance
is that relationship between them is not confrontational. Instead,
as Tom Biersteker (1982) observed, this relationship "appears to be
essentially harmonious." 19 Harmony has been carefully sought and
cultivated by government policy-makers in order to achieve its
goals—rapid industrialization albeit on the basis of dependent
development. Secondly, it was inevitable that harmony is sought
considering the lack of realistic alternatives available and the
primitive, unencouraging level of existing industrialization in the
national economy.
Surprisingly enough, elite class solidarity within the
national economic structure has worked to promote and then cement the
harmony which the triple alliance seemed to enjoy. I n Nigeria,
tribal allegiance has traditionally precluded the possibility that
competing economic groups of different tribal background would iden-
tify their common interest and form tri bo-economic bond to defend it.
This process certainly represents the dawn of a new era which promises
the disintegration of tribal allegiance and bonds and the emergence
of class structure and social formation based largely on the recog-
nition of class interest. Historically, local accumulation of capital
and the means of production were based mostly on tribal lines. The
Ibo man strictly identified with his fellow tribesman on matters of
accumulation and had cautious faith in the interaction; so did the
Yoruba man to his fellow tribesman and the Hausa man to one of his
kind. Today, class alliance based on class interest and the need to
protect these, have brought diverse but obviously united entre-
preneurs together. However, this process of social formation has not
and perhaps will not eradicate hostile feelings and antagonism be-
tween the diverse elites. What promises unity and class solidarity
is the implicit recognition by this group that thoir interest is at
stake. Moreover, the state through its several policies of indigeni-
zation of the economy opened up opportunities for tribal cooperation
based on class identification and class interest.
Although social formation based on class interest tends to
dampen and obscure tribal allegiance, the existence of "class" and
305
elite structure was seen by many as a nationally divisive upshot of
dependent development. Immanuel Wallerstein argues that this has,
in the African context, been handled by "firmly denying its existence,
or at least minimizing its significance;" however, it remains a
"divisive concept." 20 it remains indeed a divisive concept in
Nigeria where the success or failure of recent government indigeniza-
tion schemes depend to a considerable extent on the role played by
local commercial elites and their foreign counterparts. This is so
because class, on the whole, is defined in terms of relationship to
the means of production and in Nigeria's political economy, class has
assumed an important level of recognition arising as it were from
class-consciousness and the institutional necessity to identify with
foreign counterparts. Whatever the forms of class consciousness in
the alliance, it is argued that both are expressions of class
interests
.
"Given this condition," argues Richard Sklar, 21 "it is widely
believed that privileged groups and those who conduct the business
of government in non-industrial countries, are knowingly or not,
local agents of foreign domination." The expression of class inter-
ests inevitably leads to exploitation and domination of lower classes
by local elites for the benefit of the alliance. However, this
process does not readily manifest itself within the state. In
general, as Immanuel Wallerstein noted,
In peripheral areas of the world-economy, however, the
primary contradiction is not between two groups within
a State each trying to gain control of that state struc-
ture, or to bend it. The primary contradiction is between
the interests organized and located in the core countries
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It is a contention of this study, however, that in addition
to the contradiction between interests based in the "core countries"
and those in the periphery over "anti-imperialist nationalist
struggles," there is another primary contradiction in Nigeria's
political economy-one observable in Wal 1 erstein
' s words, over the
ambiguous and ambivalent role of the state structure, control of
which is sought by different groups within the nation. I argued
earlier that class formation in Nigeria has been cemented due to the
presence, recognition and therefore protection of class interests.
However, this "class analysis" does not portray the essential contra-
dictory nature of the alliance arrangement. This arrangement was
shaky from its inception. Although the local elites managed to
drown their ethnic and occupational differences, the struggle for
control of state machinery rages on. The state is essentially seen
as a powerful institution with the right over the allocation cf
national resources and therefore, whoever controls the state apparatus
controls access to resources. The result of this struggle will
ultimately decide the actual composition and formation of class alli-
ances equipped to deal with foreign forces of production. Resolution
of this struggle also would inevitably determine the eventual outcome
of recent indigenization exercises in the country.
Indigenization Decrees: A New Economic Order for Nigeria
The agitation for the indigenization or "Migerianization" of
the national economy has a long history and dates back to the late
fifties before the achievement of independence. It is not surprising
then that the gradua! transfer to Nigerians of
..control" over the
economy has always been a major goal of governs policy since inde-
pendence. It is a policy conceived of the conviction that a veritable
new economic order should be introduced in the nation's economy,
including also activities external to it. In other words, the exten-
sive classic dependence which historically characterized and defined
economic activity within the national economy should be brought to a
halt, or at least minimized. The attainment of political independence
offered a congenial platform on which to sound this intention. Before
then, capital accumulation was mostly undertaken by the colonial state
and its agents which included a sizeable number of large, mostly com-
mercial multinational corporations such as the United African Company
(UAC), John Holts, Patterson Zocharis (PZ) and A. G. Leventis. These
companies largely were engaged in commerce; buying raw materials from
local production and in turn sold manufactured goods from the metro-
pole. No visible attempt was made on their part for the domestic
manufacture of goods; industrialization enterprises were shunned and
never became part of policy. The policy of non-industrialization was
largely due to the lack of adequate infrastructure necessary to support
large-scale industry and perhaps most importantly, due to policy de-
cided by headquarters in the metropole. Therefore, commerce became
the main occupation of these companies and in the process of commer-
cial exchange, preempted local capital accumulation anci hence local
control of the economy.
Indigenous capital accumulation which took place during this
period was done by the marketing boards which was agent to the colonial
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state and itself impeded capital formation and accumulation by trans-
ferring surplus funds to Colonial State's treasury.
It was not long before proposals for increasing Nigerianiza-
tion of the economy was demanded by local elite groups. Pressures
were piled on the colonial government by the "ruling class" and in
1956, a national committee to promote indigenization of business
enterprises was formed.^ A fl>st ^ ^ ^
economy as a result of the creation of this committee was to "dilute"
the commercial dominance of the multinational companies, and simul-
taneously increase and support the role of indigenous entrepreneurs.
Encouragement of local entrepreneurship took the form of "generous
tax concessions" for "pioneer industries" and loan capital from the
government. In addition, the government saw to it that Nigerians were
allocated equity shares in the activities of the multinational com-
panies. Tom Biersteker writes that
I^J-
958
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ef Act re<?uired transnational corporation
seeking pioneer" company status to both increase Nigerian
ownership and personnel, and to use Nigerian materials inproduction However, it was not until after independence
that significant legislation was passed. After beinq
supported in principle in both the first national develop-
mental plan and in a 1961 House of Representatives resolu-
tion, provisions for increasing Nigerianization were codifiedinto Law in the 1963 Immigration Laws. 24
Maintaining the policy to take control over the national
economy does not, however, imply aversion to foreign participation.
The state has generally supported the influx of foreign capital.
Although indigenous control of the national economy occupied the minds
of Nigerian politicians immediately after independence, care has
always been taken to balance this need with the invitation of foreign
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agents of develops. The nature of this arrangement was essen-
tially contradictory and with the constant inflow of foreign capital
throughout the 1960s, the contradiction between these two policies
became increasingly evident.
The pressures for indigenization of the economy won out being
a product of the policy of transformation embraced by the ruling class
and elite, and put into concrete formulation by the high-level govern-
ment bureaucrats. Phillip C. Asiodu, former Permanent Secretary in
the Ministry ofMines and Power, suggested that "it was in the period
between 1968 and 1971 that the widest consultations were undertaken,
leading to the promulgation of the Enterprise Promotion Decree of
251972." This statement from one of the few "super permsecs" around
then, confirms the view that Nigeria seriously embarked on the politics
of transformation immediately before and after the civil war.
Indigenizing the economy represents one phase of this great
transformation. Political transformation (parliamentary to presiden-
tial system of government) represents another phase. However, between
these two, indigenizing the economy had perhaps the greatest impact
on the developing process and in turn, had a tremendous influence on
the political processes. International political and economic devel-
opments, military rule spanning the course of some thirteen years, a
more powerful and articulate bureaucracy, oil surpluses and the
"bitter experiences of the civil war" occasioned a period of national
revival and transformation. These new developments "provided the
context for efforts to restrict the sphere- of foreign capital and
secure a more self-reliant pattern of development (Tom Forrest, 1977).
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Restriction of the sphere of foreign capital took the forra
of successive indenization decrees of ,972 and ,977, designed to
fight and weaken excessive re,iance on foreign means of production
whi,e simultaneously strengthening the position of local capital
formation and accumulation. The ultimate aim of these policies is,
of course, the eventual indigenous control of the national economy'
which in itself does not remove the haunting spectre of dependent
development. The re,ationship between indigenization policies and
dependent development is clearly one that needs careful investigation
and analysis. It is the contention of this study that the success
or failure of Migerianization exercises depend to a considerable
extent on the links of domestic economy to foreign forces of produc-
tion.
Before this is substantiated, a look at the Nigerian Enter-
prises Promotion Decrees of 1972 (revised in 1977) will prove useful.
(See Appendix 1) These decrees are the products of increased public
pressure on the Military government for indigenization of the national
economy. The evidence was that during the civil war, the federal
Military government became increasingly distrustful of foreign capital
and especially the multinational corporations operating within the
country. Indigenization decrees represent a national quest for indi-
genous control of the economy, a national desire to introduce a new
economic order in the nation's economy and above all, to reduce de-
pendence on external forces of production and distribution. De-
pendent development is seen as a product of decades of colonial
exploitation and economic linkage to the metropole. It is also seen
as a source of the nation's economic vulnerability and sensitivity
but one whose importance will diminish^ ^ graduai
tion of the nation's economy. Dependent development, according to
government planners, represents a stage through which the nation's
economy must inevitably pass, subsequently ushering in periods of
dependent-led growth. Economic nationalism became a "sustaining
force" first under Genera, Gowon and reaching a high pitch under the
brief leadership of General Murtula Muhammed.
A general distrust of foreign capital (contradictory to
official policies) basically precipitated indigenization exercises
which on several occasions bordered on xenophobic reaction against
foreign presence. Biersteker postulates the central objectives of
the 1972 decree reflected the dual sources of support for indigeniza-
tion from government and local business community. "The central ob-
jective of the Federal Military Government," he writes, "was to obtain
Nigerian control over the economy in general, and over strategic enter-
prises, in particular." Control is necessary in the words of Former
Head of State General Yakubu Gowon for "consolidating our political
independence." Paul Collins maintains that the decree was meant to
give Nigerians greater involvement in economic and commercial affairs. 26
In mid-1972, the Federal Commissioner for Trade said the goal of
indigenization was to "make the country's economy truly Nigerian," 27
and later the University of Ibadan Professor E.O. Akeredolu-Ale
suggested that indigenization was inspired by a desire to reduce
Nigeria's external dependence.
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If there is any lesson to be learned from these indignation
exercises, it is that the nation's external dependence is on the
rise-a factor of dependent development and, of course, of the
alliance between local elite groups, foreign capital and state
machinery. Indigenization of the economy has not to any appreciable
extent raised the level of industrialization needed to drag the
nation from classic dependence. Peter Evans argues that Nigeria
barely deserves to be considered part of the semi-periphery. Except
for the oil industry, which is an enclave industry, Nigeria is pri-
marily an agricultural country. 28 The minimal level of industrializa-
tion taking place supports the contention that without the multi-
nationals and dependent development, the country would not presently
experience and achieve this level of industrialization. This is unlike
Mexico or Brazil which boast of residual technical and industrial
capability before the advent of dependent development.
Some investment in manufacturing is designed to preserve
Nigeria as a market and the evolution of the role of the state, the
shape and nature of alliance with multinationals and the rapidly
emerging position of local capital apparently are moving toward a tri-
partite elite structure which will have a decisive voice on Nigeria's
dependent development and on how successful indigenization programs
wl11 De
- This triple alliance works to undermine the
spirit of indigenization and where possible perpetuates dependent
development because it is in the interest of the alliance to do so.
Although the Military government under General Obasanjo was
more strongly committed to an ideology of economic nationalism than
313
the previous government under Gowon, and although it made the revised
1977 decree more explicit and clear in terms of declared objectives
the structure of domestic political economy has proven to be ill-
equipped and unsuited to the tasks which face it. Analysis of the
structure indicates the fact that the state lacked autonomy/and
distinctions between the private and public interest seem completely
ignored because politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen P lay one
and sometimes complementary roles. Ambiguous roles confusingly
Played by domestic actors tended to obscure the real nature and ob-
jectives of the indigenization scheme by forming convenient alliances
with foreign capital which the decree in the first place was meant to
check and control. The inevitable consequence of this role conflict
was the introduction of considerable ambiguity to current indigeniza-
tion programs. The first ambiguity derives on the one hand from
radical economic nationalist interpretations of policy objectives,
stressing reduced dependence, increased self-reliance and an end to
foreign domination and exploitation. On the other hand, there have
been more compromising interpretations seeking to strike a balance be-
tween foreign investment in certain sectors and encouraging joint
ventures in others (Collins, 1973). Despite official clarifications
by the Nigerian Head of State in his 1979/80 Budget Speech, ambigui-
ties still persist. The Head of State made it clear that indigeniza-
tion exercises should be given a more political interpretation; that
indigenization was not just a matter of transferring shares and the
earning of dividends, but one of control, that is, getting Nigerians
to determine their own economic future.
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The extent to which this objective has been adhered remains
to be seen. The ambiguities inherent in the interpretation of indi-
genization schemes and what they are supposed to achieve only served
to further exacerbate an already intractable and confused program.
Although indigenization programs were designed to reduce foreign
dependence on the importation of intermediary goods, and foster con-
trol and self-reliance within the domestic economy, the economy con-
tinues to be heavily dependent on foreign means of production con-
ferring as it were enormous control over the economy by foreign capi-
tal, cemented and supported by the local bourgeoisie class. A typical
comment on dependent goes like this:
All our power plants, military hardware and ammunition,
transport machinery, railway equipment, iron and steelproducts, electrical and electronic goods, and many con-
sumer goods are
. . . imported. 29
y
Government planners admit that the industrial sector is indeed
dominated by "low technology enterprises" and argue that this im-
balance is only a "temporary and preliminary" stage. But this argu-
ment was deemed tenuous by many and was not very convincing. For
example, the iron and steel complex which has been on the drawing
board for over fifteen years (major complexes are now completed) and
the other major industrial projects, including petro-chemical plants,
remain stagnant because of the "weakness of the intermediate indus-
trial sector", which ought to feed these projects. The results are
either a temporary shutdown or a radical reassessment of these
projects. In either case, inefficiency and ineffectiveness to project
execution usually is the outcome and costs have been known to be
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enormous and damaging.
The crucial question remains on how prepared the level of
industrialization now operable in Nigeria will support the need for
self-reliance and dependent development. The answer is simple. The
level of industrialization in Nigeria is not adequate to support
calls for rapid industrialization and indigenization of the economy
without a corresponding input and support from foreign agents of
development. Foreign agents of development most notably the multi-
national corporations, however, see Nigeria's industrial inadequa-
cies and the failure of import-substitution as an opportunity to
buy out import-substitution industries, transforming them into
subsidiaries which can uniquely cater to global sub-contracting
strategies of the multinational corporations. See, for example,
Professor Biersteker's table classification. (Displacement of indi-
genous Production, Distortion or Development? 1978) Efforts such as
these on the part of multinational corporations' work to sustain
dependent development and arguably to "neutralize" indigenization
process. Presently, the nation is groping its way out of classical
dependence and the minimal industrialization in the economy seems to
serve foreign interest and net the interests of the economy as a
whole. There is indeed not much industrial manufacturing going on in
the country, prompting many observers to note that:
... the crucial question is how much industrialization and
how much manufacturing is actually taking place in the
country? Are we mistaking the cranes and caterpillars and
the bulldozers or the ever-increasing number of foreign cars
blocking our roads as industrial ization?30
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"The basic reason for the failure of the strategy of 1„dustriali .
zation in Nigeria," argues Richer, Joseph
,
..
has been the
of the embryonic capita, ist Cass to play its historical role of
initiative, capital formation and increased production. 31
While this observation is basically and marginally true, it over-
looks the historical deprivation of local elites from the mech-
anism of capital formation and accumulation in Nigeria. The fact
is that local capitalist elites were never given the "historical"
opportunity to accumulate capital by the Colonial State. Depriva-
tion foreclosed any changes of local capital accumulation and
formation and forced local elites into a strategy of dependency
on the Colonial State for capital.
It is this historical deprivation of capital formation and
accumulation imposed by the colonial state on local entre-
preneurs that recent indigenization policies seek to correct.
It took the country almost two decades to seek a more equitable,
justifiable policy to redress the structural imbalances inherited
from the colonial superstructure. This, including other factors
mentioned earlier, form the core basis for Nigeria's politics of
transformation.
On the balance, indigenization decrees wisely accommodated the
interests of local as well as foreign capital. It has strengthened
the "transnational component" of the local bourgeoisie whose atti-
tudes toward capital accumulation, according to several studies,
has undermined and deterred the rapid industrialization of the
economy. The findings of these studies apparently were unanimous:
Displacement of Indigenous Production
Distortion or Development? (1978)
Thomas J. Biersteker
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Multinational
Corporations
First-order Consequence
1 Buy out import-substitution industries
and transform them into subsidiaries
a. Export finished goods.
b. Establish sales organization.
c. Buy off local manufacturers.
d. Establish a subsidiary.
Drive indigenous competitors out of
business due to their competitive
advantages
:
a. Economics of scale, finance,
marketing
.
Vertical integration.
Capital intensity of production.
Attractive wage scales.
b
C
d
Displacement of indigenous Production
(displacement of both enterprise and
entrepreneurs)
Reduction of economic
capabil ities:
a. Benefits increasingly
abroad, worsening
balance of payments
position.
b. Displacing entrepreneurs
harms the qua! ity of
local factors or pro-
duction as well as the
possibility of self-
sustained development.
Reduction of political capabilities:
Displacing entrepreneurs eliminates a
strong group on behalf of reforming
institutions and neutralizing powerful
groups opposed to development efforts.
Increase in the propensity for conflict
and hegemonial dominance maintenance:
Second-order consequence a. Displacement is a highly visible and
much-resented process,
b. Displacement increases dependency on
the multinational corporation and re-
duces autonomy in decision making.
"Nigerian businessmen are all interested in quick returns, and hence
their reluctance to invest in industry as contrasted with trade. It
has been shown also that "many of the traditional values associated
with an emergent capitalist class," for example thrift, austerity,
the need for savings and investment, are "absent among Nigerian con-
sent: in place of austerity and painstaking dedication to building
an enterprise, one finds extravagant consumption." 31
These findings indicate that Nigeria lacks the necessary apti-
tude for an industrial existence. And indeed this argument may be
controversially extended to other Third World countries, which is
inherently illogical since a handful of Third World nations-notably
those referred to as the "semi-periphery" and "subimperial ists" or
the newly industrializing countries (NICs) have achieved a remarkable
industrial progress. The obvious question then is: why has Nigeria
lagged behind other NICS?, and why has she disproved the "stag-
nationalist" thesis; and finally, why is her economy booming despite
the low level of industrialization? The answers to these questions
are difficult but the knot may be untangled by examining the nature
and structural relationship between the triple al 1 iance--the role of
the state machinery, foreign capital and local elites, a task which
was attempted in the earlier paragraphs.
In the final analysis, the logic of transnational relation-
ship will ultimately determine Nigeria's economic progress and the
means chosen to attain these goals. Despite indigenization, the multi-
national companies still retain a significant control over their
operations with the local bourgeoisie engaging or offering a supportive
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role. For instance, a government panel reoort, that « ii p s only one-third
of about 950 foreign-owned businesses that were supposed to become
fully Nigerian complied with the law. Cases of "phony" takeovers
were reported by the panel. These were mostly engineered by the
foreign owners, most of them Indians, Syrians or Lebanese, in
collaboration with some greedy, unpatriotic and misguided Nigerians
Local elites have, in the words of Biersteker been
"penetrated" and
the results have quite effectively neutralized the state's objectives
Biersteker concludes that the indigenization exercise has failed its
objectives because transnational corporations "are not yielding
managerial control." 32
It is certainly too early to judge whether indigenization de-
crees are a success or a failure. Anything to the contrary is surely
engaging in premature prognosis because the true nature of the triple
alliance as they have emerged in Nigeria is not well known. Any
empirical deduction or casual speculation is doomed to failure and
inconclusive. We do know, however, that the nexus between the state
bureaucratic machinery, local middleman and foreign capital is inti-
mate and reciprocal and characterized by the "interchange of roles"
among actors which see class interest as the cementing bond in the
relationship.
Although it has been argued that a "redistribution" of the
national wealth remains one major force driving the wheels of indi-
genization program, the truth remains that a preponderant proportion
of the Nigerian populace remains desolately poor. But for the
wealthier middle and upper class, indigenization meant access, granted
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and supported by the government, to easy wealth.
Nigerianization of the national economy created a new cadre 0f
wealthy
.. Lagos mi !
!
ionaires „ whQ owe^ ^^ ^ ^
paternalistic disposition of the federal military government and, of
course, to the easy flow of cheap money made largely possible by the
sale of the nation's ample oil reserves.
Thus Nigerianization became a major theme of a political
ruling class which sought to increase its wealth through commerce,
links with foreign capital and the progressive exploitation of the
urban and peasant population. The political class represents the
"fusion of elites" which form a critical component in the Nigerianiza-
tion struggle and which has, through this process, coalesced into an
identifiable entity. This critical component of dominant-class forma-
tion was, in fact, necessary for the comprehensive articulation of the
premises on which indigenization exercises came eventually to rest.
Indeed, without the fusion or the formation of this dominant class-
a group made up of diverse spectrum of elites which included wealthy
businessmen, senior and high level politicians, prominent and powerful
traditional rulers, the politics of transformation represented con-
cretely by several programs including indigenization, would not have
taken off. As the process unfolded, elites became the main bene-
ficiaries, and a remarkable outgrowth of this class formation became
evident— the consolidation of a vision of the ruling political class,
supported by previously antagonistic, competing interests. In this
case, dominant-class formation became a consequence of the exercise of
power by those who control the various nnHH«iui political and economic organiz-
zations.
Paradoxically, the losers in the indigenization game were
largely the poor, lower classes of the society who were left out of
the exercise because they either do not possess the ability to be
participants, or simply their rights as citizens were usurped by the
more powerful, dominant class. For example, access to the banks
which provided low interest loans to many thousands of middle-class
Nigerians, were virtually closed to the poor who were considered
largely a credit risk. Bank credit mostly depended on personal con-
tacts and prestige and the middle class were at an advantageous
position. Through the purchase of shares made only possible by the
decrees, they procured a guaranteed income and substantial finance
assets with negligible risks and efforts. Although efforts were made
by the Capital issues Commission to keep the prices of shares on offer
as low as possible-in order to maximize the number of Nigerians able
to participate— those who participated gained substantially because
stock prices quickly moved to a higher level after the exercise. 33
Thus indigenization of the economy meant very little to those who
cannot participate and, as Sayre P. Schatz remarks, "... indigeniza-
tion provided a windfall for a sprinkling of fortunate Nigerians." 34
It is only logical to argue that eventually the poor masses
of Nigeria will pay for the benefits and costs of indigenization--an
exercise which mostly eluded them. As Nigeria travels through the
path of dependent capitalist development, a price will be paid, and
benefits enjoyed. But progress will be achieved at the risk of inequality
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which may in fact be a product of increasing exploitation at an
earlier stage in dependent development. The key factor in defining
the level of inequality will, therefore, be the level of dependence.
(Vengroff, 1 977
)
35
So far, I. have argued that the unanticipated casualty of
ionization exercises are the poor, lower strata of the Nigerian
society. Certainly, this outcome was never envisioned by the govern-
ment whose intention and goals remain those of indigenous control of
the economy. "The immediate consequences of indigenization exer-
cises," writes Richard Joseph, "are discernible" and visible.
For the multinational companies it has meant theirdomestication and legitimization within Nigerian
society. The holdings of their local shareholdershave given these companies greater security in their
operations without the concomitant danger of lessened
control over their operations, or challenge to the earn-ings of their preference shareholders abroad. For the
state
_ it has meant the temporary satisfaction of theyearnings for economic sovereignty, but without in
actual practice conferring on it much more of an
influence oyer these companies that it can exercise via
the available fiscal instruments or direct government
participation. (Teriba, 1975; Joseph, 1978). 36
Coddling the multinational companies by the state machinery
and local capitalist interests meant that foreign capital was secure
or at least shielded from threats of nationalization. It meant also
an advance signal to foreign capital to further penetrate the economy
through a network of "middlemen" and through the forging of alliances
based on interests. It meant exploitation, subordination, dependent
development, and feverish capitalism. It meant, in the final run, that
the government's policies have been as Biersteker apparently put it,
"neutralized." Neutralization, however, in my opinion, does not cap-
ture the fundamental dynamism of the indigenization process. Neutral-
ization implies ineffectiveness and if anything, exercises have been
on the whole effective. Arguments could be raised, however, on the
long run effect on the dependent nature of the economy and on whether
Nigeria won the battle in the short run, but slated to lose the war
in the long run. The issue at stake is whether government's policy
of control of economy and redistribution of benefits has actually
been realized through the process of indigenization. This is a highly
difficult and controversial question. It has not been at all made
clear whether the government intended indigenization as a means of
reasserting economic control and sovereignty over her economy, or
whether it is meant as a means of distributive justice. Professor
G. 0. Mwankwo takes the later position by arguing that:
It is difficult to see how indigenization can achieve
government's objectives of egal i tarianism. The oppor-
tunities go mostly to "those who have arrived" - the
established indigenous businessmen who are being'courted
by foreigners who want to team up with them in order to
comply with the requirements of the Decree and senior
public servants and other executives wio have the neces-
sary "contacts. "3/
The former position probably is defended by the local capitalist
elites who use the state to further their interests, but who also
form tight bonds with foreign capital. As suggested earlier, the
nature of this alliance is yet not known. Is the relationship
dialectical? antagonistic? mutual cooperation? The answer to these
questions is not easy. Further research has to be done based on the
evolving structure of this alliance. But at the moment, in the
history of this triple alliance, it is necessary to state that re-
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lationship between the actors has been one of mutual cooperation
based, of course, on the coalescence of interest. Furthermore, it is
necessary also to state that the several roles played by the actors
have not been properly defined and have not, from experience, been
solidified and established. However, there is growing concern that
this alliance may not, in the long run, render productive benefit to
the nation.
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The above passage was taken to buttress the argument that
Nigerian society need not systematically and wholesomely tread the
path of western civilization and "development." The notion and view
that the nation should, has been celebrated among highly informed
circles and among those who are less informed. The issue is not
whether the country should "develop;" rather the issue is the nature
of development, including its advantages and disadvantages to the
society. Furthermore, questions of development strategy has suffered
from the myopic treatment it receives from policy-makers, who on most
occasions have excluded the possibilities of alternative arrangements
or strategies, based largely on their vision of historical forms which
tend toward the aberration of concrete experience of a situation, and
of historical possibilities which is a degenerate reflection of the
latter.
In this chapter, I shall dwell not on development issues, but
on its impact on Nigerian culture 1 by the western "development"
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approach which the country adopts at great costs to its people and
to the resources of the nation in general. However, attempt will
be made at making a distinction between what is called "moderniza-
tion" and development because these two concepts or terms have been
misused and partly understood largely by those who make frequent use
of them. In addition, I analyze the pervasive trend and impact of
American cultural values on the Nigerian society-a process I term
"from Nigerianization to Americanization" and argue that the desire
to mimic Americans on the things they do and why they are done, only
contribute seriously to the degeneration, progressive decadence and
decay of the indigenous Nigerian way of life. This argument is not
offered, of course, as a refutation of the inevitable impact of
historical progress on the society, rather, it seeks to expose the
folly of mimicing an alien civilization whose historical experiences
are concretely different from ours, and whose material foundations for
progress and "civilization" are inherently asymmetric and superior to
ours
Althouth the two systems profess the same ideological and
"philosophic intentions," there are tremendous underlying doctrinal
and resource differences. The difference is not to be found in the
logic of doctrinaire formulation, but between doctrines "which live
their day and those which never live at all" or which live on a more
appropriate scale and magnitude. In each case, a sense of logical
proportion dictates policy and judgment and the necessity for choice.
A deviation from the imperative necessity for choice in formu-
lating and guiding a society's cultural values and "freedom" results
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in risking and mortgaging that society's future and subjecting it to
the peri is of destruction and decadence for which history has ample
examples.
There is no doubt that a society progressively and systematic-
ally loses capacity for cultural discipline and self-guidance when it
allows itself to become the victim of what Hans Morgenthau calls
"cultural imperialism." 2 By this, I mean the transnational ization of
broad cultural values held by identifiable societal actors across
national boundaries based on the "persuasiveness of a superior cul-
ture" whose promises, dynamism and institutional arrangements may be
unhealthy for all and fatal for many members of the society, yet
extravagantly beneficial to only a few. I mean also the structural
and cultural relation of a segment of the society's few elites whose
privilege and wealth derive from the dependent nature and the external
linkages of the domestic economy. In either case, "independence"
is compromised and society can be victim to external and internal
interest group manipulations.
Hardly more than two decades ago when nationalists proclaimed
Nigeria an independent nation, the nation's confidence in her ability
to remain so has fallen to a low ebb. Despite the rapid economic and
social "development" in the decades following independence, it dawned
on Nigerian society that the cost of this progress was a subtle form
of dependence on external forces which is more sinister, systematically
exploitative and manipulative than formal colonialism which despite
its ills, displayed some form of responsibility. The new form of
imperialism dampens nationalist urge for agitation and self-conscious-
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ness because "penetrated" elements of the society-the elites have
been effectively and thoroughly coopted and assimilated into the
values of this supposedly "superior" culture. These national elites
in turn expend enormous efforts at propagating this newly embraced
culture down vertically to the society's grassroots with a pretense
of bringing the good life closer to them, but inwardly, the "truth-
has been that elites consciously and forcefully seek legitimacy and
justification of this new culture based on their ability to convince
grassroot society that the new culture is superior to the traditional
way of life. Initial reaction to this new ideology has been indeed
comforting to the elites who see in their cultural crusade a means of
protecting their chosen way of life with a concomitant appeasement of
the grassroot society through stratified inequality.
The emergence of the new culture has planted a deadly disease
in the social fabric of the nation and has drastically eroded confi-
dence in large segments of the Nigerian society to mold and control
their lifestyle in a manner commensurate with the prevailing situation
within the society. Although it may be argued that several "socie-
ties" exist within the framework of Nigerian nationalism, it is
equally arguable, on the affirmative, that the pervasive impact of
this new culture has permeated the very foundations of these societies
The argument is not that cultural diffusion and what emerges is not
beneficial or detrimental to the growth of a dynamic culture; the
argument is that the process of diffusion carries with it hidden,
anathemic tendencies and elements which work to undermine and distort
the very bond which conveniently cement a society. In other words,
the new culture tends to break traditional values and strive to
^
impose historical forms of alien civilization without a concomitant
rationality. The first order breeds cultural anarchy and disinte-
gration, the second distortions and mere illusory hopes. Both order
exemplify the lack of confidence in a nation's ability to shape its
'
future, and lead to its eventual demise.
The demise of Nigeria's "First Republic," military rule,
sudden burst of unexpected oil wealth, all contributed to the disinte-
gration of the shaky social structure which cemented the newly inde-
pendent Nigeria decades ago. The nation has lost both the capacity
and the will to confront mounting difficulties which threaten to over-
whelm her. The same crisis of confidence grips the capitalist system
of which Nigeria is a member. In one sense, the political crisis of
Nigeria's capitalism therefore, reflects a general crisis of western
culture, which it mimics, and which reveals itself in a pervasive
despair and inability of understanding the course of its modern
history or of subjecting it to rational direction.
From Nigerianization to Americanization
It is currently fashionable among many Nigerians and especially
among informed "elite" circles to compare Nigeria to the United States,
and to hold up the United States system as the appropriate model for
national development. This analogy is inherently faulty and may be
dangerous to the aspirations, expectations and fulfillment of what-
ever hopes the people of Nigeria hold. Analogy of this sort fails
not only to take into careful consideration the differences in
historical experiences and development, but also the material and
technological as^etri.s and capabilities inherent in the two
nations. Comparisons of this sort inevitably would be unhealthy for
all and fatal to many, once it ceased to be a mere theory and was
adopted as a practical scheme of life by the group of personalities
effectively molding the future. 3
Such indeed is my opinion, for Nigeria does not in any way
represent a "microcosm" of the American experience. The fact is
that Nigeria is in its embryonic stage of development and does not in
any appreciable manner or extent display the uniquely "extensive
possibilities" characteristic of the American system. Extensive
possibilities may be characterized on the one hand by the constraints
placed on a nation's development by the logic of the limits to growth
and hence of limited hopes, and on the other hand by the wondrous
possibilities in material produced made possible only through human
ingenuity and technological innovations and breakthroughs.
Nigeria, in this period of development, is not characterized
by extensive possibility, but may in the future, with the attendant
problems of maintaining her civilization. Such has been the case of
civilizations which she blindly emulates. The evils and false hopes
of growth and civilization by comparison must be debunked and de-
nounced by the older and younger generation as well. A well-founded
civilization must be able to draw from the stock of indigenous
philosophical foundations and material resources which should serve
the "expression of its own and only its own time." Any strategy
deviating from this general principle breeds extravagance and mort-
gages the welfare of future generations, concurrently encouraging
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expansive conization. Expansive civilization means 1mper1alism
^imperialism is ..civ11i2ation adulterated," and in this
"phenomenal ,0rm the destiny of the West is now irrevocably set."
In this stage of Nigeria's growth, emulating Western civiliza-
tion wil! inevitably force her into expansive civilization which is
hl9My inc« b'* "1th her political and ideological philosophy,
and the role she has cautionsly but delicately carved out to play in
Africa. The younger generation hopefully would denounce any strategy
aimed at expansive imperialistic growth, no matter how compelling and
attractive. They must formulate ideas and cultivate values which
negate expansive civilization and which will form the foundations for
a civilization inwardly sustaining. By adopting this strategy, the
youth may not lose much but have tremendous advantages over shaping
their future and that of the nation. The conviction that the world
abounds with unlimited resources and hence unlimited possibilities
and hopes should be discouraged. The convictions of the unlimited
possibilities open to man in his environment are fundamentally of
Western origin and should not be taken seriously in those other areas
of the globe where possibilities are limited and where hope is factor
of limited possibilities.
However, the doctrine of limited possibilities may suffer at
the hands of a people who systematically are burying the most precious
and aesthetic elements of their cultural heritage. A closer study
and scrutiny of the system indicates that Nigerian capitalism has
evolved a new political ideology—the ethics of consumption and
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ostentation which absolves individuals of .oral responsibility and
treats the, as benefactors of historical progress. This new ideology
based on staunch faith in capitalism, and supposedly internally re-
warding, has revived dependence on external forces under the guise of
transnational ization.
The Nigerian man has fallen victim to cultural diffusion which
has its primary origin in the United States. An appreciable segment
of the population has, through transnational ization, been converted
from the economic man based on traditional value and precedents to
the psychological man~»the final product of bourgeoisie individual-
ism." In the process, he graduates into the narcissistic man in a
narcissistic society, eager to satisfy his inner psychological demands
through pseudo-economic acquisitions. Christopher Lasch, referring
to the American society which the Nigerian man so emulates, writes
. • .
he is acquisitive in the sense that his cravings
have no limits, he does not accumulate goods and provisions
against the future, in the manner of the acquisitive indi-
vidualist of the nineteenth century political economy, but
demands immediate gratification and lives in a state of
restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire. 4
And so is the Nigerian man responding to the sudden infusion of oil
wealth in the national economy, accumulates wealth not as a hedge
against an uncertain, predatory future, but as a means of satisfying
the psychological demands made by a narcissistic society. He is
constantly reminded of the painful outcome of failure, of poverty, and
the prestige and recognition that comes with the accumulation of
wealth. He is constantly forced to display such wealth with the
assumption that it promotes ones standing in the community despite the
Possibility that such wealth may be ill-gotten. The narcissistic
society, of which Nigeria is a good example, does not ask probing
"
questions on the origin of wealth; what matters above all, is its
presence and the power that goes with it.
Lasch describes such society as one
. . .
that gives increasing prominence and encouragementto narcissistic traits-cultural devaluation of the Sast
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This observation is, of course, true of the Nigerian man who
has repeatedly rejected the very foundations on which his cultural
values are based for an alien culture essentially externally culti-
vated. In the process, he underestimates the value of his worth and
elevates those of other cultures. The Nigerian man has enormous
confidence in things external to him, he grossly distrusts his fellow
Nigerian and downplays his abilities for meaningful internally
generated progress, he loves foreign-made goods because "foreign is
better" and extolls the virtues of "americanization. " In this path of
pseudo-consciousness, the Nigerian man is doomed to failure and des-
truction. He resents the past and equates progress with the future.
As Lasch correctly observes,
Having trivialized the past by equating it with out-
moded styles of consumption, discarded fashions and
attitudes, people today resent anyone who draws on
the past in serious discussions of contemporary
conditions or attempts to use the past as a standard
by which to judge the present. 6
The Nigerian man believes that the future belongs to those who most
seriously and arduously follow the American footsteps. Far from
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realizing the fundamental historical differences, and far from
judging critically the utility of such a possibility and peril it
offers, policy-makers consciously force Nigeria's future through the
path of arrested development which, when spatially and sporadically
achieved, was at great human, economic and political cost to the
nation. The immediate concern is to steer the country away from
traditional, stagnating values into one of "modernization" and
development. With varying degrees of interpretation, modernization
and development represent the basic premise for the drive of national
redemption, which, as I have earlier indicated, constitutes a major
ingredient for the politics of transformation. On several occasions,
this great transformation has floundered through misinterpretations,
through equating development and modernization and on the whole,
through the misplacement of priorities.
Rapid industrialization and "modernization" are the two ele-
ments of rationalization advanced by those policy-makers who would
wish Nigeria catapulted into a modern day America. Caught in the
"industrial dilemma" of having to rely extensively on external
dependence on the importation of intermediary goods to feed her
industries, and having to produce them expensively domestically when
this is possible, efforts at concretely formulating useful strategies
for the growth and development of other sectoral economic activities
are either underutilized or simply neglected. The inevitable result
is the sectoral suboptimi zation of several linkages in the economy.
For example, agriculture which is the "mainstay of the economy" was
virtually ignored in preference to rapid industrialization. "Per-
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formance of the export crops" says the World Bank, "was particularly
disappointing.'^ It was particularly disappointing the^ ^
apart from the oil revenues which account for roughly 90 percent of
Nigeria's foreign exchange, the export of crops remains the only
means through which the nation can obtain hard currency. Moreover,
Nigeria which once was able to feed her ever-increasing population
now depends on large consignments of food importation to satisfy her
needs. As Richard Joseph observes, the country which was once the
world's largest producer of palm oil and groundnuts must now import
these commodities to satisfy its domestic needs. 8
Clearly the issue or problem facing Nigeria today is one of
balancing her ambitious "accelerated industrial development" with the
demands of other sectoral economic activity without jeopardizing the
health of other equally pressing and essential economic activities.
In the final analysis, one important question stands out-are
Nigerians not unwisely arresting and accelerating their development?
Is it not prudent to carefully stagger development plans and strategy,
and avoid the perils and the unnecessary effects of dependent develop-
ment? A clearly defined government policy and objectives would not
only visualize a continued and expanding role for foreign enterprise
as a complement to domestic capital, but would also ensure that the
productive resources of the economy are largely exploited for the
economy's advantages.
Quite apart from the clarification of government policy and
objectives toward the "complementary role" of foreign capital in the
process, of industrialization, the need arises for policy-makers to
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delineate and differentiate between the processes of industrialization
and modernization- two key development concepts never before fully
analyzed and understood. The myth of American life based on moderni-
zation and fuelled by extensive industrialization must not be
allowed to infuse 'transcendent meaning into the lives of men. Neither
should it offer messianic illusion to a people whose historical exper-
ience and material base seem highly constraining. Peter L. Berger
warns that "people hovering on the edge of despair are always open to
messianic myths" based on industrialization and modernization which
in themselves are objects of exploitation and oppression and can de-
prive the individual of the security which, however harsh they may
have been, traditional institution provided for him.
In other words, there is a price to be paid by societies aspir-
ing to modernity and industry, and "this new freedom is purchased at
a high price, and again "with varying degrees of brutality, physical
violence and exploitation, continue today as stark realities in some
parts of the Third World now undergoing 'the great transformation'." 9
It is indeed arguable that the desire for rapid transformation may
exacerbate and not reduce inequal ity, exploitation and dependent
development among nations in the international system. Advanced indus-
trial nations have in fact engaged in cultural imperialism because it
"softens up the enemy," and prepares the way for economic penetration.
Secondly, by extolling the virtues of their "superior culture" aimed
at conquering the minds of men, advanced industrial nations capture
and entrap the less developed nations in a vicious circle of dependent
development.. If that is the case, it is necessary to ask whether
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arrested dependent development is indeed the most appropriate route
to development. A nation could with the aid of foreign capital
industrialize rapidly as Brazil did some two decades ago and find
itself saddled with mounting foreign debts which will eventually make
a mockery of development. Nigeria cannot afford the luxury and
penalty of this approach. In the final analysis, what matters is
the rate of industrialization pursued by a society and how this
process affects and impacts on other sectoral economic activity and,
of course, how industrialization justifies the need for modernization
It would be argued then that industrialization and modernization are
associated processes which tend to overlap, 10 and that the promises
of modernization may be fulfilled depending on rapid industrializa-
tion which may be altogether impossible or extremely difficult, given
the lack of capital, resources, and the required attitudes and skills
in the society. Foreign capital, especially the multinational corpor
ation, usually fills this vacuum for purposes of trade and of course
profit. Transnational ization of the culture, of which the multi-
nationals are main agents, not only seeks to transform the social
culture of Nigerians, but also has given the traditional pattern of
political discourse and activity a whole new interpretation.
Politics as Spectacle
The demise of what Nigerians call the First Republic (1960-
1966) and the emergence of the "Second Republic" (1979-1983) ushered
in an era of degradation and degeneration of the traditional form of
politics which fundamentally stresses nationalism and independence.
Today's politics and the manner in which it is conducted emphasizes
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transnational ism and dependence.
The First Republic strove to cultivate the develops of
polities seen as a condition of other, more substantive types of
development. 11 This remarkable effort failed due to several systemic
reasons. In fact, the country contained several elements of contra-
diction which eventually sowed the seeds for the weakening and
destruction of the First Republic. The first of these contradictions
revealed itself in the division of Nigeria into three regions re-
flecting the strongholds of each of the largest ethnic groups-the
Hausa in the North, the Igbo in the East and the Yoruba in the West-
while the Colonial government preached one Nigeria. Divisions such
as these intensified tribal loyalty and competition. Ekwueme Okoli
writes
. . .
sectional interest including regional particularism
tends to grow in intensity, not because of any absolute import
attributed to the tie itself, but because of the existence
of competing loyalties of the same general order without
the moderating influence of the superordinate loyalty to an
all-embracing national entity. In Nigeria, the centre neverhad a chance to develop this superordinate loyalty. From
1947 to 1960, while the regions were growing in power and
influence, no action was taken to create a central power
base independent of the regions. This situation arose at
this time because the centre was tightly controlled by the
British Colonial Authority. Its power and legitimacy de-
pended on the authority of the imperial government.^
The Westminster or parliamentary form of government which the
British imposed on Nigeria was never meant to work out harmoniously;
it was as Carl J. Friedrich suggested a mere "gadget" and "ensemble"
which never sought to take into serious consideration the multi-
tribal and ethnic diversities which bedevil the nation. He writes
U2
• • •
the hope that one can employ it [federalism!
merely as a gadget, a mechanism for re olvinq aroLantagonism and conflict, as in Nigeria and elsewhereis doomed at the outset. 13 ,
Echoing this observation, Sam Ikoku argues that
. . .
not long after the granting of independence theinternational contradictions of the political svstPmLqueathed by the British began to work them v f ^The burning issues were self-determination for the ethnicminorities, the unusual federal structure, etc. 14
Therefore, systemic organization of institutional political
structures which the British left behind was contradictory in toto,
and was never established to provide meaningful approach to solving
the nation's problems in terms of the development of politics.
Concomitant with the contradictory politics of British colonial
legacy was a more sinister, tribally based political development-the
emergence, within the larger tribes, of the cult of personality, the
messianic myth cultivated by prominent nationalist leaders (who
nonetheless have strong tribal backing and followers) and celebrated
passionately by the tribes. The inevitable result was the substitu-
tion of tribal politics for national politics and the consequent
degradation of national politics. As tribal leaders seek support and
legitimacy mostly in their various regions, politics degenerates into
a spectacle where personalities and how they perform displace the
necessity to debate on the issues. In the rush to shed his tribal
garb, the politician announces with characteristic confidence that
he is "detribal ized" while inwardly maintaining tribal sympathies.
Detribalization therefore becomes the vehicle for propagating his
political ambition, and thus
the Arffittt! orv^? 1 to
self-assertion came. Hi's rlaht tn Z n"lonal1 st
leadership „as reinforced b? he hy othes?^ „was shorn of ethnic reflexes eas?l5 »m! f at he
-articulate desires of
The major reasons for the failure of the development of poli-
tics in the First Republic has been made clear. The military regimes
of the late General Aguiyi Ironsi and later of Genera, Gowon sought
to "correct" the "excesses" of the civilian regime. One major advan-
tage of this interim military rule was that Nigeria bought time out
to reexamine and reassess its political history and ultimately its
future and destiny. The military regime and the "revolution" cleared
the national conscience of the political aberration which has over
the years tended to cloud the judgment of Nigerian politicians. The
extent of this clarification and purge is not clear. However, it
was the "beginnings of a national revolution"-a revolution of the
conscience, hopes, aspirations and visions of the politicians and
people of Nigeria. In his "presidential address" to the Nigerian
Economic Society in 1973 entitled "The Nigerian Revolution, 1966-
1976," Mr. A. A. Ayida contends that the military regime ushered in
the "beginnings of a national revolution" but that the revolution was
without a "vanguard" comprising of a "body of highly dedicated men
and women with a clearly defined national purpose and a sense of
1
mission.
"
The revolution which Mr. Ayida eloquently talks of contains
a prognostic allusion of the need for the development of politics.
The lack of a clear necessity for the development of the political
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thought and processes in Nigeria as well as other African countries
has confused the placement of emphasis, in most cases, on either
the politics of development and the development of politics. It is
my contention that developing the latter would remove the severe
constraints and conflict which presently characterize much of the
African political history.
Herbert J. Spiro writes
AfVc
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rS 9enera11 ^ P la" stronger emphasis uponpolitical than upon economic development and that many
of them have professed a belief in and a commitment tothe primacy of politics. 17
This attitude toward the primacy of politics by Black African leaders
is an anachronism of history. Today, the emphasis is placed
unwisely on the politics of development which negates the wisdom of
its earlier member Kwame Nkrumah. The late Nkrumah has preached,
"Seek ye first the political kingdom: and all else shall be added
unto thee." Does Nkrumah mean increased political participation and
social mobilization, or "the generation of a greater volume of issues
for politics" and the conscientious treatment of these issues in a
clearly defined and constituted political forum? But what does
Nkrumah really mean? "The forging and popularizing of new goals,"
or rather, stagnating in old political myths and processes? Herbert J
Spiro asks, which is a better index of political development
. . .
the stability and consensus of indifference and stag-
nation, or the fluidity and discussions of ferment and of
the recognition of new possibilities for political action?
Each of these finds its advocates as an index of political
development J 8
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As a response to the needs of political development, the
Nigerian people have elected to undergo the process of the politics
of transformation, one that takes into careful considerations the
lessons and experiences of the defunct First Republic. The First
Republic was a political failure and in 1979, Nigeria adopted the
American system of Presidential government instead. This choice was
made with "characteristic pragmatism;" 19 however, it promises to
correct, as the First Republic did not, the political "excesses"
which threw the country into chaos and instability. Despite the
shortcomings of the Presidential system of government
-a system which
on the whole remains largely incomprehensible to a large segment of
Nigerian politicians and populace, it should be made clear that this
system of government offers Nigeria a chance for peace, stability
and cooperation among the various otherwise conflicting ethnic
interests. The creation of states was a timely advantage to this
system of government and served to break up regional identification
and loyalty which contributed largely to the demise of the First
Republic since it was assumed that the "language of conflict had been
cast predominantly in regional terms." Thus the abolition of the
four regions in 1966 and the creation of states instead is probably
2fi
i rreversibl e.
Although the creation of states and the subsequent adoption
of the Presidential system of government represents a remarkable
achievement in the development of Nigerian politics, it created, as
did the First Republic, a disturbing spectre— the theaterization of
politics. The Presidential system of government seems to give rise
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among Nigerian politicians to the overwhelming desire to sell them-
selves rather than address the pressing national issues for which
the country is looking forward. Politics became a spectacle-an
extravagant public display of ill-gotten wealth-and voters were some-
how convinced that the candidate with the largest display of wealth is
the "right" candidate. In the process, politics inevitably degener-
ates into a spectacle and politicians adopt pseudo-sel f-awareness
because the political game is transformed and the stakes much higher.
The rhetoric of nation-building and nationhood gives way to that of
acquisition of wealth and politicians become distinguished not on the
basis of official performance, but rather on their ability to mani-
pulate public opinion and thus win their confidence.
The quality of the political process and the productivity of
politics declines reflecting the inability of the voters to identify
and present pressing issues, including susceptibility to the nar-
cissistic wishes of the politicians. The enslavement of the elector-
ate has led to several outbursts from concerned citizens. Writing
on the two decades Nigeria "spent as goalless, aimless" nation, the
editors of Radiance Magazine accuses the nation of drift, complacency
_and decay. It also accuses its leaders of doing "incalculable
damage" to the nation because "everyone, the executives, the business-
men, the intellectuals, the 'religious' men, each wants to make a
fortune for himself from his responsibility to the nation." 21 Moral
decay in the nation's political and social institutions reflects an
inner, decadent force endemic within the Nigerian people which has
roots in the culture of narcissism. Christopher Lasch charges that a
347narcissistic society "worships celebrity
. \ . and subst1tutes
spectacle for the older foms of theater which encouraged identifica-
tion and emulation" as an extension of one's self. 22 Ni gerian
politicians unwisely exploit this feature of the Nigerian character
and treat it as a means to achieving ambitions by incorporating it
within their strategic calculations. Lasch argues
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So it is with Nigerian politicians who in the main lack the necessary
and adequate intellectual capabilities to grasp effectively and
master the intricacies of the new system which they so sheepishly
emulate. Credibility, as a result, is thus measured in terms of
prestige and the uncanny ability to convince the voters of the can-
didate's worth and sincerity.
The conduct of politics as spectacle, as a feverish game for
mass consumption, necessarily distracts politicians from real issues
and in place of selfless service to the nation, breeds corruption.
Corruption
Political drama in Nigeria will not be complete unless corrup-
tion is assigned a place; this place is by design and by accident con-
spicuous. Corruption is not a peculiar phenomenon attributable only
to Nigeria. Developed as well as developing nations suffer from this
national malaise. However, I am concerned with corruption as it is
in Nigeria, its pervasive, corrosive impact on the social fabric and
how this social evil threatens the development of politics, the
politics of development and the productivity of politics.
^
Much has been written and voiced against corruption in the
Nigerian press, but never on their impact in terms of three key con-
cepts listed above.
I discussed earlier the development of politics in the First
Republic and why it failed and the subsequent emergence of the
Second Republic. The Second Republic is precariously based on a
fragile foundation in that systemic and institutional arrangements,
although based on the twin doctrines of "checks and balances" and
"separation of powers," do not augur well with the Nigerian version
of the Presidential system. Dr. Onwumere notes that "American
political parties are weak in terms of controlling
the affairs of congressmen unlike Nigerian parties
which tend to strongly control the political behaviour oftheir legislators. 24
There is a strong tendency among Nigerian political scientists as well
as several other branches of academia to describe Nigerian parties
as corrupt and striving to protect the interests of the parties at
the expense of the interests of the nation. There is also the
critical appraisal that Nigerian political parties are not fully
matured in the dynamics of the newly adopted political system and
hence are apt to engage in conflicting relationships with each other.
These observations are basically true and do not promote a sincere
atmosphere for political discourse and interaction. When they do,
it is not a confirmation of political maturity, but the fulfillment
of the dictates of a system to which the parties and electorate have
individually pledged allegiance. Thus essentially politics is seen
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not as the management of allocation of resources or the productivity
of politics, but as a struggle for political hegemony and dominance
of the State which largely represents the instrument with which
economic and political largesse is wastefully distributed to party
faithfuls. The State and its machinery, therefore, functions more
as a reluctant agent of wealth distribution and not as its develop-
merit or creation.
Conceptualization is further complicated by the fact that
parties are the embodiment of several interest groups and not their
competitors such as is the case with American political parties. 25
The party in power in Nigeria, 26 systematically doles out the spoils
of victory to its members commensurate with the efforts made towards
victory and the amount contributed. Thus contracts are awarded not
on proven capability to execute, but simply on the basis of party
membership. Monopoly of this means of resource allocation system-
ically excludes other rival parties and breeds inefficiency and cor-
ruption. It also introduces factionalism within the "ruling" party
because struggle for contract awards are usually the case; awards
of contract has never been settled peacefully and the loser can
threaten to break away from the party. Politicians who might other-
wise make good statesmen and legislators are lured into the "wrong"
party simply because of promises and anticipation of lucrative con-
tracts. Therefore, issues of national interest and concern are
ignored or suspended for the pursuit of sectional and personal gains.
Political behavior such as these make bad politics and bad politi-
cians, and invariably is detrimental to the body politic and the
are
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development of politics.
There is also the moral dimension to irreverent political
behavior on the part of Nigerian party system. Political parties
presumably organized in order to gain control of the government and
use the machinery of this great institution for serving the needs of
the people. In Nigeria, the perversion of this simple principle i:
widespread among the competing political parties. Parties do not
only struggle to gain control of government, they also do so to
trol the means of economic production which is, in most cases, a pre-
lude to dividing the spoils of government among party bulwarks.
Practices such as these are anathemic to democratic principle and
democratic order. It should be noted, as William C. Havard did, that
the existence of parties in a democratic society is more than a use-
ful contrivance, it is a sine qua non of democratic order. In fact,
this should be so because political parties are institutions through
which the promise of the democratic ideal can be fulfilled. 27 The
existence of political parties in themselves do not, to any appreciable
extent, elevate democratic ideals to the realm of grassroot practi-
cality. This observation is indeed pertinent to the Nigerian exper-
ience and works to ensure the entrenchment of monolithic interest
group party-politics. Nigerian political parties are characterized
by remarkable asymmetry in strength, vision, and capability and
asymmetry contributes to skewed performance in political processes
rendering as it were enormous advantages to the more powerful party.
Although as it is presently, no political party has demonstrated the
capacity to control both Houses of the National Assembly. So far, I
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have resisted identifying each party by name and the role each is
constrained to play in Nigerian politics. Cautious prudence dic-
tates this posture and this will remain so in the rest of the ana-
lysis.
Asy^etry in functional capabilities conferring undemocratic
advantages to a single party is unfair, dangerous and anathemic to
democratic principles and ideals. It may lead to the emergence of
authoritarian structures and tendencies, which will not augur well to
the visions which Nigerian citizens all share. This tendency toward
authoritarianism and totalitarianism is gradually creeping its way
into Nigerian politics and will not long manifest itself clearly.
The need for checks and balances in the political system clearly
exists. This is, of course, necessary to keep in constant check any
excessive ambition toward dominance or control by any one party.
The question is: How can this be done? I propose a two-party
28
system with roughly equal electoral strength which would provide
voters with "real" alternatives in polling booths, and which promises
to remove the monopoly of a single "party function" by a single poli-
tical party which on the whole does not satisfy the demand for
effective choice and alternative. The
-advantages and the effective-
ness of a two-party system over a multi-party system is an arrange-
ment which has gained the backing of several informed and competent
Nigerian citizens. The benefits of such an arrangement does not de-
rive from academic exercise. It is a lesson derived from experience.
Under the two-party system, it is easier to reach an accord
between two parties--an advantage which has so far eluded Nigerian
political parties. When accords are reached thai a >
^
d n
'
ey do not promise
stability and durabnity because each party is ready even without
voters' consent, to withdraw its agrees. Two-party syste. re-
duces voters'
"choice to a clear-cut either/or proposition, COm-
promises and reconciles a broad range of potential^ disruptive
groups into a relatively stable consensus." As Havard observers
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Responsibility and accountability is thus placed on the shoulders
of the majority party with the minor party in opposition. This sort
of arrangement would clearly assist in the development of politics
and the productivity of politics.
The politics of development suffers largely from the lack of
adequate and clear identification of actors and the lack of a con-
sistent, coherent articulation of what it is Nigerians are developing
and how this development is executed. The political class "as the
ruling elite" has demonstrated inability to coherently and consistently
formulate policies which are in the nation's interest. Consequently,
the civil service or the bureaucracy are thrust with enormous responsi-
bility of first playing a significant role in policy formulation, and
second, of executing them. Since the civil service is characterized
by the "existence of ethnic group consciousness" which may "frustrate
the evolution of national goals" due to conflicting ethnic loyalties
and bias, corruption is therefore a characteristic feature of the
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politics of development.
Professor Onitri and A. A. Ayida observe that when this
process is
or-grou^rwh^h'conrrollne^cMn^rroTr6" 15 ' the^
ffl:s.art1ci,laply where the poiuica" -t
The resultant conflict between the political ruling class and
the bureaucrats, each with interest to further and protect, breeds
and entrenches solidaristic and egoistic corruption. Although
"governmental corruption or improbity is found in all forms of
bureaucracy and all periods of political development," 31 it is only
necessary to point out that the success or failure of the politics
of development depends to a considerable extent on the probity of
the ruling class and, of course, also on the bureaucracy. It also de-
pends, as Susan Rose-Ackerman points out, on the "elimination of any
conflict of interest between law makers and bureaucrats. Since the
same individuals perform both tasks, they can act to maximize personal
gain." 32
Conflict of interest is exacerbated by the tendency of the
political ruling class to see the issues of national development as
primarily one of the intricacies of economic determinism. Hence
little or no role is played by them while concurrently abdicating
the formulation, articulation and implementation of this role to the
bureaucrats. Examples of this abdication of role can be found in
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recent state declarations and interventions in the economy such
the 1972 and 1977 indenization decrees, where the state apparatus
was given a decisive role to play in its formulation and implementa-
tion. The "neutralization" or
-failure" of the program, according
to Tom Biersteker, could be traced to the collaborative spirit and
arrangements between the bureaucrat on the one hand, local capital
and international finance capital on the other. 33
National "development" has solely been equated with economic
criteria and "modernity" and has eclipsed other primary criteria such
as the development of politics, introducing as a result confusion and
disarray of emphasis and priority. Joseph La Palombara points out
that
After the achievement of the overriding political goal of
national independence, little if any attention is paid to
the problem of political development; almost no systematic
articulation takes place regarding the possible character-
istics of political "modernity".
. . at best a certain
amount of lip service is paid the matter of political
development; at worst, the whole area is demagogically
treated or submerged to the prior needs of goals of
effecting economic development. 34
Under these conditions, bureaucratic corruption emerges and thrives
and a series of documentation on bureaucratic corruption in Nigeria
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abounds. When bureaucrats and the ruling political class who are
ostensibly responsible for formulating, articulating and effecting
national goals and aspirations are"corrupt, the inevitable result
is the underproduce vi ty of politics, aided and exacerbated by the
desire for ostentation.
The Cult of Ostentation and Stupefaction
"A Cornucopia of easily won oil revenues," writes Peter
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Kilby, "can also corrode the social fabric This was indeed the
case when "petro-naira" created a new generation of nouveau-riche
class whose only claim to wealth is the systematic looting and embez-
zlement of public treasury. The term nouveau riche is not limited
to the new breed of politicians, top civil servants and businessmen,
but also to a new generation of middle-class Nigerians including the
intellectuals and the professional class, whose aspirations range
from "owning properties" to enjoying the "American" way of life by
sometimes "being there." When the government promulgated its indi-
genization decrees, it offered the way to easy and unearned riches
by the upper and middle classes. Richard Joseph writes
f?! t
he aS
?
1
r?
nt Pro Pertied class desirous of bigger
cars, flashier clothes, more lavish parties and burial
celebrations, greater means to satisfy these desires have„been transferred to them at the behest of the government. 37
In most cases, the profit accruing from these businesses is not
plowed back into the business as a means of generating and sustaining
growth and development. Rather, it is spent on frivolous, lavish
and ostentatious consumption. Today, the "great urge of many Niger-
ians, from manual workers to senior civil servants and university
staff," laments Joseph, "is to inject themselves into a trading cir-
cuit, whether of cement, lace, or palm oil, and get their 'cut' of
38the action." Thus, in their bid to achieve quick success and
riches, relatively respectable professionals risk atrophising their
competence; this often has been the case. Manual workers in a
feverish struggle to measure up to the professionals and thus compete
effectively, don ill-fitting suits with oversized briefcases,
acquiring in the process the language of business "deals." The
^
bastardization of the business culture was an outgrowth of the oil
boo. which instilled in the Nigerian citizenry-poor and rich alike-
an inordinate ambition for massive acquisition, instant celebra-
tion and gratification, and on the whole, conspicuous comsumption.
The struggle for a piece of the action pervades the entire
social fabric from the bricklayer to the top civil servant, and from
the small businesswoman in the village market to captains of large
corporations. Kilby observes that
', ™;
the
.
temPtati °n to privatize the new wealth exercises
a not insignificant segment of the population. Politicians
^undr^l^jV- h°Pe *^ Pontage oTifi'
Although the struggle to "privatize" petro-naira by the various seg-
ments of the Nigerian populace has been carried on through sheer
hard work and efforts, other means have been actively sought-devious
and surreptitious in origin and with the active connivance of politi-
cians and those who control the state machinery.
The role of the politician has been one of the cult hero, a
messianic figure whose success depends on his ability to reach out
and touch the people; who would in turn pronounce him worthy of their
votes. He becomes a celebrity and invariably is forced to lead a
double life. Richard Sennett in The Fall of the Publi c Man_.(1977).
bemoans the dilemma of the public man--the age of civility became the
age of charisma, extroversion and false "intimacy." Politicians were
judged as personalities and acted accordingly. The traditional
vision of the pol i tician— the "cargo ship personality," the agent of
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earthly abundance and the precursor of change-once upheld and
cherished by voters, now degenerates into theatre and spectacle The
politician's ability to win votes and elections is thus transformed
into a factor of charisma, of prestige and of mesmerism. Voters,
therefore, are suddenly converted into victims of narcissism. And as
Lasch makes clear, "personal magnetism, a quality which supposedly
enabled a man to influence and dominate others, became the major
'
key to success." The politician and political process degenerates
into a form of spectacle and success, in the eyes of the politician,
has to be "ratified by publicity."
The politician, realizing his worth, is tied precariously to
how he presents himself and not necessarily the issues to the public. In the
attempts to "sell" his candidacy, he indulges in the mastery of
"interpersonal relations" and not the conscien ious mastery of the
issues. Thus, the "true" politician degenerates into a "confidence
man," the "master of impressions." As a matter of solving the prob-
lems which face society, the politics of spectacle has very little
to contribute and indeed has nothing in common to a prescribed solu-
tion. But in Nigerian politics, what really matters and what comes to
dominate the aspirations of most voters is to see a candidate in an
ostentatious display of wealth and power--qual i ties which are care-
fully calculated to manipulate and thus render neutral opposition
forces. This process goes to show how increasingly sophisticated
Nigerian politics are. The editors of Radiance , a Muslim magazine,
lament that "politics has been progressing towards sophistication
. . .
the perfection of trickery, manipulation of public mind and attitude
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to suit certain vested interests. 1,39
The vulgarization of Nigerian politics meant the distortions
of traditional values of life as manifested in the politics of
development; it also meant the accommodation of "vested interests" in
the form of alien demands of the diffusion of alien culture into
indigenous way of life. The process of cultural diffusion, it should
be pointed out, is not per se detrimental or anathemic to the growth
of a nation. What seems objectionable, however, is the frivolous,
"vulgarized," inimical impact this acculturation will bring. In
addition, the necessity for choice of more appropriate cultural attri-
butes and elements which are worth emulating, are institutionally
scuttled, and those which present inimical repercussions are con-
doned and even encouraged by those whose habits find refuge in
ostentatious living.
The politics of development conducted under pressure to ele-
vate the standard of living of the masses, saw an advantage in alli-
ance with foreign capital, especially the multinational corporations.
The alliance between the state machinery and the multinational cor-
poration forged a policy based on the ethic and culture of consumption
and suddenly it was understood that the worker might be useful to
the capitalist as a consumer; that he needed to be imbued with a
taste for higher things and lustful desires for the good things of
life. The multinational corporations have products and a way of life
to sell, and saw in the state machinery a demonstrated willingness
to act as a partner. Mass production of goods internally (where
possible) and the importation of luxury items became a strategy on
~rs were the pub,ic-p00r and rich a!l ke . l n the proceS5
.
culture of caption, not of productivity was born ^^
became students who yearn for enlightenment in the culture of con-
sumption. The virtues of consumption were extolled; if you do not
consume, you do not "have" it This attamn+ * •. T attempt to civilize the masses,
says Lasch, has now given rise to a cnr,-^y a society dominated by appearances
--the society of spectacle.
The provision of luxurious materials of life displace the
most essential and the television which is a recent transplant to
Nigeria and which has gained the attention and confidence of most
households, calls attention to these products by way of periodic
advertisements. It extolls the advantages of the American way of
life and promotes "consumption as a way of life." "When economic
necessity yields to the necessity for limitless economic development,"
writes Guy Debord, "the satisfaction of basic and generally recog-
nized human needs gives way to an uninterrupted fabrication of
pseudo-needs." 40 The use of video tapes, a luxurious commodity
whose operation is hardly understood by many consumers in Nigeria
becomes a status symbol which must be owned by an up-and-coming seg-
ment of the population. Thus every progress-oriented person desires
to own one, and the market is flooded with cheap and shoddy products
designed to fulfill this burning need. Businessmen who make endless
trips to "overs" (abroad) come home loaded with pornographic movies
and other assorted "goodies" because "it is what the people wanted"
and not a means of promoting useful and legitimate commerce. This
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-asure of value, declares the nation's
"Committee on Ethica!
Revolution," p.ovides all kinds of vices that dull numan perception
fill! the mind with lustful desires" and breeds "moral decay."
The politics of develops has educated the
.asses into "an
unappeasable appetite not only for goods but for new experiences
and personal fulfilment" which indeed is frivolous and unnecessary
for a healthy polity. It upholds consumption as a way of life and
substitutes the traditional values of hard work, thrift and delayed
gratification for the ethics of leisure and pleasure. Not only does
this new way of life dull the senses into stupefaction, it betrays
the promise of good future which the politics of development was
supposed to cultivate. This new culture transforms us into connois-
seurs of our own decadence by extending aristocratic habits to the
masses.
"The apparatus of mass promotion," writes Lasch, "attacks
ideologies based on the postponement of gratification;" it allies
itself with the desire for lavishness, ostentation and "popularity."
The apparatus of mass promotion dictates to one on how his life
should be run and in the process turns the victim into a zombie,
always ready to serve his master. The mass media, exemplified by all
forms of advertising and by the television, instructs you on how to
lead the "good life" and never made available the means to this end.
The object, not entirely free from the profit motive, "is to divert
people's attention from their problems, from the inequities of the
rul ing class.
"
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As politicians seek more public exposure and as the "pri-
vileged class" engage in spending sprees designed for theatrical
display and spectacle, a narcissistic trait emerges, reflecting the
poverty of the narcissist "inner life," furnishing in the process
"proof of that culture's bankruptcy." As a reflection of this bank-
ruptcy, people are driven to acquire wealth by all means; corruption
abounds and life is made "cheap." The talk of every city gets its
loaded share of sex, money and power; interpersonal relationships
degenerate into manipulative games where the end product is sexual
conquest. Traditional values which ought to provide a pool where
future directives could be drawn is devalued and in some cases re-
jected, implying deep-seated symptoms of cultural crisis which
afflict us. The will and the ability to cling to traditional values
in a rapidly "modernizing" world is rare indeed. Only the wise and
prudent prevail, and only those who learn from the past survive.
Thus the flight from our past would only worsen our cultural drift
and predicament. A judicious look into our past is not only neces-
sary, but therapeutic. It seems to me, then, that out of this turmoil
and confusion, we might produce a different kind of society, one
that is more complicated, more civilized and less dependent.
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Part IV
Conclusion
PART FOUR - CONCLUSION
POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION: AN OVERVI
The politics of transformation seeks to examine prevailing
ideologies by looking into the past "while going beyond mere survival
of that past" for the sole purpose of "creation of new forms and
modes" and the presentation of new demands based on the satisfaction
of the new psychological man of our times. Thus the politics of
transformation and its process is both psychological and historical;
very much a product of historical change and a matter of "sensibi 1 ity .
"
In Nigeria, the historical attempt to control its destiny by
coming to grips with those concrete issues which face her and which
threatens to overwhelm her, gave life and impetus to the politics of
transformation. The need for this type of politics arose partly out
of the demands made by academic intellectuals and those who run the
machinery of state, to the ruling political class who were unable to
coherently and consistently articulate programs and policies on which
the future of the nation depends. Furthermore, concrete lessons of
experience derived, first, from history, and second from global
international relations made it necessary that Nigeria transform her
position in the international system with the objective of mastering
this new position.
The politics of transformation took several forms and can be
understood within the framework of four fundamental systemic changes.
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These systemic changes include the indenization or
"Nigen'anizaJon"
of the national economy; the creation of new politics; one which seeks
and hopes to "correct" the political excesses of the First Republic,
by transcending the systemic difficulties and attitudes left behind
by the British colonial regime; Nigeria's entry into the Organizati
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); and finally, the transnational
i
tion and "modernization" of the society.
It is indeed difficult to measure whether indigenization
decrees of 1972 and alter 1977 designed to transfer the control of
the economy to indigenous enterprises has been a success or not. A
measure of success has been achieved, however, much in the direction
of control needs to be achieved. Although many fortunate Nigerians
now have a greater share in the growth of the economy, evidence
indicates that Enterprise Decrees as a legislative instrument have
been flexible, making it much too easy for foreign corporations to
circumvent. Of nearly one thousand enterprises affected, only about
one third fully complied by the middle of 1978.
Failures to comply fully can be traced to two major points:
firstly, there is what could be termed structural failures; while
the letter of the decree was in most cases adhered to, its spirit -
that of spread of ownership or control of formerly foreign owned
businesses - has not been. Ownership has in fact been concentrated
among a few capitalists. Secondly, there has been downright evasion
and "dishonesty" on the part of foreigners who own businesses. Those
foreigners include but are not limited to Lebanese, Syrians and some
Arabs.
The report of the Indenization Panel appointed to investigate
misdeeds of the decree found that the main devices used to circuit
its provisions included application for naturalization,
"fronting,"
interpretational problems of classification of enterprises, lack of
adequate enforcement procedures and frequent amendments providing
for exemptions on "flimsy grounds." It is hoped that the new military
government of General Buhari would close certain loopholes inherent
in Enterprises Decrees and study closely the new arrangements by
multinational corporations designed to keep the country in the path
of dependent growth and development.
This new arrangement is known as "international sub-contracting."
The term refers to a relationship whereby transnational corporations,
in order to supply their markets in advanced capitalist countries,
arrange to use Third World firms which they control to produce entire
products, components and services. With the failure of import-
substitution strategies of industrialization in the country, inter-
national sub-contracting has been gaining momentum. Since international
sub-contracting tends to produce those luxury goods and consumer durables
which only the bourgeoisie can afford, production tends to be
sector specific without any direct benefits to backward or forward
linkages within the economy. Moreover, such economic activity does not
promote the transfer of useful technology or upgrading of labor skills
needed for sustained economic growth and development. Thus Nigeria's
goal of diversified and self-generating industrialization had been
frustrated. Policy to correct these structural ills will depend
considerably on careful screening of transnational corporations and
their corporate activities, including the national will to lessen
372reliance on transnationa! corporations for nationa! develops and
industrialization.
It is necessary to recognize however that these corporations
can play important parts in the transfer of appropriate or choice
technology and skills, or as contractors and suppliers of needed goods
and services. Conflict of interest when marked, can be solved by
regulating the activities of transnational corporations through
screening of foreign investment and the inflow of technology proposals
on a case-by-case basis to the use of concerted policy instruments to
control and monitor the activities of such corporations. Developing
countries in turn should enact explicit legislation taking into
consideration the special characteristics of transnational corporations.
The process should be one of mutual adjustment.
We believe that the role of such corporations will continue
to be of great importance, either as a source of investment and
therefore of transfer of technology or services or a combination
of these functions. However, we point out that this could be done
with greater domestic participation and control and in some cases, a
greater degree of selectivity regarding the extent of foreign input.
Effective control, however, often continues to rest with foreign -
partners. Most developing countries would like this situation changed
and several policies and legislations are geared towards surrendering
control albeit through political means.
The achievement of these goals and objectives seem difficult
indeed especially in a nation bedevilled by multiplicity of
interest and ethnic groups. Thus, the politics of consensus was
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inevitable; the bureaucrats and the civil service providing the
necessary legitimacy and the framework on which the programs of
transformation may be concretely formulated and executed. The game of
consensus was primarily played by the Military government and top
level bureaucrats, who, at one point in the history of Nigeria, held
the key to Nigeria's demise or survival as a nation. This game was
Played remarkably well and peaceful and has formed the background on
which subsequent games are played.
Although the political basis for transformation was carefully
laid out and constructed, it should not be seen as a measure of success
on those essential programs and policies which are in general crucial
to the success of the need for transformation. It should be said however
that some policies have achieved some measure of satisfaction while
others have not.
The success or failure of those policies are better analyzed
if the state is understood to be the site of class interaction, and if
the role of the state is said to be one of major, selective inter-
vention in the nation's economic life. Thus state institutions,
and politices, are consciously and deliberately organized to reach out
and touch the civil society. The extent to which this is actually so
is indeed doubtful as pointed out earlier in this study. However, the
logic of state intervention should not (at least in theory) be
regarded as the promotion of the interests of a single class; rather
it should be seen as a deliberate attempt at resolving certain systemic
contradictions including those presented by economic and social forces.
Taken on the merits of each, certain policies and programs
which embodies the spirit of transformation, could be judged successful;
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for others, it is simply too early to call or determine. However, on
the whole, essential policies, given the right attitude and force,
stand a chance for tremendous success and achievement. For example,
indigenization decrees, which aim at transferring economic control to
the indigenes from foreigners, is promising, although several
strategies employed by some "penetrated" Nigerians and their foreign
counterparts to throw out the spirit if not the letter of these
policies are proving to have, according to Tom Biersteker, a
"neutralizing" effect. This judgment, in my opinion, is premature.
The fact of the matter is that roles played by various institutional
actors including those played by foreign interests, in the indigeniza-
tion process have not crystallized and have not been clearly understood,
But it should be said however that local capital in active connivance
with the state machinery are aiming to obtain a greater share of the
Nigerian economic pie from the multinational corporations who control
the major industrial processes in the country.
Concurrently, evidence points to the fact that an active
alliance exists between multinational corporations and segments of the
nation's bourgeoisie. This alliance is primarily one of convenience
enjoyed by both partners. On several occasions, the state apparatus
has been involved in this triple alliance, creating, unfortunately,
the impression of the existence of a cabalistic arrangement, whose sole
purpose is advancing particular interests. In this sort of game,
the average Nigerian is the loser. The results of this arrangement
on the indigenization decrees is hard, at the moment, to tell or even
predict with any degree of accuracy due to the evolving nature of
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systemic alliances. However, one thing is certain: Nigerian
entrepreneurs (at least most of them) are simply not interested in
controlling the economy; most want a quick, significant portion of the
fruits of the economy, they seem to be content to playing a secondary
role to foreign capital
- the exact opposite of what indigenization
policies dictate. On the whole, Nigerian businessmen and production
forces lack the necessary capital, the technology and managerial
expertise to effect the much celebrated industrialization process and
regime without the active participation of foreign agents, such as the
multinationals. These agents, in my opinion, have a long stay in
Nigeria.
The international oil industry is by no means shielded from
political demands made by producer-state governments. Demands of
political nature will, in my opinion continue to be made on trans-
national companies until specific goals envisioned by producer
governments individually or collectively, as in OPEC, is
accomplished.
Much has been written on OPEC; several theories and models
have been advanced in attempts to understand the organization's
behavior. Political organizations, such as OPEC, defy academic
modelling not so much because of its institutional complexities as
uncertainties behind its motives, goals and political aspirations.
We have concluded that OPEC is a cartel of a different sort, capable
of controlling the market but if it is to maintain its privileged
market position in the long run, it must either confront Non-OPEC
oil producers through placing market barriers, or come to terms with them.
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Theories aimed at understanding OPEC behavior within the frame-
work of international industry has not been very promising either
Games theories have been used extensively to understand problems of
this sort, but I do not think that game theory is relevant to
competitive behavior in the sense that it has been able to solve problems
of any consequence in the international oil market. However, game
theory is heuristically important in deepening our understanding and
its applicability in the affairs of global oil is of some theoretical
value.
Within global oil industry, significant and important changes
have taken place both in its structure and mode of operation. With
the emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
the traditional role played by international oil companies was
virtually transformed from one of total control of production and
pricing decisions to one of mere offtakers or contractors of oil.
Oil companies are in effect stripped of much of their negotiation
capabilities. The decline in the companies' control is evidence by
the decreasing share of world trade and production they handle.
International oil firms in the early 1970s accounted for nearly
ninety percent of the non-communist trade in crude worldwide; by
the close of the decade, this share of the market slipped to less
than fifty percent.
This reduced role of the oil companies in world trade has
been as a result of the increased importance of oil producing host
governments who now assume an increasingly important role (through
their state owned oil companies) in marketing crude, totally
excluding the transnational oil companies. Direct intergovernmental
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sales reached almost six million barrels per day in 1979. Policies
designed to exclude transnational oil companies from certain activities
in producing nations have mostly based on political considerations.
As such, this study has elaborately stated why a government-to-government
negotiation is desirable and inevitable in the global oil industry.
We believe that this method will introduce stability, order and mutual
satisfaction. It is in fact the sign of the times to come.
Such eventually may be the case in Nigeria's oil industry.
Although elements of independence such as the nation's oil corporation
(NNPC) are actively groomed to replace the activities of the foreign
multinational oil companies, a closer study indicates that NNPC has
a long ground to cover in order to achieve these goals. The odds are
that the services of the multinationals will still be needed, but
not as before, be it in the form of production-sharing contracts or
service contracts. Nigeria is not yet matured, as Brazil and Indonesia
found out in their cases, that the creation of elements of independence
do automatically abolish the crucial role played by multinationals
in the international oil industry. However, it is conceivable that
the major role presently played by these oil multinationals will in
time be downgraded with the emergence of government-to-government
approach in international oil negotiations. Nigeria will, undoubtedly,
favor this approach which will consolidate her position within OPEC.
And as a response to those who have repeatedly called for the with-
drawal of the nation from the ranks of OPEC, I say that doing so
would mean a deliberate, catastrophic mistake and I argue that
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Nigeria should not. A policy designed to achieve withdrawal would
only exacerbate the economic problems which today face the nation.
It would also attenuate the visions and hopes of those Nigerians
who see her greatness tied to the global transnationalization process.
A major economic and cultural crisis and catastrophe awaits
Nigeria if she does not systematically and judiciously attenuate the
grand visions she entertains of her future and exemplified in her
erratic policies of arrested economic development. Development
and "modernization" must be commensurate to the capabilities devoted
to such goals. Any policy which deviates carelessly from this
simple fact, courts dependency and dependence on foreign forces for
internal growth and development.
The flight from our past and the systematic degradation of
our cultural heritage, made thinkable and worthy by our overwhelming
urge and desire to be "Americanized," to fall victim to narcissism,
would only strengthen the transnational component of Nigerian
capitalism and would inevitably entrench the waning of our culture-
This would render us vulnerable to the wishes of external interests.
When we understand the problems facing us, the rest is easy, and thus
out of this turmoil, we might produce a different kind of society,
more complicated, saner, more civilized and less dependent.
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APPENDIX
Indigenization Decrees: Schedule and
Distribution of Enterprise Ownership
The Nigerian Enterprises Decree of 1972 and later revised
in 1977 was an "imaginative and necessary" legislation desianed
to ensure that the control of the economy is gruadually transferred
to Nigerians while accommodating judiciously the interests of
foreign forces of production. These decrees call for a new economic
order for Nigeria and a "new deal" for Nigerians.
Enterprises have been classified according to levels of
capital and technology intensive characteristics and on this
basis, "Nigerianization" exercises were implemented. Schedule I
enterprises which comprise low technology, low capital inputs
are to be wholly owned by Nigerians. Schedule II comprised
mostly of service industries such as banking and liaht manufacturing
should have not less that sixty percent indigenous equity interest:
and Schedule III embraces all other enterprises which do not fall
within Schedules I and II. Schedule III enterprises are to have
forty percent Nigerian ownership or equity (see Diagram).
' 1 1 VNEW SCHEDULE I (Enterprises to be whoihA
owned by Nlgerinr.sl
1. Cosmetics and perfumery manufacture.
2. Supermarkets and Departmental Stores
having a turnover of less than N2m. per
annum.
3. Distribution agencies excluding motor
vehicles, machinery and equipment and
spare-parts.
4. Estate Agency.
5. Furniture making.
6. Manufacture of suit-cases, brief-cases,
hand-bags, purses, wallets, portfolios and
shopping bags.
7. Passenger bus services of any kind.
8. Poultry farming.
9. Printing of stationery (when not associated
with printing of books),
10. Slaughtering, storage, distribution and pro-
cessing of meat.
1 1
.
Travel agencies.
12. Wholesale distribution (of local manufac-
tures and other locally produced goods).
13. Commercial Transportation (wet and dry.
cargo and fuel).
14. Rim Distribution (Including cinema films).
1 5. Manufacturers' Representatives.
16. Indenting.
17. Commision Agents.
PROPOSED SCHEDULE II
Enterprise* which for reasons of public
policy should be controllod by Nigerians in
equity and management terms. These
should be enterprises which, by their
nature, are of strategic importance to the
economy. In this connection, the Panes
recommends that Government sponsored
institutions and private Nigerian citizens
should have not laaa than 60% equity In-
terest In tha following areaa:
ADDITIONS TO EXISTING SCHEDULE II
1. Supermarkets and Departmental Stores
hiving a turnover of more than N2m. per
annum.
2. Banking—Commercial Merchant and
Development banking.
3. Insurance—all classes.
4. Mining and Quarrying. —
5. Basic Iron and Steel manufacture.
6. Cement manufacture.
7. Petro-Chemica! Feed-stock industries.
8. Fertilizer Production.
9. Pulp and Paper mills.
10. Plantation Sugar and Processing.
1 1 . Salt Refinery and Packaging.
12. Construction Industry
13. Plantation Agriculture for tree crops, grains
and other cash crops.
,
1 4. Textile Manufacturing industries.
1 5. Internal Air Transport (Schedule and Charter
Services).
1 6. Oil Milling and Crushing Industries.
17. Distribution and Servicing of motor vehicles,
machinery and equipment, tractors and
spare parts thereof.
18. Lighterage.
1 9. Wholesale distribution of'imported goods.
PROPOSED SCHEDULE III
All other enterprises not coming within
Schedules I or II above should have a mini-
mum Nigerian participation of 40%.
Tha second stage of tha indlgenisation
schema shall com* into effect not later than
December 31, 1978. This will give time for
the efficient execution of tha schema. Tha
Ministries of Justice and Industries era
directed to ensure that all legislation,
reorganisation and strengthening of the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board and
other preparatory work should be com-
pleted forthwith. <
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